CREDIT FOR ARMS

Waikato Times, Volume 127, Issue 21197, 21 August 1940, Page 9

CREDIT FOR ARMS

U.S. CONCESSION LIKELY AMERICA AND THE WAR INVOLVEMENT IN THE PACIFIC Should British credits in the United States of America be exhausted before the war against Nazi Germany is ended, America will most probably extend credit for Great Britain to purchase war material, In the opinion of Professor L. M. Lipson, professor of political science and public administration at Victoria University College, Wellington. This view was expressed by the professor in the course of a public address in Hamilton last night on the subject of the domestic and foreign policy of the United States. The meeting was held under the auspices of the Hamilton Rotary Club. No doubt existed, Professor Lipson declared, that there was an overwhelming sentiment in the United States in favour of a British victory in the European war. At the same time, however, “straw” ballots of American public opinion revealed that not more than 10 per cent of the population was in favour of actual military participation in the war. What the people desired was to give Britain all possible assistance short of declaring war. XJ.S.A. Capabilities “At the present time, I consider, that is as much as we can hope to get from the United States,” added Professor Lipson, in expressing the opinion that, after all, there was little military help which America could offer at the present time. The country was providing Britain with all the ’planes which she could possibly spare, there was no army which America could despatch to Europe, and preparedness in this direction would not be complete for two years or, most certainly, for at least another year. Furthermore, the American Fleet was stationed in the Pacific and the nation’s naval strategy was based on the assumption that the Navy could not fight in two oceans at the one time. In Professor Lipson’s opinion it was serving British interests to have that fleet based in the Pacific Ocean.

Professor Lipson outlined the origins of United States foreign policy. He said that when the 13 colonies rebelled against England in 1776 to secure their independence, they found hostile States all around them. There was Canada in British hands, Florida ruled by Spain, the French in possession of Louisiana, the hostile Indians to the West, and the British Fleet stationed in the West Indies. It was natural, therefore, that the new nation should feel isolated and that such isolation should be adopted as the fundamental point of the new foreign policy. George Washington had expressed the belief that the United States should keep out of foreign affairs. Monroe Doctrine Principle In the 1820’s, when Florida was secured from Spain, Louisiana acquired from France, and the Indians had been driven farther into the interior, that policy was elaborated by a declaration that America should not only remain aloof from European affairs but that European powers should keep out of the American Hemisphere. That policy was enunciated in the famous Monroe Doctrine which was the basic principle of American foreign policy throughout the nineteenth century. Unfortunately, it was still the underlying feature, although it was not as strongly defined as previously. The United States attitude was divided into three main divisions, Professor Lipson added. On the Atlantic seaboard the people had the national characteristics of Europeans with whom they had racial and industrial connections. In this area had been found the desire that the United States should participate in such affairs as the League of Nations. There were notable exceptions to this general attitude, however. Isolation Theory Changing In the Central area, comprising the great farming centres of the Mississippi basin, the people were traditionally largely isolationist. This mid-western territory, however, was becoming increasingly more international in its outlook. The third area of opinion was found on the Pacific seaboard where the people looked across the Pacific Ocean to the Asiatic powers, anxious to ensure American security, especially against Japan. There was found a feeling of hostility to that Eastern power. Any attempt by any power to impair the security of the American Hemisphere, including Canada, would, Professor Lipson considered, lead to the United States being involved in war. Another possible area of conflict was Europe. After the Great War the American people felt that they had been led into war without securing any benefit. Thereafter they favoured strict isolation, although opinion had changed considerably in the 1930’5. Then there was the Pacific as an- ■ other possible sphere of war. In that area, the professor continued, there were no sentimental bonds with other countries, except with the British Dominions of New Zealand and Australia, of which the people of the U.S.A. knew very little. The factors likely to involve America in war in the Pacific area, therefore, were [ purely economic. East Indies’ Future From a strategical point of view the nation had little to gain, for while j she maintained control of Hawaii no potential enemy was likely to secure a base sufficiently close to the American continent to strike at any point. Some of the essential commodities lacking on the Ameri- ; can continent were rubber and tin, ' the largest supplies of which always ; came from the East Indies. That factor alone was likely to involve America in war in the Pacific if a hostile power attempted to secure ! control of the Indies. Professor Lipson also dealt with j United States domestic politics, trac- j ing the development of the two prin- j cipal parties ancl the changes intro- [ duced by President Roosevelt. The : meeting was presided over by Mr ' W. Fraser, president of the Hamilton Rotary Club.