DIPLOMATIC SIEGE OF STALIN

Waikato Times, Volume 127, Issue 21246, 17 October 1940, Page 6

DIPLOMATIC SIEGE OF STALIN

If Japan imagined that the United States was not sincere when it flung back Japanese challenge, subsequent developments should have been convincing. Passenger liners are promptly being diverted to the Far East to remove all American citizens from the possible danger zone, a fact which in itself cannot fail to impress upon Japan that the United States is in deadly earnest. Thousands of nationals are not called home without good reason. In addition, the State Department is refusing to issue or renew passports to Japan, China, Indo-China and other countries in the Far East. Perhaps even more significant is the fact that American citizens are advised not merely to withdraw to the Philippines as they have done before, but to return to the United States. That is a clear indication that America sees the possibility of the Philippines becoming involved if relations deteriorate as seriously as is feared to be probable. The next step is now for Japan to decide, for Mr Roosevelt has made America’s position clear. The enthusiasm of the Japanese for the Axis pact has obviously been dampened by the blunt refusal of the United States to be panicked, and Japan may yet realise that she has been placed in an extremely difficult position by Germany and Italy, from whom she need expect no worthwhile sympathy if the pact turns out disastrously. The two European countries have no real link, cultural or political, with the Japanese, who might have realised that they were being used as pawns in an unscrupulous game of aggression. The Japanese Ambassador to Moscow by his denial has drawn attention to Japanese anxiety lest there should be a rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet. He is attempting to show Stalin that Russia’s interests lie in co-operation with Japan rather than with the United States, but Stalin will have his own opinion on that matter. The indications are that Stalin is about to be submitted to a diplomatic siege. Whether he will be persuaded to commit himself definitely one way or the other remains to be seen. If he rejects Japan’s overtures he will clash with Hitler and Mussolini just as effectively as if he came to a friendly understanding with America. He may hold his hand a little longer because much depends upon the decision which he will be pressed to make. While he holds aloof he is safe; if he commits himself anything might happen.