FRENCH DEMOCRACY

Waikato Times, Volume 125, Issue 20911, 16 September 1939, Page 13 (Supplement)

FRENCH DEMOCRACY

(Pierre Brossolette, Foreign Editor, Le Populaire, Paris.)

IT IS EASY to understand why the grantof “full powers” to the Government headed by M. Edouard Daladier should have aroused—in Paris and elsewhere—certain apprehensions concerning the future of the Parliamentary regime in France. Never before has a Premier obtained such wide powers for so long a period of time. After its experiments with despotism and with absolute power, first under the Monarchy and then under the. reigns of the two Napoleons, the French nation has sought a guarantee against the return of autarchy in the strict and permanent control exercised by Parliament over the Government. Since 1871, the rule has constantly been that there can be no law, no budget, unless it is first voted by the two Houses. And now a Government, already in possession of very wide powers since October, 1938, finds itself invested until November 30—practically the end of the year—with sovereign powers which enable it not only to promulgate the budget for next year, but also to decide whether the 1940 elections shall be adjourned c c not. to change the electoral regime, or even, if it so pleases, to abolish meetings and the freedom of the press. Never Since the Time of Napoleon 111 have such extreme powers been granted to any sovereign. Never, even during the world war, has Parliamentary control ceased to function as completely as it has today. It is therefore not difficult to understand the apprehension that has manifested itself that parliamentary institutions are on the decline in France, and that the unprecedented powers granted to M. Daladier are really the first step toward an authoritarian regime, or to employ the accepted phrase, toward a species of to tali tarianism. Naturally, the Government denies any wish to introduce into France the slightest form of a totalitarian regime and regards all suppositions of this kind as prejudical. Its thesis is that the country is actually faced with international difficulties such as it has never before known, that it is threatened by countries which derive considerable superiority in the realms of action and propaganda through their dictatorial regimes, and that if France wishes to surmount this grave obstacle it must meet exceptional circumstances by requiring a no less exceptional accommodation of its traditions of liberty. Once this is done, we are asured, once the danger is over, the Parliamentary regime Will Once More Function Normally Are these assurances absolutely sincere? Are not a certain number of people in the entourage of the head of the French Government saying that after all, even if the international sky should clear, it would be very pleasant to remain in power by means of a prolongation of the present exceptional state of affairs ? And has not M. Daladier himself sometimes been moved by his extreme personal temperament to think that the salvation of France is synonymous with his own presence at the head of the Government? One cannot, of course, be sure of anything. But that is not the real problem. In order to substitute an authoritarian regime for a Parliamentary one, the wish to do so is not sufficient. One must have, the ability to accomplish it. Let us suppose that the present Government, or certain of its supporters, entertain such plans, the question arises as to whether they could obtain the prolongation of their powers, and whether they could make use of these powers to cause the Dissappearance of the Liberties wnich still flourish throughout the country. Naturally, the answer to this question varies according to the angle from which the evolution of the international situation is envisaged. There are three possibilities: that war is imminent: or, on the contrary, that a lasting “detente” is to be hoped for; or, lastly, the present tension is likely to be indefinitely prolonged. In the case of war, the powers enjoyed by the Government would differ extensively from those granted to M. Daladier. In one sense they would be wider, since they would include censorship of press and radio and general requisition rights to supply the needs of national defence. But, on the other hand, there is little doubt that the Government would, from the outbreak of hostilities, become one of nations 1 union which would exclude all risk of any attempt for personal power, either by an individual or by a party. Furthermore in more ways than one, collaboration between Parliament and the Government is indespensable in time of war. So that, however paradoxical it may appear, war would probably lead to practices closer to Parliamentarianism than those at present employed. But this does not mean that either grave losses, or success due to the exceptional talents of a general, would not give the military element the temptation of assuming the essentials of power; similarly, following a Prolonged and Impoverishing Conflict, the eventuality of social movements—through which democratic institutions might suffer profound changes—cannot be excluded. But these are only extreme possibilities, and rather theoretical ones even then, and they are only mentioned in order to make our examination scrupulously complete. Let us suppose that, instead of culminating in war, the present situation should become markedly and permanently easier. In such a case it may be held as certain that the chances of success of totalitarian ideologies. in France would become once more almost non-existent. For it cannot be ignored that if M. Daladier has obtained exceptional powers, he did so by exploiting the gravity of the international situation. It furnished him with an extremely convenient argument for asking that the work of the Government might be neither hin-

Marking Time :: Government’s Full Power

dered nor retarded by Parliamentary discussions. And if the opposition, to counter these practices, has abstained from having recourse to the means which it would have employed normally—campaigns of public meetings and social and political agitation •—it is because it did not wish to give the impression abroad that the country was divided and thus increase the temptation that the adversaries of France might have to range themselves either against France or against its allies. But it is self-evident that were the international tension eased, the opposition could make immediate use of all the means at its disposal, and if the necessity of financial national defence at all costs ceased to determine the working classes to bear without protest the crushing burden of taxation, France would see as it always has since 1871, the Victory of the Democratic Forces, which, by elections and street manifestations, have always succeeded in breaking the retrograde action of a conservative press and of vested financial interests. This does not mean that French democracy would not be faced by serious problems. The methods of Parliamentary discussion in France, which have existed for so long, are certainly an anachronism today. They need revising. The question would also be raised as to whether purely political assemblies are capable of intervening usefully and wisely in the social and economic realms which are so important to-day. But it is difficult to see why these problems should not be solved by the ordinary democratic methods, just as the religious, scholastic, and financial problems of the last century—which seemed, when they arose, just as hard to answer as the present social and economic difficulties—were solved. Recourse to authoritarian measures would not therefore appear inevitable. France is a country with a strong political education, and can in no way be compared in this respect with Germany or Italy in the. days immediately preceding the establishment of Fascism in those countries. There remains therefore only the most obscure eventuality, the prolongation for an indefinite period of the present international tension. In such a case, it is certain that it would be extremely easy for the present Government to remain indefinitely in power and to maintain democratic rules and habits in ever-deepening abeyance. If the international situation has not cleared up by November 30 it is difficult to see what would prevent M. Daladier at that time from asking for and obtaining the Renewal of His “ Special Powers.” There is also nothing to stop him then from adjourning for one or two years, if not longer, the elections which ought normally to be held in 1940, and thus avoid popular control as he has already avoided Parliamentary control. It is difficult to see, too, what could stop M, Paul Reynaud, the Finance Minister, from continuing to impose an anti-democratic fiscality- by decree laws. The patriotic motives which now paralyse the opposition would continue to paralyse it if threats from abroad remained as serious. The despotism which characterises the actions of the present Government could therefore continue, be accepted and become the rule, and it is possible that public opinion, gradually becoming accustomed to an exceptional regime, corresponding to quite extraordinary circumstances, would end up by letting itself go, insensibly, to indifference and passive acceptance. In the economic realm the risk is all the more appreciable in that the latest financial decree laws of M. Paul Reynaud are obviously the answer to preoccupations other than those of last November. Through those the Government was trying above all to restore “confidence” among the middle classes by a return to the more classical theses of liberalism; more liberty was granted to enterprises by revising the limitations imposed upon them by the social legislation of 1936. In appearance at least, therefore, the constraint could pass as destined to re-establish what the economist Terms a Liberal Regime. But, obviously, the April decrees no longer have exclusively this aim. The systematic taxation of consumption gives the impression that the Government has secretly tried to prejudice industries producing articles for consumption in order to carry over the productive effort to factories useful to national defence. On the other hand, if the restrictions imposed by the 1936 laws on the liberty of employers when engaging labour have been gradually abolished by the Daladier Government, the April decrees have established new ones, particularly with regard to industries engaged in national defence. Thus the new decrees increase the authority of the Executive in the social and economic as well as in the political realms and tend to institute, a beginning of “war economy,” as such a state is described in totalitarian countries. These remarks enable us to answer with a fair degree of accuracy the question of whether the granting of full powers to the Daladier Government is a stage on the way to the establishment of an Authoritarian Regime in France. It can be said of the French people that, deeply individualistic and “frondeurs,” they will only tolerate a “strong” Government in the measure of a proportionate, danger from the exterior. M. Daladier owes the extraordinary position which he has created for himself to Herr Adolf Hitler and Signor Benito Mussolini. When the danger which these two dictators represent disappears. France will return to its democratic practices. But it would be well that this day be not too long delayed. For nothing is as demoralising for countries strongly attached to liberty as to remain in tutelage for a long period.