MUNICH AND EUROPE

Waikato Times, Volume 124, Issue 20740, 25 February 1939, Page 1 (Supplement)

MUNICH AND EUROPE

CHANGED SITUATION : : NEW. ERA OPENED

(Christian Science Monitor.)

IN THE PERIOD THAT has passed since Munich it is clear that this has become a different world. For since the partition of Czechoslovakia began, many of the foundations of the international order are seen to have been swept away. From the moment that the German troops crossed the bastion of Bohemia, it was apparent that the era of Versailles had ended and that the boundaries drawn after the World War were again subject to change. From the moment that Eduard Benes resigned the Presidency of Czechoslovakia, it was seen that the remnant of the Republic had passed under the hegemony of Germany—that German continental influence had replaced that of France, and that economic control, if not wider domination of South-eastern Europe, was in the hands of the Reich. But there are other fundamentals and far-reaching implications which bear upon the task of erecting a New Order in the World. The new situation is not to be divorced from its moral implications. It cannot be separated from the problems arising from the methods that have been used. Yet the “realistic elements” of to-day’s fast moving developments need to be appreciated as a first approach to the practical tasks of establishing that peace which “may yet be achieved for our time.” Some preliminary assessment of major changes can be obtained by fitting developments of recent months into a pattern of eight fundamentals:— I.—Efforts to end war have entered their third phase since the “war to end war.” After Munich, the world’s millions voiced their unspeakable relief at reprieve from holocaust. In assessing the costs and the future, no sane individual will underestimate the worth of having achieved a period of peace. But the efforts to make that peace secure are faced by the fact that the balance of power on the Continent has crumbled. Active support of the League of Nations and of strategic security was the immediate sequel to the World War. Secondly, expansion of the Fascist powers caused Europe’s major nations to attempt to effect a traditional “balance of power.” The third phase begins with the. balance completely altered by Germany’s resurgence, the simultaneous weakening of French influence, and the loosening of the bonds which fixed the boundaries of the postwar states. The action over Czechoslovakia merely Placed the Capstone Upon a Trend. How far a new balance will result from the promised international guarantees of the new borders of Czechoslovakia is not yet apparent. For Great Britain, a specific commitment in the centre of Europe involves significant precedent. And the effectiveness with which such guarantees could be implemented remains a controlling factor in the balance which they would be designed to create. ll.—Germany has returned to Empire. The German imperium is not defined alone by the 225,000 square miles, which now exceed by 8 per cent the nation’s pre-war Continental area. The indications are that no European Power is in a position to halt the eastward march of the. Reich’s influence before it reaches the Dardanelles—a point which there is considerable reason for assuming may be the “line of resistance” drawn by Downing Street. Preparations for ultimate possession of colonies continue apace in Germany. And possible expansion in the Ukraine—at the expense of Russia, which Germany may claim is an Asiatic Power—is interpreted by some as not incompatible with the German declaration that its last territoral demands “in Europe” have been satisfied. lll.—Democracy has been placed more definitely on the defensive. The territorial successes of the “dynamic” States have increased the division with which the world views the growth of Fascism. The effort to range the democracies in a military front against the dictators offers Only Aggravation of the Conflict. The effort to regard the Fascist ideology merely as one would an incompatible neighbour fails to recognise those aspects of the problem which are a concern to the community at large. Munich brought an increasing recognition that the. solution lies at neither extreme. It proceeds from recognition that the drive and force of liberalism had been retarded because of the complacent belief that liberal ideals were so recognised that they required no defence. Nothing can be clearer in the new world than that the need for a renewed commitment to individual freedom and liberty presents a challenge as great to-day as at any time in history. The ideological battle can be won only by strengthening liberal government, not by fighting the dictatorships.

IV.—America has, in fact, become less isolated than ever. This may seem incomprehensible in the face of the increased “stay-out-of-other-people’s-wars” sentiment. But

in any consideration of long range policy it must be seen that the United States is no longer “insulated” by Britain from the impact of European events. A heightened American naval building programme has taken into account the restrictions which Britain has imposed on its own sphere of action. It is no longer possible for the United States to concentrate its entire naval strength in the Pacific, feeling that its eastern coastline may be entrusted to British control of the Atlantic. British problems at home clearly leave the American role more sharply cast in the Far East. The stiffening diplomatic attitude toward Japanese economic encroachment on the Asiatic continent reflects this development. Any demarche touching Japan’s expansion can hardly proceed without American sponsorship. And in South America where Fascist penetration proceeds with fewer restraints from Europe, the Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine arises not out of direct action but through cultural propaganda and economic indirection. V. —Rearmament has entered a new phase. Prior to the Reich’s expansion, as represented in the absorption of Austria and Sudetenland, rearmament could be characterised as a “retreat from disarmament.” The postMunich heightening of defence measures, however, has brought the democracies to the task with almost the same desperation that marked rearmament of the dissatisfied powers. The problem for the world appears twofold. Granting that no permanent peace can be forged without ultimate disarmament there is, nevertheless, the immediate necessity to prove that the sheer weight of munitions need not, in itself, breed conflict if other provocative elements in the equation be controlled. Second is the need for redoubling the efforts not only toward immediate pacification but toward those longrange readjustments which alone can establish some sense of justice and rationality. VI. —Two opposing economic systems are vying for ascendancy. Britain and the United States stand as major exponents of an “open” world economy, the effort to break down the barriers of international trade and restore the world commercial equilibrium on as wide a basis as possible. Germany is proceeding upon a “closed” economic theory in which autarchy—economic self-sufficiency—becomes a major objective. Italy, as well, bending every effort toward self-sufficiency, has raised autarchy to the level of a Fascist political-economic doctrine. The contention between the two methods may in some measure be compared with the past century’s conflict between free trade and protective tariff. It is not yet apparent how long the economic world can exist “Half Controlled and Half Free.” VTL—Self-determination has openly been made the instrument of power politics. This doctrine—the establishment of national bounaries upon racial and linguistic lines—was admittedly applied imperfectly in the World War treaties. But the Czech settlement proceeded without the people themselves having any direct voice in the change and even without time for exchange of populations. Promised plebiscites were not held and some threequarters of a million Czechs have been placed under German sovereignty. Germany has persuaded Hungary to keep its demands within a racial framework but the limitation springs from political rather than ethnographic objectives and racial minorities continue to be “abandoned” in those areas where their inclusion in the homeland states does not serve as an immediate aid to policy. VIII.—A breathing spell has been provided. It is to achieve the “larger settlement” for which hope was expressed after Munich that new advances must be made. In some sense of restitution for the tremendous sacrifice demanded of the Czechs, it is still necessary to provide a far greater measure of international assistance for the new State. Moreover a more adequate approach to the resultant refugee problem is still to be found. Beyond such immediate steps toward pacification lies the problem of whether the anticipated “Era of Conferences” can be established. The question is whether two-power and four-power negotiations are to be sufficient to establish justice. They may be the only means that seem possible at the moment. But a broadened method that will hear all parties to a dispute and establish the reign of law as something higher than the immediate policy of individual nations must remain the goal toward which responsible statesmen will strive. It has been recognised that the “trouble with the World War” was not only the war, but the improper peace which followed it. The fluid state which follows a war has been, in a large measure, created by the Munich settlement. Creation of a just and lasting peace remains the opportunity of to-day and to-morrow.