BRITAIN’S FOREIGN POLICY

Waikato Times, Volume 122, Issue 20498, 14 May 1938, Page 13 (Supplement)

BRITAIN’S FOREIGN POLICY

Realist’s View : : Premier’s Appeal to Reason

(Scrutator in Sunday Times.)

MR. CHAMBERLAIN is to be congratulated on the success of his speech. It has been well received in Europe. Germany is pleased because he has refused to commit us in advance to coalition against her; France because he is resolute to maintain and strengthen the bonds that unite us to her; Italy because he thinks that her word is still worthy; and Czechoslovakia because he gives her ground for hope that statesmanship may yet avert the tribulation that will certainly be hers if she is treated as a mere paAvn in the game of the balance of power. At home the country is as near unanimity as it ever is except in war time, and even Mr Churchill, hitherto the real leader of the Opposition on these questions, sees in the speech an approach to his own views—a sign perhaps that he has seen reason to chasten them. So much praise, indeed, has the speech had that some will ask whether the Prime Minister has not made the mistake of pleasing too many people at once. Are there in his statement of policy inherent contradictions which time is sure to expose? Is he purchasing immediate relief by postponing problems which will return in an aggravated form by reason of the delay ? These are Questions That Must Be Faced. The real answer is that he is one who still retains faith in human nature. You may regard international politics as a match either between all black and all white or between various shades of grey and brown; as a purely mechanical resultant of forces which you may adjust but cannot alter, or as the working of the subtle chemistry of human nature with changing reactions and precipitants; as the sport of fate or the choice of reason. According as you take the one view or the other you will want to force the issue and accuse Mr Chamberlain of timidity and procrastination; or you will see in him the best hope of shaping the ends of destiny in accord with reason and humanity. The division of opinion when it is not made by party factiousness is temperamental rather than political. But Mr Chamberlain is also a realist, and he recognises that armed might can overthrow unarmed reason; if not for ever at any rate for long enough to bring frightful disaster on the world. Therefore rearmament, as complete and rapid as may be, is the basis of his appeal to reason.

As a realist he sees that the military combinations which we are bidden to prepare have nothing whatever to do with the Covenant of the League but are another form of the system of alliances that led to the Great War, and for geographical and other reasons a weaker form than it was then. Collective security is, in fact, an exaggeration of that collective insecurity from which we suffered in the Great War. As a realist, again, he is barred equally from saying either that we will defend Czechoslovakia or that we disinterest ourselves entirely in its future.

To say the one thing at this juncture is to invite Germany to do as she pleases; to say the other is to make promises that we might not be able to fulfil. In a democratic State only the will of the people can make it possible to carry on a serious war, and in the absence of any vital interest it is imposible to say in advance and irrespective of all circumstances that the will of the people would be either for or against participation, or what would be the duty of a Government to advise. What, then, are the circumstances under which it is conceivable that we might again be compelled to enter on a Great War? The clearest case of all would be if Italy were to dispute the security of our main sea highway through the Mediterranean. For that reason Spain, not Czechoslovakia, has become the Principal Issue In Our Foreign Politics, and the negotiations with Italy hold the place of most immediate importance. If, as seems probable, General Franco wins in Spain it may well be, as Mr Eden was fond of arguing, that the Power which has intervened least will be the most popular in Spain; on the other hand, it is possible that General Franco, out of gratitude or under some sort of coercion, may reward the Powers that have helped him by alienating Spanish territory to them or by giving them concessions in some form or another that would dangerously weaken us in the Mediterranean. There, at any rate, it could not be argued either here or in France that no vital interest was concerned. For France, too, any disturbance of the allegiance

on the shores of the Mediterranean Avould be a far more serious menace than anything that could happen in Central Europe. At the worst, territorial changes in Central Europe would only make contingent invasion more easy; but changes on the seaboard of the Mediterranean would be actual invasion. They would separate France from her North African colonies, and us from the rest of the Empire. We should indeed have an alternative route by the Cape, but the longer voyage might well make it impossible for us to support our population with food or our industries with raw materials. Can we, then, separate Europe into two parts, one in which we have no vital interests to defend and therefore need not, and should not, take on fresh responsibilities, and another in which we have vital interests which we would defend irrespective of circumstances? With our answer to that question is bound up the Whole Issue of Peace and War in Europe, not perhaps this year or next, but ultimately. If you can separate them peace should be certain; if you cannot war is probable. The real object of Mr Chamberlain’s policy is to effect this separation, and the refusal to commit ourselves in advance to any fresh obligation in Eastern Europe is an important initial success. The conversations with Italy are the next stage, and apparently Mr Chamberlain has good hopes of success. If success were in fact achieved, it would remove what, after all, was the main cause of our going to war in 1914, namely, a challenge to our seapower. If they were a failure Mussolini might be cast for the part of the Von Tirpitz of a new war. It would not be a happy role for him, and it is not one that is necessary to the fulfilment of any legitimate German ambitions in the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. To use Italy against Germany is no part of our diplomacy. There remains another set of circumstances which might threaten peace even if an arrangement were made with Italy and the idea of any challenge to British seapower were eliminated. France has committed herself to the defence of Czechoslovakia, and if she intervenes to protect her Russia is under promise to intervene on the same side. With or without us, success could not be guaranteed. For geographical reasons the war would be fought mainly in the air, and its incidents would revolt the world by their cruelty and their insane destructiveness; if the Russian army were to take part there would be the added abomination of an invaded Belgium in the East. But suppose that the fortunes of war went ill and France were invaded by Germany, the motive of vital British interest absent in the East and exorcised by diplomacy in the Mediterranean would again revive. For that reason Mr Chamberlain frankly admits that when once a war of this character had started no one could guarantee that we should keep out of it. We could not allow France To Be Crushed or Dismembered, alike for reasons of affection and of our own safety. The strongest argument of all against arrangements, however contingent, for common action in Czechoslovakia is that it would create a division of Europe into opposing alliances that we are anxious to avoid. Ultimately, the chance of peace rests on the power to find some accommodation with Eastern Europe between German ambition and state liberties. Justice is not all on one side; but must be distributed impartially. It is still reasonable to think that if Germany can get justice for Germans outside her borders without war, and without dislocation of national independence, she would prefer peace. Czechoslovakia has already shown that she would prefer a settlement of statesmanship rather than of war; there is not a sign that she resents our refusal to commit ourselves in advance; it may even be that she sees, as Belgium and Poland have done, that the offers of assistance of Great Powers are not wholly disinterested or an unmixed advantage. Mr Chamberlain’s decision is both courageous and logical. He recognises that power-politics may prevail and that circumstances may be too strong for our neutrality. He therefore presses forward our rearmament with fresh energy. But for the present his appeal is to reason and enlightened self-interest. If you are appealing to anyone’s reason you do not shake your fist in his face too. And it is his duty to encourage Czechoslovakia as well as Germany to a just and honourable settlement.