Far Eastern Situation.

Waikato Times, Volume 121, Issue 20278, 21 August 1937, Page 15 (Supplement)

Far Eastern Situation.

Lord Lytton In Christian Science Monitor

THE FACT that the League of Nations failed even to try to effeat a settlement of the Far Eastern situation in 1932 and 1933 has had a disastrous effect upon international relatione. After appointing a commission to Investigate the facts of the Manchurian crisis, and adopting the unanimous findings of its commission, the League adjourned sine die any further consideration of a possible solution of the complicated situation in the Far East. The committee which was appointed by the Assembly to examine the recommendations of its commission of inquiry in Chapters IX and X of its report has not even met, and the abandonment of all further attempts at mediation so discredited the League that its value as an international agency for securing justioe and preserving peace has progressively diminished. The Far East remains one of the danger zones threatening International peace, and other zones of equal danger have since been added. Sooner or later, if the League is to survive, It must face up to the Far Eastern problem and take up again, at the point where they were dropped, the threads that may lead to an acceptable and permanent settlement In that region. In the last few weeks Indications have appeared both In Japan and In Great Britain of a realisation that such a settlement is desirable and of a wish to bring It about. The opinion thus Indicated, however, has been based on the assumption that Great Britain and Japan might settle this question between them, and the solution indicated Is that Great Britain should reoognlse the State of ManohUkuo and recover the friendship of Japan by acquiescing in the Japanese protectorate of Manchuria, which was forcibly established in 1931-32. It should be made clear at the earliest moment and with the strongest emphasis that no solution can be achieved on those lines. The Only Bhred of Credit that the League can claim In Its handling of this question Is the fact that up to now It has refused to recognise the situation which has been created by force, and a unilateral departure by Great Britain from this position would be a betrayal of the League, which the British people would never permit. Any such action would only embitter still further international relations and increase rather than diminish the danger of future conflicts. A solution can Ibe found, .and must some day be found, if war is to be averted, but It will be a collective solution and not one brought about by an alliance of two or more Powers to condone an act of violence and Injustice. The smaller Powers of the world Joined the League in the confident belief that It would be strong enough collectively to defend them from aggression by their more powerful neighbours. Their faith has been badly shaken in recent years by the fate of China and Ethiopia, but they would have no further use for a League, the more powerful members of which entered into alliances with one another to annex or partition the territory of the weaker ones. If this were ever to happen, they would be forced in self-defence to seek alliances of their own, and the world would be driven back once more Into the dangerous system of Power polltios In which large groups of heavily-armed States would be plunged Into war with eaoh other In a World Struggle for Supremacy, If a settlement of the Far Eastern problem is not to be sought by an Anglo-Japanese alliance at the -expense of China, it Is necessary to consider by what other means one is to be sought. The first condition of any solution la that it must be durable, and the experience of history proves that solutions brought about by force can never be durable. If the Far East is to cease to be a danger zone, the settlement must be reached by agreement, and must be acceptable to all the parties concerned. The function of the League of Nations in bringing about such a settlement must be that of an intermediary, a broker, a conciliator. It was for this reason that the commission over which I had the honour to preside frankly recognised the futility of a purely legalistic verdict. If, as the commission found, the action of Japan could not be justified on the ground of self-defence, a legalistic decision would have demanded the restoration of the status quo ante, but the commission recognised that this could only be brought about by force, and, even If the force were available and were employed, it would not remove the seeds of future conflict. It would transfer the sense of injury from China to Japan; it would not establish the,, conditions of a durable peace. Circumstances which had brought about the original conflict would remain to bring about its renewal whenever the opportunity should occur. In all our discussions we tried to convince both the Chinese and the Japanese representatives who gave evidence before us that the League by which we had been appointed was anxious to be of service to both of them; that as both countries were members of the League, they were entitled to its help, and we asked them to assist us In trying to bring about a settlement which would Safeguard the Interests of Each, which would be at the expense of neither, and to which both would be able to look back In the future with satisfaction as the starting point of a new period of more satisfactory relations. Such a solution we tried to indicate in the last two chapters of our report. If the League had spent less time in discussing our findings and had proceeded at once to a consideration of our suggestions for a solution, it is not impossible that one would have been found. The time which has been lost, and the circumstances which have since intervened, have made a solution more difficult, but, provided that the members of the League remain united in their decision not to recognise what was accomplished by force, it may yet be^possible. One circumstance, and one circun®ptance alone, is more favourable to a solution now than when Ihe commission

Failure of the League :: Force Not the Solution

was conducting its inquiry—the U.S.S.R. Is now a member of the League and therefore available to take part in any discussion of a Far Eastern -settlement. It is obvious that the U.S.S.R. as a neighbour State must *be a consenting party to any settlement in that part of the world and one of the guarantors of its maintenance. At the time when our commission was in Manchuria, the U.S.S.R. was not only not a member of the League, but, unlike the United States, was unwilling to take any part in the inquiry. We were unable to obtain any Russian evidence on the spot, and were obliged to write our report without any knowledge of what Russian opinion on the subject might be. That obstacle has now been it is possible now, as it was not in 1932, to discuss a solution with representatives of all the countries primarily concerned in the Far East. In all other respects the situation ifi less favourable than it was. The Prestige of the League Has Diminished, its authority has been flouted with impunity, two of the countries occupying a permanent seat on the Council have resigned and the continued membership of a third is now more embarrassing than its resignation would be, and—worst of all—the statesmen who represent the great Powers seem to have lost their own faith in the possibility of collective action. The starting point for the approach to a settlement to-day would necessarily be different than it was in 1932, but the settlement itself, whenever and however it may be achieved, must be the same. The starting point to-day is the State of Manchukuo. The Japanese, having created it, wish for it to be recognised. As a Japanese protectorate, which it is in fact to-day, the States members of the League are pledged by a resolution of the Assembly not to recognise it. But a seally independent State in Manchuria, guaranteed not by the presence of a Japanese army, but by the wishes of the inhabitants and an international treaty, is the basis on which a permanent settlement in the Far East must be founded.

An independent State In Manchuria, the neutrality of which is guaranteed by all its neighbours, is an indispensable requisite of any durable settlement of the Far Eastern problem. If and when the will to find a settlement by agreement is forthcoming, the means should not ibe impossible. In the view of our commission, the strategic and economic Interests of China and Japan in Manchuria were oapable of reconciliation. It was only their political claims which were incompatible, since they could not possess the area and neither was willing to accept the possession of the other. On the basis that the territory shall not be owned by either, but shall be in fact what it Is claimed to be to-day, a Free and Independent State, all other interests are capable of being adjusted. That the population of Manchuria, which is overwhelmingly Chinese, welcomed or acquiesced in the dependence on Japan which was Implied In the so-called Independence of Manchukuo, no evidence (except in the presence of and obviously at the dictation of Japanese authorities) was produced before our commission, and all the free and independent evidence we heard was in the contrary sense. Whether the governments of China, Japan, the U.S.S.R. and the United States would be willing to negotiate on this basis and whether they could ever agree, no one can predict. But, faced with the alternative of continued political and eoonomlo friction from which they must all be the sufferers, it is not unthinkable that they may one day come to prefer a settlement from which they would all be the gainers. I doubt if such a moment has yet arrived, but, provided that there is no weakening in the unity of the League members, no suggestion of a bilateral solution behind the back of the League, 1 am confident that the need for a solution will soon become recognised. Again, if before negotiations are resumed it is made clear that the solution aimed at is to be at the expense of no country but in the Interests of all, there is every likelihood that they will be entered into In a spirit that will make agreement possible. 1 have refrained from entering into any discussion of the detailed points of difference and difficulty which will need adjustment, since clearly each country must be free to state its own case and select the points of chief importance to itself. 1 have only tried to indicate on the broadest possible lines the kind of solution that might satisfy all claims. The principal thing, before negotiations are resumed, is that Confidence In the Possibility of a collective settlement should be restored, and that the difference should be made clear between a collective settlement by agreement and an imposed settlement whether brought about by force of arms or by diplomatic pressure. When we were in the Far East we were repeatedly reminded, both in China and Japan, of the bitterness which had been created in the past by interventions of a forcible kind, as, for instance, when Japan had been deprived of the fruits of her victory by the diplomatic pressure of European Powers, or when in the midst of the World War China had been forced by Japan to accept the 21 demands. The history of both countries is full of such incidents, and both have every reason to mistrust the greed and selfishness of Western Powers whenever they have intervened in the Far East. Japan is determined to-day never again to be coerced, China is afraid she may be deserted by the friends in whom she has put her trust. Both fears must be dispelled before the willing co-operation of these -two countries can be secured. The League of Nations has no territorial ambitions, no interests to serve except those of peace and Justice, and therefore through the instrumentality of the League procedure alone is any settlement of this difficult problem to be expected.