CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND MR. DISTRICT JUDGE WARD.

Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1889 Session I, H-20

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1889. NEW ZEALAND.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND MR. DISTRICT JUDGE WARD.

Return to an Order of the House of Representatives dated 17th July, 1889. Ordered, " That copies of all correspondence between the Government and Mr. District Judge Ward relative to the case of Christie, a bankrupt, be laid before this House."—(Mr. R. H. J. Reeves.)

No. 1. Petition to His Excellency the Govbenob of New Zealand. The humble petition of us, the undersigned inhabitants, traders, and others, carrying on business or resident in Oamaru or the vicinity thereof, humbly showeth : — 1. One William Christie, of Oamaru, auctioneer, a bankrupt, was, at an examination held in the District Court of Timaru and Oamaru, being a local Court of Bankruptcy, holden at Oamaru on the Bth day of April, 1889, charged by the Colonial Investment and Agency Company of Now Zealand (Limited), under section 171 of " The Bankruptcy Act, 1883," that he, the said William Christie, had, with intent to defraud the said company, made or caused to be made delivery or transfer of the property of him, the said William Christie, between November, 1887, and May, 1888. 2. The said Court adjudged the said William Christie to be guilty of the said offence—that is to say, that he, the said William Christie, the bankrupt, did, on the 23rd day of May, 1888, with intent to defraud one of his creditors—to wit, the said Colonial Investment and Agency Company of New Zealand (Limited) —cause a promissory note, his property, for £234 17s. 1d.., made by the Southland Flour-mill Grain and Agency Company (Limited), to be delivered to the Messrs. Mackerras and Hazlett, of Dunedin, merchants—and adjudged the said William Christie to be imprisoned in the Oamaru Gaol for a term of four months, with hard labour. 3. We, the petitioners, after a careful perusal of the evidence taken at the said examination, and from our intimate knowledge of the said William Christie and his dealings, are satisfied that the said William Christie had no intent to defraud the said company, but acted, whether mistakenly or not, under a bond fide, and honest belief that he was justified in the course of action he adopted, and was within his legal rights. 4. The evidence taken at the said examination, which extended over four days, was very voluminous, but the substance of it, in so far as it related to the charge upon which the said order was made, was as follows : — 5. In August, 1884, the said William Christie commenced to do business with the said company, the nature of which was that the said company discounted bills of exchange and promissory notes accepted or made by the constituents of the said William Christie, and indorsed by him to the said company. 6. The said William Christie took in his own name securities over land, stock, grain, and wool, to secure payment of the said bills and other advances, and at the time of the discounting of these bills forwarded particulars to the company of these securities, which were in general held by his solicitors to the order of the company. 7. Owing to a sudden and extensive fall in the price of stock and in the yield of grain within twelve months after the commencement of this business, the securities became unrealisable, and the said William Christie was instructed by the manager of the company to carry them on as best he could, applying to the company for as little direct assistance as possible. 8. This was done by the said William Christie from August, 1884, until May, 1888, and the company's manager was aware, as he admitted on the said examination, that the said William Christie was managing the said securities as one business, keeping no trust account, but paying the whole of the proceeds of the securities when realised from time to time into his general account, and using the same for the general purposes of the said securities. 9. It was proved that, independently of his transactions with the said company, the said William Christie was doing a largo business, showing during the above period a gross profit of £16,000, while that derived from the company's business only amounted to about £2,000. 10. That out of his own business the said William Christie paid towards the nursing and carrying on of these securities a sum of between £6,000 and £7,000 over and above all advances made by the company or moneys realised out of the securities by him. I—H. 20.

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11. It was proved that during the period during which he was charged with transferring property with intent to defraud—namely, between Ist November, 1887, and 31st May, 1888 —the said William Christie received from the said company and out of the securities the sum of £15,500, and paid away either direct to the company or in nursing and carrying on the securities a sum of £15,700, thereby showing that more than the full amount received from the company was accounted for as having been paid to them or applied for their benefit. 12. The particular payment or delivery adjudged to be in fraud of the company in respect of which the order was made, was, according to the evidence, a bill received by the said William Christie in respect of certain grain alleged to have been held by him, as were the other securities, practically to the order of the company, but which was the produce of a farm jaf which he was mortgagee in possession. 13. The said William Christie alleged, upon the said examination, that he believed that, independently of any authority from the said company to deal with the securities, he had the right so to do, owing to the large amount of money which he had himself expended in nursing and carrying them on. 14. He further alleged that the account of Messrs. Mackerras and Hazlett, towards payment of which the said bill was delivered, was an account for bags required by him for the purpose of harvesting the grain covered by the securities claimed by the company. 15. Under these circumstances, and having regard more especially to the fact that £200 more than the total amount received from or on account of the company during the last five months of its business connection with the bankrupt was paid by him either to or on account of the company, and that during the whole period of his business connection with the company he paid away on their account from £6,000 to £7,000 more than he received from them, we are satisfied that in making the said payment in respect of which the said order was made the said bankrupt had no intent to defraud. That the said William Christie had no notice specifying the exact nature of the charges to be made against him, and his counsel therefore were acting under great difficulties, and were taken by surprise at the evidence given, and it has since the order was made been "ascertained that the wheat in respect of which the said promissory note was given did not form part of such securities, and if proper notice of the charge had been given, and counsel had not been taken by surprise, this could have been proved. We therefore humbly pray that your Excellency may be pleased to cause a pardon to be given to the said William Christie in respect of the foregoing. Henry Aitken, J.P., Shipping Agent, Oamaru, and 177 others.

No. 2. The Hon. Mr. Hislop to District Judge Waed. Sic, — Oamaru, 11th April, 1889. I have had forwarded to me for transmission to the Hon. the Minister of Justice a petition of which I enclose a copy. I telegraphed to the Premier stating that such petition was about to be sent, and suggesting that I should send you a copy, with a request that you would be good enough to give it your consideration, and to send your comments to the Minister of Justice by the first available mail. The Premier, who is acting in the absence of the Minister of Justice, approved this course, and I have therefore to request you to act accordingly. I have to ask that you will particularly report the evidence upon which you came to the conclusion that the intent which the bankrupt had in making the payment was to defraud the company, also your views as to what class of cases are meant to be covered by the subsection under which the conviction was made. Please also state the reasons which operated with you in refusing facilities for -an appeal. I think it right also to state that it has been reported to me that you were, twelve months ago, if not now, indebted to the prosecuting company in a large sum of money, and that the company favoured you by often allowing the interest to be far in arrear. Perhaps you would state to the Minister of Justice whether there is any truth in this assertion, and, if any, to what extent it is true. I regret to have to introduce such a matter, but I think you will agree that it is better that such a statement should bo met at the earliest possible opportunity. I have also particularly to draw your attention to the last paragraph of the petition, so that you may state whether, if the wheat in respect of which the bill was given was in part or in whole not included in the company's securities, your decision would have been different; also whether, if other evidence than Christie's had been produced to show that the bags bought from Mackerras and Hazlett had been used for the company's grain, ie would have affected the matter. I am sending a copy of this letter to the Minister of Justice, whom please address by first mail. I have, &c, C. D. E. Ward, Esq., District Judge, Christchurch. T. W. Hislop.

No. 3. Mr. H. Newton to the Hon. Mr. Hislop. Sic,— Oamaru, 13th April, 1889. With reference to the petition praying for a remission of the sentence lately passed by Judge Ward against Mr. William Christie, I think it my duty to write to you. You are aware that I acted as Mr. Christie's counsel throughout the examination, and had therefore full opportunity of becoming acquainted with the facts and the law relating to the case.

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I honestly think that in making the payment to Mackerras and Hazlett, in respect of which Mr. Christie was convicted, he had' no intention to defraud. I believe that in the interests of the company (partly also, no doubt, in his own, inasmuch as his interests were identical with the company's) Mr. Christie had to purchase bags-from Mackerras and Hazlett, and that he thought they were entitled to be paid before the company, inasmuch as their goods had practically gone to the company. Mr. Christie swore that he purchased these bags to enable him to harvest the company's grain, and I believe him. Judge Ward did not, alleging that seven hundred pounds' worth of bags could not have been used in the company's interests. Since the trial the books of the bankrupt have been further examined, and it has been ascertained that more than one thousand pounds' worth of bags were used for the company's grain. Another reason I have for thinking that Mr. Christie had no intent to defraud is that J am satisfied he had a belief that, owing to the large amount he had paid away out of his own moneys to nurse and carry on the securities claimed by the company, he was entitled to deal with them to some extent as if his own. In doing so he may have been wrong, but if he acted under an honest sense of right he had no intent to defraud. With regard to the law of the case, I think it more than doubtful whether the delivery of the promissory note to Mackerras and Hazlett was an offence under the Act. To be such there must have been a delivery of the bankrupt's property with intent to defraud. In Mr. Christie's ease, if there was any offence, there was a breach of trust in improperly dealing with property held by him upon trust for another. That, however, is no offence under the Bankruptcy Act. You will understand that I write this letter with a view to its being used in connection with a petition which I have read, and with the allegations of which I concur. I have, &c, The Hon. T. W. Hislop, Colonial Secretary. Hebek Newton.

No. 4. District Judge Wabd to the Hon. Mr. Febgus. Sib,— Christchurch, 23rd April, 1889. Herewith I have the honour to forward report in case of W. Christie, bankrupt, of Oamaru. I have, &c, The Hon. T. Fergus, Minister of Justice. C. D. S. Wakd, D.J.

Report on the Case of W. Christie, Bankrupt. Christie commenced business in Oamaru in January, 1883, as auctioneer and stock and grain merchant, starting with a capital of £1,000. In August, 1884, as stated in the petition, he commenced to do business with the Colonial Investment Company, the nature of which was that the company discounted bills of exchange or promissory notes accepted or made by Christie's clients (all farmers) in his favour, and indorsed by him to the company. The amount owing to the company on those bills and notes in June, 1885, amounted to £12,160. The arrangement was that each bill or note should be covered by security taken in Christie's name from his clients, and that such security should be under the control of the company. In 1885 a heavy fall took place in the price of stock and agricultural produce generally, and the securities, chiefly produce liens and stock mortgages, became almost unrealisable. Thus Christie, whose capital was only £1,000, and who owed the company £12,160, as above stated, became practically insolvent. Of this fact, however, the company do not appear to have been aware, though it was believed that his capital was not large. Mr. Ritchie, the then manager of the company, informed Christie that immediate payment of the bills then due would not be pressed for, and stated that as long as the amount of stock specified in the security was kept, and he (Christie) was satisfied with the individual men, it was better for them to carry on. Christie was to find funds for carrying on these securities out of his business generally, which he represented to the company as large and profitable. The method adopted by Christie to obtain funds for this purpose appears to have been to sell the grain, wool, and stock intrusted to him for sale by his clients, and to pay the proceeds to his general account, giving no notice to the company of these sales, and using the proceeds as his own property, leaving the clients whose goods he had sold liable on their bills and notes indorsed over by him to the company. It is needless to point out the gross dishonesty of this method of carrying on business by a man in insolvent circumstances. In the case of In re Engleheart (12 W.E., 388), an auctioneer appropriating the proceeds of a sale to his own business, in lieu of paying them over to his client, was sentenced to six months' imprisonment by Mr. Commissioner Holroyd. In the case of one Simpkinson, who had given bills to Christie, indorsed by the latter to the company and secured by a mortgage over certain sheep, Christie admits that he seized and sold these sheep and received the price, £250 ; also that he appropriated this money, giving no account thereof to the company. He gave Simpkinson a release which he knew at the time was worthless, as the company held the unfortunate man's bills. Christie stated that it was his practice to use the proceeds of a good security to support a bad one ; but the giver of the good security was not consulted on the point. Large further advances were made by the company, and Christie's business went on. The total sum due by him to the company for advances purporting to be guaranteed by the securities of his clients in June, 1887, amounted, according to the account rendered by him to the company at that date, to £30,103. The ultimate realisation of these securities by the company proved that these advances had been obtained, in great part, through gross misrepresentation by Christie of the value of the property pledged for repayment. There seems to have been considerable laxity on the part of the company in ascertaining the real value of such property; but this may be in part explained by the fact that the then manager of the company (Mr. Eitchie) and the bankrupt appear to be intimate

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friends. It appears from Christie's books that his turnover for the year ending December, 1887, was £110,000 ; his overdraft (in December), £2,033; and his capital, £148—taking all debts and securities at the full values appearing in his books. Prom starting in business with the company in 1884 until his failure he lived at the rate of £1,200 a year. At the close of 1887 Christie applied to the company, on behalf of sundry of his clients, for advances for harvesting purposes amounting in the whole to £2,500. After being assured by him that there were no liabilities which would have to be paid from the proceeds of these harvests prior to the repayment of this £2,500, the directors agreed to make the advances required; and Christie subsequently drew, on account of the clients specified, £2,186, not one shilling of which has ever been repaid to the company, according to the evidence of Mr. Begg, director, and Mr. Bartleman, the present manager. By letter of the sth February, 1888, it was notified specially to Christie that no tampering with the securities would be allowed, but that the proceeds of all sales must be handed over to the company. About the Ist May the directors deemed it advisable to pay Christie a visit. They ascertained that large quantities of produce over which they had a lien had been disposed of and not accounted for to them. Mr. Begg calculated that between six and seven thousand pounds' worth of grain had been sold by Christie just before their interview. Christie stated to them that he had sold the wheat of Aitkenhead, whose grain was under lien then held by Hislop and Creagh on behalf of the company, and whose bills had been indorsed by him to the company, and that the proceeds were more than sufficient to pay such bills. He was requested to pay them, but refused to do so, alleging that he required the money to make up the deficiency on the bad securities of others. The directors said they should take legal proceedings ; Christie stated he should refuse to assign the securities under any circumstances ; and the meeting broke up. An injunction was forthwith obtained from the Supreme Court prohibiting Christie from dealing in any way with the securities in his possession. This was served on the 17th May. Shortly afterwards he assigned the securities to the company, and in June his business collapsed altogether, though he did not file until December. On the 27th April Christie sold to the Southland Milling Company 780 sacks of wheat—6o bags of Aitkenhead's, 385 Irvine's, 335 Simson's. The wheat of Aitkenhead and Irvine was under lien to Christie, and their bills under discount by the Colonial Investment Company, the lien being shown in the account furnished to the company by Christie in June, 1887. In payment for this wheat Christie received a promissory note from the Southland Milling Company for £234 17s. Id. He did not pass this note through his bank account, but retained it at his office until the 23rd May, when, being in Dunedin, he telegraphed to his clerk to send it—not to himself, but to Mr. Ritchie, by that time eliminated from the service of the Colonial Investment Company; and by his request Eitchie took it to Messrs. Mackerras and Hazlett, to whom he (Christie) owed £445 on a past-due promissory note. This I held to be a delivery by Christie of part of his estate—he being in utterly insolvent circumstances—with intent to defraud the Colonial Investment Company, to whom the proceeds of Aitkenhead's and Irvine's wheat were due. Of course it was also a fraud on Aitkenhead and Irvine, whose wheat was thus absorbed by Christie in payment of his own debts, in lieu of paying theirs to the company. At this date the amount due on bills by Christie to the company was £32,138, and the ultimate balance against him after realisation of securities, £15,715. When he filed in December, 1888, his total assets only amounted to £431, £245 of which was represented by furniture. Christie might also have been convicted on the ground of having embezzled the proceeds of Simpkinson's sheep as before mentioned, as it appears from my notes that there was sufficient evidence on this head, dehors his own confession. After sentence of four months' imprisonment with hard labour had been pronounced against the bankrupt, Mr. Newton, who appeared as one of his counsel, instructed by Hislop and Creagh, requested that he might be released on bail, pending an appeal. I said that it appeared to me doubtful whether an appeal lay in criminal cases, and that the framers of the rules under the Bankruptcy Act, and the Judges who approved those rules (Sir J. Prendergast and Mr. Justice Richmond), apparently considered that no such appeal lay, inasmuch as the rules touching appeals clearly applied to civil cases only. I also said that, in my opinion, the Act gave me no power to release a bankrupt on bail after conviction. Referring to your telegram, I may state that on the day after the order of committal was issued the Clerk of the Court wired to me that he was informed that by mistake it had been dated "March" instead of "April," and asked if he might correct it. This telegram reached me at Timaru, on my way to Christchurch. I replied then that, if this date was a mere clerical error, he might correct it. The recitals in the order clearly showed that it was made in April. Subsequently I wired that he had better issue a fresh order with the correct date, and serve it on the Gaoler, allowing him to retain both. This second telegram was delayed, and both were obeyed. In answer to a further communication from the Clerk touching the fact of Oamaru being a "police gaol" only, I wired directing him to issue another order substituting Dunedin as the prison; but this telegram arrived too late to be acted upon, the return to the writ of habeas corpus having been made. I may here point out that if the legal advisers of the bankrupt are correct in their contention that no committal under the Bankruptcy Act can be legally made to a police gaol, and if, as it is contended on clause 6 of that Act, a District Judge has no power to commit to any prison outside of his district, it will follow that in any district—such as Ashburton—where there is only a police gaol a bankrupt cannot be committed by the District Court at all. Referring to the petition, I may observe that clauses 9, 10, and 11, commencing, ""It was proved," should begin " It wa,s stated on oath by the bankrupt," for there appears to bo no other proof of the allegations they contain. Clause 9 alleges that the bankrupt was doing a large business independently of the company, and from this business derived £16,000 gross profit, and only £2,000 through his connection with the company. As Christie's whole business came at once to an end on the termination of his credit with the company, the above assertion must, on this ground, be held doubtful. Spencer, his book-.

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keeper, swears that the profits made in 1884, 1885, and up to December, 1886, amounted in the whole to £2,713 10s. 6cL, taking all debts and securities at book values. No evidence was given with regard to profits in 1887; but the bankrupt stated that his capital diminished in that year from £413 to £148. As the loss of the company on realisation of these securities amounted to £15,915, it is quite clear that, if, as in ordinary balance-sheets, due provision had been made for depreciation and over-valuation, there would have been no profits visible. Clause 10 alleges that the bankrupt paid towards the nursing of the securities between £6,000 and £7,000. There was given, as I have said, no proof whatever of this beyond the bankrupt's own statement. But Mr. Bartleman, the present manager of the company, swears that Christie received and appropriated to his own purposes £10,000 of the company's moneys. If Christie ever did pay this £6,000 or £7,000, it is clear he recouped himself handsomely. Clause 11 alleges that Christie received, between the Ist November, 1887, and the 31st May, 1888, from the company and out of the securities £15,500, and either paid to the company or expended on the securities £15,700, leaving a balance of £200 in his favour. It is easy to test the accuracy of this statement. No amount received by the bankrupt and paid by him to the company, or expended on any security, appears in his schedule as a debt due by him. But Simpkinson, the proceeds of whose sheep he embezzle"d in April, 1888, appears there as a creditor for £374. The Bankrupt himself stated that he had never accounted to the company for these proceeds, which had gone into his general business, and had not been applied to any security. Reckoning this amount against him, the balance, even of his last six months' receipts and payments, is against him, on his own showing. In addition, as already observed, Messrs. Begg and Bartleman swear that not a shilling of the £2,168 advanced in 1888 for harvesting purposes has ever been repaid. The bankrupt had full notice that no tampering with the securities would be allowed, but that proceeds of sales must at once be forwarded to the company. The company had advanced to him the sums he required for harvesting, £2,168. He was indebted to the" company in the sum of £32,000 on indorsed bills, £15,900 of which turned out to be practically unsecured. He bad received and appropriated to his own purposes £10,000 of the company's moneys ; co that, even if he had paid £7,000 " into the company's securities," and were entitled to charge it against the company, the balance was heavily against him. Under these circumstances no honest or reasonable man could for one moment believe that he had the slightest right, either legal or equitable, further to appropriate the proceeds of the company's securities. But what Christie may consider his rights is quite beyond my computation. I purposely refrain from comment on the letter of the Colonial Secretary in this case. It was shown by the evidence that Christie has long been a client of Hislop and Creagh. His defence was intrusted to them ; and, at the date of the above letter, when, as Mr. Hislop states, he, being at Oamaru, arranged with the Premier that he should act as Minister of Justice in the case of his own client, this firm were taking legal proceedings for the extrication of their client from gaol by writ of habeas corpus. 23rd April, 1889. __^ C. D. E. Ward, D.J.

No. 5. The Hon. Mr. Fergus to District Judge Ward. Sir, — Department of Justice, Wellington, 30th April, 1889. I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd instant, enclosing report upon the case of William Christie. As regards the observations made on the last page of the report, I take the earliest opportunity of informing you that you are quite in error in supposing that the Hon. Mr. Hislop was acting in any other capacity than that of a Minister of the Crown. The petition for Christie's release was handed to Mr. Hislop as the Minister then present in Oamaru, and he, with the concurrence of his colleagues, and to save time, forwarded it to you for report, instead of sending it to Wellington to be again forwarded to you by the Minister in temporary charge of the department. I have further to inform you that this case, so far as it has gone, discloses nothing more as regards the relations existing between Mr. Hislop and Christie than was already known to the Government. I purpose to again address you upon this subject after I have had time to further consider your report. I have, &c, Mr. District Judge Ward, Christchurch. T. Fergus.

No. 6. District Judge Ward to the Hon. Mr. Fergus. (Private.) My dear Sib,— Christchurch, 29th April, 1889. Kindly cause the enclosed addenda to be affixed to my report in Christie's case. If you wish to inquire into his antecedents you will find him very well known in Wellington. He was manager of the Colonial Bank there; and executor to the will of Mr. Crawford, an old Wellington merchant. Sir E. Stout conducted the proceedings against him on behalf of Mrs. Crawford. I did not take any notiag of Mr. Hislop's question touching my debt to the Colonial Investment Company, because I do.not in the least recognise his official right to ask it, whether ho bo acting as Minister of Justice on behalf of his own client, or as Colonial Secretary. But I have not the slightest objection to the whole colony knowing exactly what my sole connection with the company in question really is. Some eight or nine years ago I mortgaged to them for £850 certain land at

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Hokonui, which had cost me £1,800; halfryearly interest, £31 17s. 6d., payable Ist July and Ist January. No doubt this interest has often been in arrear, especially as a tenant of mine ought to have paid it during part of the time. But it has certainly never been in arrear for six months ; and, as the company had ample security, they never troubled me about it, nor had I ever to ask any favours in respect of it; and certainly at the last two half-years £31 17s. 6d. was paid in July and January respectively. With respect to Mr. Hislop's knowledge of this mortgage, I may mention that it appeared in evidence that the ex-manager of the company (Eitchie) was staying with Christie while the bankruptcy case was proceeding. There was therefore full opportunity for inquiries. Yours very sincerely, The Hon. T. Fergus, M.H.E., Minister of Justice. C. D. E. Ward.

Addenda to Report in Christie's Case. I omitted to mention that Christie stated that the promissory note to Mackerras and Hazj,ett (towards paying which he said that he appropriated the promissory note of the Southland Milling Company) was given for sacks. No account from or promissory note due and paid to Mackerras and Hazlott was produced, although asked lor. Had the account been one which the Colonial Investment Company could justly have been called upon to pay it would certainly have been rendered to them.

No. 7. The Hon. Mr. Fergus to District Judge Waed. Sic,— Department of Justice, Wellington, Bth May, 1889. I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter marked H Private," and dated the 29th April last, which reached me last week. I have delayed replying to it because I felt some difficulty in deciding whether I should treat it as a public document or not. It seemed to me quite clear that in such a matter as that of a petition to Plis Excellency the Governor praying for a free pardon, and in respect of which I have to act in a gwas-i-judicial capacity, it would be improper for me to receive from the convicting Judge any communications other than those of an official character, and it seemed to me still clearer that the Judge should not seek to prejudice me by a private communication dealing with matters outside the charge upon which the conviction was made. Had the petition claimed consideration upon the ground of good character, it might have been right for the Judge to inform me in his official report of any circumstance which showed that consideration on such grounds was not merited, leaving me to make inquiries through the proper channel. In this case the petition confined itself to the charge upon which the bankrupt was convicted, but you have gone outside this, not in your official report, but in a letter which you ask me to treat as private. I shall await any explanation which you may desire to make, and I need scarcely say that I shall be glad if your explanation removes the feeling of uneasiness which your communication has raised in my mind. My present opinion is that lam bound to treat your letter as a public one, but before taking any further steps I will await your reply. There is yet another point in this correspondence to which I think I should direct your attention. You have thought it right, in view of our relative official positions, and of the position in which I stand towards my colleagues, to comment upon the part taken by Mr. Hislop in this matter. I deem it my duty to say that all that Mr. Hislop has done has been approved of by other Ministers; but, even had it been otherwise, I cannot admit that your remarks were called for. Statements were made to Mr. Hislop for the purpose of being communicated to the Government, and in making you acquainted with those statements, and in giving you an opportunity of confirming, explaining, or rebutting them, I think Mr. Hislop acted within his rights. I may add that I am taking steps to obtain further information as to the charges against Christie, and will probably have to ask for a further statement from you. I have, &c, Mr. District Judge Ward, Christchurch. T. FebGUS.

No. 8. District Judge Waed to the Hon. Mr. Febgus. Sic, — Christchurch, 14th May, 1889. I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of two despatches from you in re Christie, dated 30th April and Bth May respectively. In that of the 30th April you inform me that I am in error in supposing " that Mr. Hislop acted in Christie's case in any way other than as Minister of the Crown." In reply, I have only to state the following facts : Messrs. Hislop and Creagh were solicitors to Christie for a considerable time before his bankruptcy. They appeared as his solicitors in the proceedings in bankruptcy. At the hearing of the criminal charges against him Mr. Newton appeared as senior counsel, instructed by Messrs. Hislop and Creagh: Mr. Creagh sat with him as junior counsel, and during a considerable part of the proceedings Mr. Hislop sat in Court on the bench behind them. Upon Christie's conviction Messrs. Hislop and Creagh took proceedings to extricate him from gaol by habeas corpus. While these proceedings were in progress a petition for Christie's pardon emanated (I w am informed) from the office of Mr. Newton, the above-named senior counsel, and after signature was sent to Mr. Hislop. Mr. Hislop arranged with the Government that he was to act as Minister of Justice pro tempore, and received the petition. In lieu of forwarding it with the customary request for a report, he sent me a copy of the petition, with a letter on which I have hitherto forborne to comment. Mr. Hislop, lam informed, is still senior partner in the firm of Hislop and Creagh.

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In view of the foregoing facts I have merely the honour to return my thanks for the information above specified in your despatch of-the 30th April. In your despatch of the Bth May you, in effect, charge me with endeavouring to bias your decision in this case by a private communication respecting Christie, dealing with matters outside the charge against him. If you refer to the date of this private letter you will find, I think, that it was written some days after Christie had been released from gaol, and prior to the receipt of your despatch of the 30th April. After Christie's release I certainly deemed that the matter was ended as far as he was concerned, though probably not as respected Mr. Hislop and myself, forasmuch as, according to Mr. Hislop, Christie had a right of appeal to the Supreme Court, the exercise of which was not prevented by the writ of habeas corpus, and had not chosen to use that right. As the act in respect of which he was convicted, and, in my opinion, the intent with which that act was done, were clearly proved and shown by the evidence, as stated in my report; as, according to his own confession, he had been trading with utter recklessness and gross dishonesty during the four years preceding his bankruptcy, and had, six months before filing, deliberately embezzled* the property of one of his clients, to whom he gave a release which he knew to be fraudulent and void; and as he had during the above term succeeded in incurring debts to the amount of nearly £23,000, after deducting the value of ail securities, while he only produced £430 of assets for division among his creditors, it certainly never occurred to me that you, in a quasi- judicial capacity, might deem him a deserving recipient for a free pardon. Had I thought this probable I should certainly have inserted in the addenda to my report words to the effect of those to which you refer, which were, in full, as follows: "If you wish to inquire into Christie's antecedents you will find him very well known in Wellington. He was manager of the Colonial Bank there, and. executor to the will of Mr. Crawford, an old Wellington merchant. Sir Eobert Stout conducted the proceedings against him on behalf of Mrs. Crawford." I would have inserted words to the above effect for the following reasons : In reporting on a conviction in bankruptcy it is impossible for the Judge to restrict his report purely to the crime of which the bankrupt has been convicted. In order to enable the Government to judge of the propriety of remitting any part of the penalty inflicted, an account of the bankrupt's trading should be given, and if, in addition to what appeared in evidence at the trial, it be known to the reporting Judge that previous legal proceedings affecting the bankrupt's character, and displaying his peculiar views of trade, have taken place shortly before the term to which the evidence has been directed, it is quite within the scope of the Judge's duty to indicate such proceedings to the Minister of Justice, leaving him to make such further inquiry as he may deem fit. In the present case this is especially necessary, inasmuch as, in the third paragraph of the petition, the petitioners refer to their intimate knowledge of Christie, and of his dealings generally, as a ground for their belief (on which they ask you to proceed) that he acted in the special matter referred to without intent to defraud. The question of Christie's character, and of the nature of his former dealings, is therefore distinctly raised by the petition itself. The indication of former proceedings given by me being thus clearly required, the manner of giving it was not a matter of serious importance. Your charge against me is therefore utterly unfounded. I forward herewith a second addendum to my report, which will probably prove sufficient. As you state in your last despatch that all that Mr. Hislop has done has been approved of by the Government, I shall now briefly advert to his letter to me of the 11th April. The first question in it refers to the intent of Christie to defraud the company—which I have already pointed out in my report was perfectly clear. Mr. Hislop next requests me to report "my " views as to " what class of cases are meant to be covered by the subsection under which the conviction was made " (subsection (7) of section 171 of "The Bankruptcy Act, 1883 "). It is not usual to demand from a Judge, in his report on a criminal case, his opinion on abstract questions of law. Moreover, in this case the demand assumes a most singular aspect. The rule nisi for the writ of habeas corpus was moved for on the ground (inter alia) "that the alleged delivery of a promissory note does not describe an offence under section 171," above cited. Thus Messrs. Hislop and Creagh, by their Dunedin agents, served me with a rule nisi —which I had a right to oppose —in effect inviting me to show cause why the order of my Court should not bo held " invalid " on the above ground; while Mr. Hislop, as Minister of Justice, demanded a report of my views on the same point " by first available mail " — i.e., before the rule could possibly be argued in the Supreme Court. Thirdly, Mr. Hislop desires me to " state the reasons which operated with me in refusing facilities to appeal." To this I have already adverted in my report; but I may here remark that the Judge of a Bankruptcy Court has no power to grant or refuse facilities for such appeal. These facilities must be given by the rules, and for them the Ministry of 1884, who framed the Order in Council embodying them, are responsible. Of that Ministry Sir Harry Atkinson was Premier. The last two questions in Mr. Hislop's letter, touching "wheat" and "bags," have already been answered in my report. I have now only to advert to the story which he mentions respecting the relations between myself and the Colonial Investment Company. Had every detail of that story been strictly correct it would not have had the faintest influence on the decision to which I came, nor do I believe it would have had the slightest effect on any other judicial officer in the colony if placed in the same position. It is a matter of complete indifference to me whether the true account of my only transaction with the company be made public or not; but I cannot for a moment admit that the Minister of Justice has a righj; to demand from any Judge an account of the private relations existing between him and any suitor or creditor appearing in his Court: and if either you or Mr. Hislop have any charge to bring against me in respect of this case you will find me ready to meet it. I have, &c, The Hon. T. Fergus, Minister of Justice. C. D. E. Ward, D.J.

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Beport in Christie's Case. — Addendum No. 2. As the petitioners base their belief in Christie having acted without intent to defraud on their intimate knowledge of him and of his former dealings (see paragraph 3 of petition), and as, therefore, it may be desirable for the Minister of Justice to inquire into his antecedents, I may state that prior to his appearance as a trader at Oamaru he resided in Wellington, where he was manager of the Colonial Bank, and also executor to the will of Mr. Crawford, an old Wellington merchant. Sir Robert Stout conducted the proceedings against him on behalf of Mrs. Crawford. I omitted to remark with reference to the petition that the petitioners state that they have carefully perused the evidence taken at Christie's examination, while, in fact, a large part of that evidence was documentary, and has never been published, as far as I can ascertain, so that they harl no opportunity of perusing it.

No. 9. The Hon. Mr. Febgus to District Judge Wabd. Sib, — Department of Justice, Wellington, 25th May, 1889. I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th instant. I do not propose to discuss further with you the action taken by the Hon. Mr. Hislop in this matter of Christie's, nor to yield to your apparent desire to make it a personal matter. I need only remark that Mr. Hislop was acting officially, and with the full knowledge of his colleagues, and that you seem to misunderstand your position when you think fit to comment, as you have done, upon his action and upon the statements concerning it made in my letters of the 30th April and Bth May. -» - As regards your private letter to myself, I regret that I cannot agree with you " that the manner of giving " the information contained therein " was not a matter of serious importance." It seems to me in the highest degree improper for a Judge to seek, by means of a private letter, to influence the mind of a Minister against a person applying for a pardon, or a remission, in respect of an offence of which he has been convicted by the Judge. You state that you "cannot for a moment admit that the Minister of Justice has a right to demand from any Judge an account of the private relations existing between him and any suitor or creditor appearing in his Court." I dissent entirely from this position. If a Judge does not perceive the obvious impropriety of adjudicating between persons to one or other of whom he is under pecuniary obligations, it becomes the duty of the Minister of Justice, in the interest of the public, to intervene. It is with great regret that I have to inform an officer of your lengthened experience that your views on this subject meet with the gravest disapproval of the Government. With regard to the last paragraph of your letter, I need scarcely say that I have made no charge against you. Should such a course become necessary, you may rest assured that I shall not shrink from the responsibility of making the charge in unequivocal terms, nor of taking such measures as may be deemed adequate to the occasion. I have, &c, Mr. District Judge Ward, Christchurch. T. Fbbgus.

No. 10. The Hon. Mr, Hislop to the Hon. the Minister of Justice. Colonial Secretary's Office, 28th May, 1889. I have to request that you will cause this memo, to bo attached to the papers in Mr. Christie's case. After reading Mr. Ward's letter which you submitted for my perusal, I felt that it would not be right that Mr. Ward's statements should go unchallenged by me, or that the unsoundness of his argument should not be pointed out. I have probably referred more fully to the statements which he made with regard to myself, and which I presume he meant to reflect upon me, than their importance demands; but I was anxious to clear away, once for all, matters with which Mr. Ward has attempted to cloud the real issue raised by you in your letter to him. The most important part of my memo, is from clause 14 to the end, in which I amplify the statements made affecting Judge Ward. I considered that the weight of the charges which are implied in my remarks demanded from me full and explicit treatment. I deal with Mr. Ward's statements seriatim:— 1. It is true that Mr. Christie was a client of my firm, and this I mentioned in my first communication to the Premier. It is also true that Mr. Newton and Mr. Creagh (my partner) appeared as his junior during the proceedings in the Bankruptcy Court for Mr. Christie. 2. It is not true that I for a considerable part of the proceedings sat upon the Bench behind Messrs. Newton and Creagh, and the imputation that I was there in consultation with them is unfounded. I was, during the four days of the trial, only three times in Court, and in all not more than an hour. Once, having to wait for some information which I was having prepared in the Resident Magistrate's office, I went into Court for a short time. I did not speak to either_of the counsel. In the evening, when going home, I called in to see my partner. Mr. Newton was just closing his address, and I waked until the Court adjourned. The next day I called at the Court to tell my partner that I intended to go to Dunedin by the afternoon train. I did so as soon as it was convenient, and then left. It is true that after the conviction my firm took stops to have Mr. Christie released by proceedings in the Supreme Court; but it is not true that such proceedings were initiated before the petition was prepared. It is also true that the petition emanated from the office of Mr. Newton.

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Indeed, it was prepared by him, in accordance with his own understanding of the case. Why Mr. Ward could have troubled himself to find out where the petition was prepared I cannot understand. It is not true that I acted as Minister of Justice. I only acted as any other Minister might have done in forwarding the petition. Had I acted as Minister of Justice I should have required him to report to me, and not to you direct. It is quite absurd to suggest that the merely formal operation of sending the petition was inconsistent with my position, and especially so when the course about to be pursued by me had been approved by the Premier, who was acting for you. Nothing can be clearer than the statement I made in my letter as to the capacity in which I wrote. I fully explained that what I was doing had been approved by the Premier; and Mr. Ward's constant reiteration of the untruth in the face of my statement and your letters is suggestive rather of the partisan's than of the judicial mind. Mr. Ward makes a point of my forwarding a copy of the petition instead of the original. If this is irregular I can only urge the sufficient excuse that if the allegations in the petition were correct the Judge had been misinformed at the trial, and had therefore acted under a misapprehension. I took a little trouble to find out the true state of affairs, and I ascertained, what has now been admitted by the Judge, that his statement of facts when sentencing Mr. Christie was not correct, and therefore, in my opinion as well as that of others, the defendant was unjustly suffering. I own that I was anxious that the matter should receive immediate consideration, and that, if the petition should prove correct, there should be no unnecessary loss of time in relieving him. I should in any other similar case be actuated by the same feeling. Besides, this course had, after the Premier consulted the officers of the department, been approved of by him. There was the probability of the Judge leaving Christchurch before the petition could return from Wellington, and therefore the chance of a prolonged delay before his report could come to hand. As to the matters upon which I asked the Judge to report, I know of-no rule which ought to have prevented me from asking his opinion upon any of them. The Judge had had the matter argued before him, and I only asked him to give you the benefit of his views, so as to help you to a decision. If Mr. Ward's view, that there was no appeal, was the correct one, theu it was essential that the law should be discussed in the light of the several matters referred to in my letter. The suggestion that I wished the information for my own purpose is ludicrous. Mr. Ward's reference to the grounds upon which it was sought to procure a writ of habeas corpus is absurd, and is only the outcome of suspicion, unfounded on fact. The particular ground to which he refers, and in respect of which he suggests that I improperly desired the advantage of his opinion, was not at the time, nor for some time afterwards, known to me. It was, like most of the grounds upon which the rule was moved for, inserted by Mr. Chapman upon his own responsibility. Mr. Ward makes the statement that he thought at the time he wrote his private letter that the matter as regarded Mr. Christie was at an end. In view of his entertaining this belief, it is still more difficult to find an excuse for his having written the letter and the addendum to the report. When the official excuse fails surely he had no right to convert himself into a private fcraducer of Mr. Christie. Mr. Ward's statement that I asserted that there was a right of appeal is unwarranted. I see nothing in the papers to justify such a statement. When I asked him to report why he had not afforded facilities for granting an appeal I acted upon information which had been given to me. As a matter of fact, the only reason for bringing the case before you at that time was that there was no right of appeal, and whatever my private opinion might have been I never questioned publicly or to you his decision in this respect. Had there been an appeal, and had the imprisonment been suspended, you would have had no right, pending such appeal, to interfere. You will see by reference to my memorandum, written in Oamaru, that I justified the request of the petitioners for your interference on the ground of Judge Ward's decision that there was no appeal, and the new facts which had been disclosed. It struck me that the Law Officers might raise the question that an appeal was the proper course, and that, therefore, delay might take place. I pass over the reference made to Mr. Christie with this remark : that it is a pity that Mr. Ward cannot, in a calm way and by reference to the evidence and the law, justify his sentence instead of dealing in vituperation. I have perused the evidence as reported, and fail to see anything therein to justify his statement that Christie committed any deliberate embezzlement. On the contrary, he asserted his right to receive the money, and Mr. Ward's statements of the law, that as between the company and Mr. Christie's client the company were not bound, is not, in my opinion, correct. It is elementary law that a man or company is bound by the action of an agent, and nothing was more clearly shown than that Mr. Christie was the agent of the company, and that he was authorised to deal with the securities in globo, and to receive payment of moneys, although they might be represented by bills. Mr. Ward's statement of the law is not, in my opinion, indicative of careful consideration of the case. A perusal of the newspaper reports will furnish you with sufficient facts upon which an opinion on the above matters can be obtained. Mr. Ward's opinion that a man's application for consideration is to be viewed to his detriment in the light of transactions outside that of the one upon which he is found guilty cannot be justified by reference to the principles which regulate the conduct of English Judges in all criminal cases. To show that Judge Ward, when under softer and more humane influences than seem to move him when dealing with Mr. Christie, recognises these principles I might mention the case of Bruhn, upon whom a concurrent sentence (five years for arson and two years for larceny) wag. passed by him. The circumstances of this case and the nature of the application are known to you. I might also remark that the correspondence which some little time ago passed between Mr. Ward and Ministers shows that he can recognise the inconvenience and impropriety of such a rule as he wishes to apply to Mr. Christie's case. Mr. Ward lays down a rule as to the mode of arriving at the defendant's motive which is not warranted by authority. Any novice in law knows that the motive must be gathered from a view of 2—H. 20.

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the particular action and its immediate surroundings. It is little less than scandalous for any Judge to suggest that in such a cas"e as Mr. Christie's he is justified in considering, or asking the Minister to consider, previous conduct o£ the defendant, especially when such conduct, even if truthfully attributed to him, was not such as to make him amenable to the criminal law. Judge Ward adhered to truer principles in Bruhn's case. Judge Ward attempts to justify what he says by referring you to the statement with regard to Mr. Christie and his dealings in the 3rd paragraph of the petition which he argues claims consideration on account of character, but the disingenuousnoss of this attempt is shown by the fact that it was only after receipt of your letter that he refers to this part of the petition. It is also clear to any one, when the 3rd clause is read in connection with the other clauses, that the statement is confined to Mr. Christie'stealings with the company, or, at most, to his transactions at Oamaru, and not those of years before in another place and in a different capacity. After a lapse of over a month Mr. Ward has replied to the questions contained in my letteii of the 11th April. His statements thereon seem to me to show absence of consideration and a contempt of the arguments which were submitted to him in Court, and which, judging from the reports published, seemed to me conclusive, and which, I know, are considered by other lawyers as conclusive, that cases of mere fraudulent preference do not come withiii the subsection, and that Mr. Christie, even if you take the facts as found by the Judge, was guilty either of a fraudulent preference only or of an offence which was beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. Yet Mr. Ward dismisses the subject with a few flippant remarks. As to Mr. Ward's statement that it is not usual to ask a Judge his opinion upon abstract points of law, I presume that what is done in each case is regulated by its necessities. Mr. Christie's case was a very unusual one, inasmuch as the usual right of appeal to the higher Court was barred, and the whole question to be dealt with by you was one of law, upon which it was desirable to have full information. If I had wished unfairly to bias-you in Mr. Christie's favour I should have refrained from asking the Judge to report, and have contented myself with sending the opinion and arguments of those who inclined to the interpretation of the law favourable to his innocence. It is difficult to understand what complaint there can bo against me for asking Mr. Ward to inform you of his views. I think his replies, although unsatisfactory, show that it was right, before you and the Law Officers reviewed his decision, that you should be informed by him of the grounds for it. Mr. Ward closes his letter by commenting upon my question as to his dealings with the prosecuting company. The conjecture which he made in his former report as to how I received my information is erroneous. It did not reach me till after the trial. After hearing the statement ! thought it right to make some inquiry before repeating it to the Premier and Mr. Ward. This I did, and when I found that it had some foundation, I came to the conclusion that it was right to inform yourself and the Premier what I had heard, and that it would be unjust to Mr. Ward not to give him the earliest opportunity of explaining or denying the statement. I may mention that during Mr. Christie's incarceration I did not see him, and after his release I only spoke to him twice, and on those occasions but for a short time. lam astonished, notwithstanding what Mr. Ward did w 7hile a Judge of the Supreme Court, that he can argue that there was no impropriety in sitting under the circumstances admitted by himself. It never crossed my mind that, assuming his relations to the company to be as represented, his sitting could be defended. I notice that Mr. Ward states that the company were amply secured, and in support of such statement mentions that the land cost him £1,800. You will be able to judge of his candour and the value of his explanation when you learn that the mortgage is some years overdue (duo 30th June, 1884) ; that the principal can be called up by the company at anytime; that, although the company have been anxious to call in their loans, including money secured on mortgage, the full amount is still owing ; and that the land is now valued under the Property Assessment Act at £830, and that it has become the habit of these companies to regard such valuation as the maximum value of the land. Ask yourself the question, " Would the company, while the proceedings were pending, be likely to enforce their rights against Mr. Ward?" The company maybe managed by purists who would be incapable of allowing unworthy considerations to affect them, and Mr. Ward may be stoically indifferent to all evils which might befall him, but will the public generally and the parties more closely interested believe them to be such? Will the Bench, under such circumstances, remain as it ought to be— like Gtesar's wife —above suspicion ? (Since writing the above I notice, from information in my possession, that while these proceedings were pending a transfer from Mr. Ward to the New Zealand Agricultural Company of part of the land, in consideration of the company's transferring to the prosecuting company part of sections 120 and 535, was presented for registration. Prom this it will be seen that, actually, while proceedings were pending, Mr. Ward was either negotiating or carrying into effect an arrangement, made at his request, between the two companies.) The impropriety of a Judge sitting under the circumstances above mentioned, as well as of his addressing a private letter of the kind of Mr. Ward's, must of course be considered apart from Mr. Christie's case, and the circumstances of Mr. Christie's case must be reviewed apart from the fact of his having been my firm's client. It would of course be absurd to suppose that the relationship between my firm and Mr. Christie should prevent the matter from being treated with the same regard to healthy rules which would characterize your action if such relationship did not exist. I have, because of my firm's connection, refrained, and I will continue to refrain, from personally taking part in any decision which has been or may be taken in Mr: Christie's case. Now, however, that questions are raised as to the principles whjch ought to govern the conduct of judicial officers, I do not think that any consideration ought to prevent me from expressing and endeavouring to give effect to my opinion, which is based upon principles recognised by me, not during this discassion only, but practically from the time I studied such questions. Mr. Ward has in Mr. Christie's case only repeated what he has done in other cases. Just before I left for the South I had occasion to look over the depositions and other papers in Meikle's case, when I learned that Mr. Ward had presided, although he was at the time indebted to the

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prosecutors and had received indulgence from them. I mentioned this to you in a letter, and you afterwards expressed to me your disapproval of his conduct. In the case of the Queen versus McLean he sat, although he was under heavy monetary obligation to Mr. McLean. How different is the principle by which he regulates his own conduct from what he expected of the late Mr. Justice Chapman, in respect of whom he wished to define the rule as to self-interest to such an extent as to urge, as evidence of his being likely to be biassed, and that therefore he ought not to sit in a case, the fact that he happened to have been godfather to a child of one of the suitors ! These cases of Meikle and McLean occurred when Mr. Ward was a Judge.of the Supreme Court, and it may therefore be questionable whether you, in your capacity of Minister, had a right to call him to account; but no such question can arise when he is guilty of such improprieties as an officer under your control, for whose conduct you are responsible to the country. I will close this memorandum by stating that, whatever may be the needful action, no officer should be allowed — * (1.) To permit the administration of justice to come under suspicion by sitting in a case where he may be taken to be swayed by considerations personal to himself. (2.) To address a Minister in .a judicial matter by a private letter. (3.) In such letter, or by any other means, to attempt to prejudice the mind of a Minister by referring to matters outside the charge. (It is obvious, if he does anything of this kind his own mind must be swayed by the same consideration.) The toleration of conduct in variance with these principles must strike at the root of judicial purity. The Hon. the Minister of Justice. T. W. Hislop.

No. 11. District Judge Wabd to the Hon. the Ministeb of Justice. Sib,-- Christehurch, 18th June, 1889. I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th May. You are entirely in error if you believe that I have the least intention of making " this matter of Christie's a personal matter." As an illustration of the manner in which you and Mr. Hislop attempt to deal with the judicial Bench when a client of the Colonial Secretary's is concerned, I deem this correspondence of the gravest public importance. I regret that you reiterate the refuted charge of my having attempted to bias you against Christie by a private letter. In my last despatch I pointed out that the indication of legal proceedings contained in the letter to which you allude, written several days after Christie's release from gaol, was simply required by the statements in the petition. If nothing more was stated in my private letter than ought to have appeared in my report, the accusation of attempting to bias is simply absurd. After the use you have made of my private letter, however, I have to request that it be considered a public one. Notwithstanding " the gravest disapproval of " yourself and Mr. Hislop, I adhere to my denial of " the right of the Minister of Justice to demand from any Judge an account of the private relations existing between him and any suitor or creditor appearing in his Court; " but, of course, I do not wonder that you and Mr. Hislop contend for the exercise of private inquisition. As to your theory of the duty of intervention by the Minister of Justice, it is clear that you completely misunderstand your position. You have no authority whatever to interfere with the course of law in civil cases. As to criminal cases, if, whenever a client of a Cabinet Minister is sentenced to imprisonment such Cabinet Minister is to be permitted forthwith to transform himself into Minister of Justice, and to intervene, after Mr. Hislop's fashion, with the Judge who convicted his client, such a course will simply be destructive of the independence of the Bench, and will be an entirely new development in constitutional government. I observe that, after reiterating the refuted charge above referred to, you state at the close of the letter that you have not made any charge whatever against me, which is so far satisfactory. You then courteously assure me that you will " not shrink from making a charge in unequivocal terms" on the first opportunity —on the truth of which assurance I feel the utmost reliance. I have, &c, The Hon. the Minister of Justice. C. D. E. Wabd.

No. 12. The Undeb-Secretaby, Department of Justice, to District Judge Wabd, Sin, — Department of Justice, Wellington, 13th July, 1889. I have the honour, by direction of the Minister of Justice, to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th ultimo, and, in reply, to inform you that the tone of your communication was such that it seemed to the Minister proper that ho should defer taking any further action on the subject of it until he had had an opportunity of submitting the whole correspondence to Cabinet. Pressure of parliamentary business has, however, rendered it impossible for Ministers, until to-day, to give the matter full consideration. A petition, as you are no Boubt aware, has been presented to Parliament by Mr. Christie ; and the Government is of opinion that the decision of Cabinet should be deferred until the Public Petitions Committee shall have reported upon the charges made in the petition. I have, &c , Mr. District Judge Ward, Christchureh. C. J. A. Haselden, Under-Secretary.

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No. 13. District Judge Wabd to the Hon. the Minister of Justice. Sm,— Oamaru, 20th July, 1889. I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of a letter from the Secretary of Justice, stating (inter alia) that the Cabinet do not intend to take any action respecting the correspondence in re Christie until the Committee to whom his petition has been referred report upon it. It is pleasant to observe by the telegrams that the matter has been brought before both Houses, and that the despatches in question must be forthwith produced. The case is now in the hands of the Legislature, to whom you and I are alike responsible. It remains for the Houses of Parliament to decide whether you and Mr. Hislop are to be approved of as the apostles of the new doctrine of intervention, under which, according to you, no tradesman to whom a Judge or Resident Magistrate owes a shilling can sue or be sued in his Court without its becoming " the duty of the Minister of Justice, in the public interest, to intervene; " or whether I have simply done my duty in repelling a grave attack on the independence of the judicial Bench. As the law now stands, had I refused to hear Christie's examination in bankruptcy on the sole ground that a debt fully secured by mortgage was due by me to the Colonial Investment Company, one of his creditors, a writ of mandamus ordering me to proceed with it would certainly have been granted by the Supreme Court. I have recently observed that the pressed copy of the petition of certain residents of Oamaru in favour of Christie, and the letter of the 11th of April from Mr. Hislop forwarding it, are in the same handwriting. It is thus clear that this petition, if drafted by Mr. Newton, was engrossed by a clerk of the Colonial Secretary. I have, &c, The Hon. the Minister of Justice, Wellington. C. D. E. Wakd, D.J. » ;

{Approximate Cost of Paper.— Preparation, nil printing f1.,850 copies), £1 Cs.]

By Authority: Geobge Didsbury, Government Printer, Wellington. —1889.