SUBMARINE WARFARE

Waikato Times, Volume 125, Issue 20908, 13 September 1939, Page 11

SUBMARINE WARFARE

DRAMA OF THE GREAT WAR HEAVY TOLL ON ALLIED SHIPS SUCCESS OF CONVOY SYSTEM The part played by German submarines in the Great War of 19141918 and the methods adopted by the British Admiralty to combat the menace are of exceptional interest. As interesting an account of those fateful years as any is found in a chapter of the biography of the Rt. lion. Winston S. Churchill, “Thought and Adventures." Mr Churchill was First Lord of the Admiralty in 1914-15 and has bjen included in the present War Cabinet in a similar capacity. In his book he states that the years 1914 and 1915 had vindicated Admiralty strategy. The va6tness of the unseen task performed by the fleets was not fully appreciated in those days of stress and strain. The whole of 'the enemy trade had been swept off the outer seas, and all avenues ol victualment and reinforcement were held for the sole use of the Allies. In April, 1915, England enjoyed a supremacy at sea the like of which had never been seen even In the days of Nelson. Security was so complete as to pass unnoticed. The strategic effect of placing the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow before the declaration of war had been alike complete and instantaneous. Whom at the end of August, 1914, the prestige of the Royal Navy was proved by the brilliant and lucky dash into the Heligoland Bight, the Kaiser—all his in-feriority-complexes confirmed by the sinking of his cruises on their very war parade-ground—accepted the triumph of British naval power on the surface of the seas. Turned to Submarine© The thoughts of the German Admirais, thus foiled, turned inevitably to the submarine. Here was a wonderful and terrible new weapon, whose power and endurance had never been tested by any country till war came. Yet it was not until February, 1915, that Germany resolved to employ this method against commerce and von Poll! was allowed to proclaim the first German blockade of the British Isles. This was an enormous decision. But though the world looked with horror ami indignation at the sinking of merchant ships without a thought for , the safety of passengers and crews, the British Admiralty felt no serious ! ■ alarm. They knew the Germans had only about 25 L-boats, and that no , more than one-third of them could be on the prowl at once. On hundreds of ships proceeding weekly in and out of scores of harbours, this handful of marauders could make no serious impression. No substantial or even noticeable injury was wrought upon British commerce by the first German submarine campaign. Upon the other hand, grave difficulties loomed up for Germany. The torpedoes that sunk neutral ships destroyed the goodwill of the neutral world. Finally, the sinking of the Lusitania roused a storm of wrath and a Note from America which brought the campaign in British waters to a close. The first U-boat attack ceased in June, 1915, and thereafter for more than a year—nearly two years in all since the declaration of war—the British command of the seas was absolute and unchallenged. Had the war ended in 1915 or 1916, history would have recorded, in spite of the brokenoff encounter of the fleets at Jutland, that the domination of the British Navy had been undisturbed. Building U-BoaU All this tme the Germans were building U-boats, and the German Ad- : niiralty staff clamoured uneeatdngly lo be allowed to use them. The conflict between the Civil Power, te: rilled ol bringing the United States and other neutral countries into the war against them, and the German admirals, is a long, cold, intense drama. From October, 1916, onwards German submarine activities had been increasing, and on January 9, 1917, the civilians in Germany abandoned their opposition to extremist measures. A hundred submarines lay ready to proceed on fateful missions. *The admirals marshalled facts and figures to prove that unrestricted U-boat warfare would certainly yield a sinkage of 600,000 tons a month, and that five months of this would bring Great Britain, the arch-enemy and soul of the hostile co-operation, to her knees. The orders were issued and the unrestricted warfare-began on February It was some time before the Government felt any real concern but the sinkings mounted month b\ month. The sinkings of British, Allied and neutral merchant shipping by submarines alone had crept up in October and 000 tons a month. In January the total was still 284.000 tons. In’February the sinkings rose to nearly 470,000 tons. April saw another tremendous rise, when a total of 837,000 tons was sunk. The methods of defence fell into three categories. The first was mechanical. The dodges and devices of 1915 had been elaborated and multiplied. Depth charges, hydrophones to detect submarine engines, flotilla-hunting manoeuvres, explosives, nets with tell-tale buoys, decoy©, zig-zagging, all were in full activity. The second category was the re-organisation of the Naval Staff. But Jt was the adoption -of a third expedient, the tactics of convoy, that alone decided the fate of nations. By July the convoy system was in full working order and monthly sinkings fell from 800,000 tons to 300,000 tons. By October 1, 782 great ships had been convoyed across j the seas with the loss of only IG7. The war effurt of the allies had never slackened. The American armies had been carried safely across the seas, and the doom of Germany had for ; some months been only a'matter of lime. »