ECONOMIC WAR

Waikato Times, Volume 125, Issue 20912, 18 September 1939, Page 11

ECONOMIC WAR

BRITAIN’S NEW MINISTRY PRESSURE ON GERMANY LESSON OF 1914-18 APPLIED One of the most interesting and important wartime announcements yet made is t.hc official statement that the ; new’ly-created British Ministry of Economic Warfare is now in full operation. The aim of the Ministry, it is stated, is to disorganise the economy of the enemy and thus prevent him from effectively maintaining his War Ministry's activities. It will have the widest scope. The Ministry of Economic Warfare must be regarded as a vital offensive arm complementary to the operation of the three services. Every effort will take account, however, of the legitimate trading needs of neutral countries. The organisation has been in progress for two years, and there is a complete staff, drawn partly from the foremost experts. Little doubt is entertained by stu- 1 dents of the vast literature dealing with the economic and naval side of the Great War that it was chiefly our trade with Germany’s neutral neighbours that undermined for more than two and a-half years the of the British Navy, “ succoured our enemies and nearly led to our defeat.” This aspect of the Great War is, perhaps, most convincingly dealt with by Rear-Admiral M. W. W. P. Consett, G.M.G., in his book, “The Triumph of Unarmed Forces,” in which he gives an amazing “ account of the transactions by which Germany during the Great War was able to obtain supplies prior to her collapse under the pressure of economic forces.” RearAdmiral Consett was British naval attache in Scandinavia (including Holland) from 1912 to 1919 and was naval adviser to the Supreme Council in 1920. He writes with intimate firsthand knowledge of the abuses of neutral trade in Scandinavia during the war years. Grim, Silent Struggle Asserting that the war “ was prolonged far beyond the limits of necessity,” Read-Admiral Consett says that it is certain that in 1914 Germany was “ neither prepared nor equipped for a struggle of four years’ duration.” Britain’s entry into the war and the battle of the Marne had placed all hope of an early decision for Germany out of the question. The problem with which Germany was faced from the very beginning was an economic one. S*he was not self-supporting and the supplies upon which she depended for feeding, clothing and munitioning her armies and for supporting her civil population had to come from overseas. The four years’ Great War was a struggle for the mastery of these supplies. “ The clas<h of arms, the destruction of cities and even the passing subjugation of smaller nations, were not the sole determining factors of an issue in which one-half of the more highly organised nations of the earth sought to impose their will upon the other half . . . The real struggle itself was unaccompanied by any single act of violence; yet it was more deadly in its passive relentlessness than the military forces and engines of war, on which the whole attention of the world was riveted.” For more than two years Germany maintained an unequal economic strug*gle with us; she suffered famine, but she won through. “ In 1917,” says Admiral Consett, “ she sealed her own doom by declaring war upon all merchant vessels in the waters round the British Isles; for by this act trade with the outside world overseas was virtually stopped, British trade with Germany’s neutral neighbours, which had continued throughout the war, ceased. America entered the arena and Germany was reduced to starvation; her troops left the fighting line in search of food.” Supplies from Neutrals The overseas supplies Hia-t reached Germany went mainly through Scandinavia and Holland, passing through two sitages, one by sea and one by land. ! Over a certain part of neutral trade 1 we possessed belligerent rights, sane- ; tioned by international law, treaty and convention. The rules of naval"warfare under which Britain had fought in the past gave her great power over neutral itrade with the enemy; but at her own suggestion they had been made to suffer fundamental alteration in the long period of peace after the Napoleonic wars. Much of our belligerent power had been surrendered voluntarily; and the Navy, on the strength of which the power to enforce these rights depended, had therefore been rendered partially impotent. During the war, and while the enemy was receiving the benefit of our surrendered rights, a series of efforts was made to retrieve them and bring into use the rules of the past for the conduct of our naval warfare. This policy brought us into conflict with America. The new rules, of our own making, were chiefly contained in the Declaration of Paris (1856) an-d the Declaration of London (1909). Having passed the scrutiny of the British Fleet and found sanctuary in Scandinavia, merchandise in its second stage was free from further beligerent interference. Nevertheless, there were at our command very powerful and effective coercive measures by which it could be controlled and which could not be disregarded with impunity. Supplies for Germany Had there been certainty that our supplies would neither reach nor indirectly benefit Germany, there was every reason thait trade with Scandidinavia should have been encouraged. But from the very beginning, till well into 1917, goods poured into Germany from Scandinavia, and for more than I two years Scandinavia received from the British Empire and the Allied | countries stocks which, together with those received from neutral countries, vastly exceeded all pre-war quantities and literally saved Germany from starvation. During the dispute between Great Britain and the United States regarding our right to interfere with American trade, the latter country was able to show that Britain’s trade with Scandinavian countries had increased to a vast extent. The war brought to Scandinavia a period of unprecedented prosperity. During 1915 and 1916 those countries received supplies in excess of all previous quantities. There were times when meat was so scarce in Copen-

hagen (due to exports to Germany), that butchers’ sheps had to shut down. | Special fast trains packed with fish, the staple article of diet among many j Danes, carried it to Germany when fish : was unprocurable in Denmark. In- ■ cidentally, the trains were run on British coal and the fishing tackle w’as I supplied by Great Britain. Swedish spindles were idle when the wharves ; and quays of Swedish ports were j choked with cotton for Germany. Coffee, the favourite beverage of the Swede was unobtainable in 'Swedish restaurants at a time when Sweden ! was exporting large quantities of cofi fee to Germany. When Germany was j in the grip of hunger and food riots I had to be quelled by the military, dis- | aster was averted in 1916 only by the prodigious supplies that entered from I Scandinavia. j This position was finally ended in 1917 after the entry of America into ! the war. Space forbids further men- | tion of the terrible economic pressure ■ exerted from then onward till Ger- ! many's final collapse in November. 1918. The newly-organised Ministry of Economic Warfare will prevent the mistakes of the Great War and will enable British sea power to be exerted . to its fullest extent.