CHAMBERLAIN'S CHANGES

Waikato Times, Volume 124, Issue 20821, 3 June 1939, Page 15 (Supplement)

CHAMBERLAIN'S CHANGES

Reversal of Policy : : What was the Reason)

(Mallory Browne in American Journal.)

SELDOM, IF EVER, has it been so difficult to get a true perspective on the European situation as a whole. At a moment when the- map is changing every few days, and the diplomatic alignment shifting every few hours—or so at least it would seem—it is hard to get far enough away from events to see the European picture as an ensemble. Yet perspective—a view of European trends as a whole—was certainly never more necessary if we are to see where current developments are leading us. As Mr Anthony Eden said at a luncheon in London the other day: “ He is a rash man who would dare hazard a guess as to what the situation will be even a few days from now.” Nevertheless the impressions in the various European capitals whose business it is to look ahead are well worth recording, and provide perhaps the safest way of perceiving the implications for the future of present developments. To take London first: Prime Minister Chamberlain’s pledge of military aid to Poland, implying as it does vast —in fact almost unlimited—new British commitments to resist any further German expansion in Europe, is Certainly a Far Cry from the appeasement policy of the autumn and winter months. What is the real meaning of this sudden and apparently inexplicable reversal? All sorts of explanations are published and whispered here: Such as “ultimatum” from the Foreign Secretary, Viscount Halifax, revolt of other Cabinet members, pressure from the United States Government, orders from the Conservative Party machine. A close study of the Premier and the British public during the past few months rather indicates that these guesses completely miss the point. The explanation seems simple. The strength of Mr Chamberlain lies essentially in the fact that he is an average Englishman. Like Herr Hitler in his earlier years when the Reichsfuhrer rose to power, Mr Chamberlain embodies the emotions, faults, ideals, and reactions of the great majority of the British people, especially in the provincial cities and countryside, which is what really counts in the end—not the very vocal but small group of liberals and intellectuals in London. Thus what has happened is that Mr Chamberain, synchronised with the vast body of British opinion, has awakened only with them to the peril inherent in German Expansion and Domination of the Continent of Europe. It must be remembered that Englishmen outside of London have hitherto been hardly less isolationist than the middle westerners of the United States. It took the latest mid-March raid against Czechoslovakia to awaken these Siople to the impossibility of further comrtable isolationism. It is impossible not to be deeply impressed by the sudden change in British opinion since the seizure of Czechoslovakia by Germany on March 14. One may talk to many British people—diplomats, members of Parliament, businessmen, journalists, and others—and nearly everywhere there is the same sharp transformation; all those numerous English men and women who formerly were only too ready to give Germany the benefit of the doubt, in fact to justify its actions on the basis of the alleged wrongs of the Versailles Treaty and

the mistakes of France and England in postwar years—all of them are now convinced, almost against their wills, that German pledges are not to be honoured. In Paris, the reaction of the latest German coups de force has been less marked. “Well, what else did you expect? What are you surprised about?” is the answer the average Frenchman gives, with an expressive shrug of his shoulders. Unlike many Englishmen, most Frenchmen have always been more than slightly sceptical as to the value to be put on Herr Hitler’s assurances of peaceful intentions, and therefore his latest violation came as less of a shock. Still, me practical effect of Germany’s absorption of Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia was actually greater in France than in England. Premier Edouard Daladief seized the occasion to carry a big step further his efforts to impose upon France the ' Authority, Discipline, and Unity which it has visibly lacked. M. Daladier’s own leaning toward authoritarianism —not to say dictatorship—are almost an open secret, and the mid-March European crisis gave him an opportunity, which he was significantly quicK. to perceive and utilise, of carrying a long stage ahead his own personal hold on France. it wouid be an obvious mistake to speak of M. Daladier as a dictator thus far, but it would be at least equally naive to fail to register.the fact that circumstances appear to be sweeping him along in the direction in which he is by no means loath to let himself be carried. Most enlightening of all perhaps were conversations with several Germans. Two of these, it so happened, had recently returned from interviews with Herr Hitler himself. Briefly, this is what they believed to be Germany’s plan: Through economic penetration of the type which recently produced the Germano-Rumanian trade treaty, Herr Hitler would continue gradually to extend his hegemony over the whole of South-east-ern Europe—Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and perhaps later, Greece and Turkey. Poland, the one danger point which the Germans fear, because they recognise that the Poles are perfectly capable of precipitating a war to avoid becoming a dependency of the Reich, would be pacified if possible by a Combination of Concessions and Threats. Then—and this is the essence of Herr Hitler’s plan as these highly-placed Germans revealed it—Germany and Italy together will suddenly present England and France, some time this year, with May or September as the favoured months, with a daring plan for dividing Europe into four specific spheres of influence. This scheme, according to present plans, would be sprung suddenly on the world as a glorified peace plan sponsored either by Signor Mussolini and Herr Hitler, or by the former alone posing in the same role of peace-maker which he assumed at the time of the Munich agreement late last September. Like many other best-laid plans of mice and men it may very well “gang aft a-gley.” The same Germans, who claim to be convinced of its veracity, insist at the same time that Herr Hitler will above all in no circumstances allow Germany to run the risk of a defeat. In other words, he will not hesitate to modify any plans if he felt they were not assured of success.