STALIN THE DESPOT

Waikato Times, Volume 125, Issue 20990, 18 December 1939, Page 8

STALIN THE DESPOT

OPPONENTS “LIQUIDATED”

THE RED COLOSSUS THREAT TO EUROPE There are two great recent changes in the Soviet union, closely connected with each other (wrote Mr W. H. Chamberlin, staff correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor, from Paris last month). First, the character of the regime has been transformed during the last few years as a result of the purges which politically, and often physically, " liquidated ” almost all the survivors of the Bolshevist Old Guard, many prominent Soviet generals, diplomats and captains of industry. Secondly, the Soviet Union having joined the ranks of the so-called “ dynamic States,” is now committed forcefully to changing the European frontier which it accepted after the civil war and wars with Poland, Finland and the Baltic States in the years following the conclusion of the World War. It becomes retrospectively increasingly clear that the central purposes of the purges was to free Stalin from anything in the nature of Communist public opinion. The official charges of pro-German, pro-Japanese activity and industrial sabotage were not the real reason for the trials. Stalin desired to destroy every Communist of independent reputation dating from the early period of the revolution, with the purpose of having his hands free for any policy, including an understanding or alliance with Fascism, that he might choose to pursue. His destruction of Marshal Tukhachevesky and other prominent Red Army generals who. it is worth noting, weren’t old regime military leaders but young men who had made careers under the revolution, was motivated by nervous fear of a Bonapartist coup. Present Despotism As a result of the purges the Soviet system changed from an oligarchical party dictatorship, with a certain ideological basis, into a purely # ' personal despotism. Stalin, whose chief lieutenants now are either too young to have participated in the revolution or who played a mediocre role therein, can, like Hitler and Mussolini, follow any policy, internationally or internally, which seems expedient, regardless of its compatibility with the ideas of Marx and Lenin. This makes the future course of Soviet development more incalculable than ever. Stalin’s first conspicuous use of his new, completely unfetter position, was the conclusion of the sensational understanding with Hitler which so shocked those uncritical admirers of the Soviet regimen in western countries who took its anti-Fascist professions seriously. Stalin’s Policy One must admit Stalin played hia cards cleverly, recognising that his three objectives in their relative order of importance are maintaining his own power, increasing the Russian territorial possessions, and stimulating international revolution. His policy during the month immediately preceding the war was a masterpiece of Machiavellian cunning, pushing Europe into a war from which he proposed to stand aloof, reaping all possible advantages. He encouraged England and France to believe he would co-operate in defending Poland, then at the very last moment, when neither Hitler nor the Democratic Powers could very well back down, switched his orientation to the Third Reich.

A prolonged destructive war, wherein Germany, France and England are the main participants, can only benefit Stalin, whether he thinks primarily in terms of Russian power or world revolution. He already, with practically no military loss, has regained a large area inhabited by some 13,000,000 people in Eastern Poland and, following the best Hitler technique as used in Austria and Czechoslovakia, gained bloodless control of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

But Stalin’s greatest opportunity may well come at the end of the war if it ends in the breakdown of Germany. It is very likely all eastern and south-eastern Europe will then be in an extremely chaotic condition, very favourable for Communist propaganda, and Stalin will have the Red Army as a weapon to convince those who do not succumb to propaganda.

One can already see indications of a radically new alignment of forces in such an eventuality, with Fascist Italy and conservative Spain perhaps siding with England and France against the Red Colossus, while Germany itself may be the prey of a civil war, with England and France supporting moderates against extremists, who may go Bolshevist as the price of Soviet aid.

The more immediate question is how far Stalin can and will help Hitler. The weakness of Stalin’s huge empire is its uncommonly inefficient economic system. The masses of the people still live at an extremely low standard and the traditional defects of bad quality industrial production, inefficient transportation and incompetent distribution show no improvement.

Even the easiest industrial problem, the increase of the quantitative output of iron, steel, and oil. has lagged badly in recent years. Russia, if it desires, can supply Germany with gold, manganese, timber, and copper. Its ability to supply any large amount of oil, iron or steel would seem to depend upon whether the Germans will be allowed to organise production.

There is no indication that Stalin will send any troops or aeroplanes to Germany, but as it is to his interest to prolong the war he will probably feed Germany raw materials, thereby somewhat counter-balancing British and French supplies from America. The social order of the new Russia would seem to suggest a less efficient Fascist State with strong Oriental characteristics as regards the absolute power of its ruler and the extremely precarious tenure of the life and liberty of its chief functionaries