THE RUSSIAN MOVE

Waikato Times, Volume 125, Issue 20918, 25 September 1939, Page 7

THE RUSSIAN MOVE

EFFECT ON WAR GERMAN DISADVANTAGE SOVIET FOR HERSELF (Omclal Wireless) (Received Sept. 25, 1 p.m.) RUGBY, Sept. 24 At the end of the third week of the war two questions are uppermost in the public mind, and the Sunday papers make a feature of both. The surprise at the Russian move in Poland has given place to speculation as to its effect on the situation. Mr Garvin, in the Observer, largely dfevotes himself to consideration of this, and arrives at the conclusion that so far the “fourth partition” of Poland has worked very much to the Russian advantage. He points out that Russia has advanced “to a line north and south, which on an average is 150 miles from the former frontier.” Mr Garvin adds that thus far between the Baltic States and the middle of the Carpathians the Russians hold “all strategic and political points famous in old and later wars as commanding the rivers, roads, railways and disputed racial areas.” Hitler Loses Oilfields In addition, the desired Carpathian oilfields have been lost to Hitler, who

The German Chief-of-staff, General Haider (left), photographed with the Italian Chief-of-Staff, General Pariani. is left with the task of “incorporating in his mixed empire some 30,000,000 Slavs who are unsubduable in soul. In the long run they will give him and his system moral wounds.” Although Moscow may give supplies to Germany, they will not be to the degree of Nazi expectation. The Soviet is working for herself and is likely to follow the advice of the Russian statesman. M. Gortscacoff, “not to labour on behalf of the King of Prussia.” Lack of News Remembering the epic stories of mass fighting which occurred in the first few weeks of the last war, many people comment on the lack of reported movement and incident in the opening of the present campaign. “Scrutator,” in the Sunday Times, opportunely devotes an article in elucidation of the Allied war policy. He frankly admits that the rapid collapse of Poland was a great disappointment, and suggests that had Russia not intervened and had the Poles been able to hold on for another month, as there seemed every prospect of their being able to do, the Polish Army might well have been able to turn the “notorious Polish mud” to good account against the immobilised German mechanical army. Tribute To Polish Soldiers “Scrutator,” in a tribute to the Polish Army, says: “Whoever is to blame for the Polish collapse it is certainly not the common soldier. The resistance at Warsaw and elsewhere shows of what splendid military material he is made.” Turning to the British-French policy, “Scrutator” says: “The foundation of victory is our complete command of the sea. Germany has made no secret of her fears. She wants a short war and is anxious not to be drawn into a long military struggle. “Her present problem is the reverse of that of 1914. Then she had to force the lines in order to win. Now she hopes to win merely by defending her own and forcing us to attack.” Strength of Siegfried Line “Scrutator” suggested that the Siegfried Line, although not so strong or favourably placed as the Maginot Line, is far stronger than any German fortified position in the last war, and points out that it can only be reached as a result of long and careful preliminary work. Any policy of mass frontal attack would be exactly what Germany would wish and would be unlikely to lead to victory, quickly or slowly. Victory in war consists not in inflicting a loss on the enemy or even in the ratio of losses inflicted and received, but in convincing the enemy that he cannot possibly win.