GERMANY AND AFRICA

Waikato Times, Volume 124, Issue 20734, 18 February 1939, Page 25 (Supplement)

GERMANY AND AFRICA

AMERICAN ATTITUDE PANAMA CANAL DEFENCE QUESTION OF DIPLOMACY Discussion of thp aequisition nf an American naval b;.sr i n the British West Indies -preferably at Trinidad —is the result in Jho ‘stale Department and naval quarters here of knowledge that London is considering the possibility of offering colonial concessions to Germany in Africa, .-ays a Washington message tn the Christian Science Monitor. The discussion has two aspects—one diplomatic and one strategic. On tin- diplomatic side discussion of the possibility serves as a reminder to • Britain that any territorial concessions to Germany which would bring it closer to Latin America than any outlying American military base today would be viewed most unfavourably here. On the strategic side is the fact that the United States is fairly well in control to-day of the northern half of the Caribbean area, but has no potential bases in the southern half of : the chain of islands which rim the j Caribbean and therefore control the approaches to the Panama Canal. While the whole question is only ! !he subject of hypothetical discussion the fact that it is being discussed is j evidence of the extreme seriousness i w?lh which Washington view's the j post-Munich possibility of restoration : 1.0 Germany of a position in Africa j from which—given modern means of ; communication—it could exert im- | portant influence on South America. I A Diplomatic Axiom Behind !hp discussions is the diplo- j matic axiom that small nations tend to gravitate into the orbit or the nearest large Power. The United States always has been the nearest large Power to La (in America. Germany, firmly established on the western , coast of Africa, -might 'bernme a nearer Power. Its position in South America would undoubtedly be enhanced by acquisition of areas in the north-west of Africa. Germany is known to have for years east interested glances at. Liberia. Also, if suggestions that Portugal pay the colonial price for German overseas renaissance are to be taken seriously the Portuguese colony of Port Guinea is a possible foothold for Germany. Port Guinea and Liberia would give Germany an excellent base of operations for a programme of aggressive commercial and cultural penetration into South America. Both are located on the western hump of Africa which reaches out into the Atlantic towards South America. Both would bring Germany nearer to Brazil and the Argentine than the Panama Canal.

Concern in Washington over the j future of Liberia is acute. As an unofficial American protectorate, it now j | provides a means whereby American j aviation could get a foothold in the I South Atlantic. It constitutes virtu- j ally the only source of rubber avail- ' able to the United States which is not j | controlled by British or Dutch inters ests. In other words —to put it bluntly— j j American diplomacy does not want j Germany to obtain a foothold in North-west Africa. The question therefore arises what would be done if Britain should suggest to Germany that it satisfy it* j colonial ambitions at the expense of | Portugal—and Of Liberia. Site For Base Needed On the theory that such a concession to Germany would be a threat to United States influence in South America the Washington thesis runs that if Britain intends to allow such a development it would owe the United Slates an opportunity to counteract this German influence by permitting the United States to develop at least a naval base in the southern part of the West Indies. From the naval point 'of view' the most desirable place would be Trinidad where a harbour big enough to accommodate the entire United States fleet is to be found. This does not imply any desire to j obtain Trinidad. Complete ownership of the colony, it is considered, would | carry with it more disadvantages than i advantages. All that is considered j desirable is a naval base. This could 1 be accomplished by lease. The United , States now has a naval base In Cuba at Guantanamo under lease from Cuba, ! Why not —it is asked here—obtain a base at Trinidad by lease? Such a base would enormously tm- j prove the defences of the Panama j Canal. It would also bring American 1 naval strength 500 miles nearer to j South America —and therefore in a better position to counteract by Its ; presence potential future German in- j fluence in that continent. The. question is whether Britain would ever consent to any such arrangement. The Washington suggestion* at this time is probably to be interpreted rather as an indication of the. seriousness with which Washington views discussion of territorial I 'concessions to Germany in Africa than . as important per se. But it shows the degree to which the results of the Munich settlement have stirred up reassessment of all phases of America’s position relative to Latin America.