Problems in Germany.

Waikato Times, Volume 121, Issue 20272, 14 August 1937, Page 15 (Supplement)

Problems in Germany.

AT THE BRINK OF A PRECIPICE (Round Table)

MUCH A 5 A GREAT MANY Germans may dislike the secret police methods and other repressive aspects of the new regime, modern Germany as a whole certainly does not believe in the virtues of democracy as she has experienced it hitherto. The democratic system Is inseparably connected In German minds with the period of humiliation and disaster after 1918. It proved unable to recover for Germany "equality” or freedom to arm herself and manage her own internal affairs as she pleased. Modern Germany Is not militaristic In the old imperialist sense of the word. Her people do not want war for its own sake. But she Is strongly military and will not shrink from the use of her tremendous power if she thinks that is the only way to secure her legitimate rights. Further, the dictatorial form of government, with its control of the Press, Its suppression of contrary opinions, and its national regimentation, gives to those at the head of affairs a freedom of decision and initiative, and a Menacing Power of Propaganda, unknown in democracies where a free public opinion ultimately controls policy through a free press, free elections, and a free parliament. Germany, now that she Is free from the restraints of Versailles and Is recovering her strength, is beginning to demand “equality” in a more expansive sense of the word ■ —the kind of position in the world that she thinks appropriate to a great Power, compared with that of other great Powers. She is once more asking for her place In the sun. That is a complex demand. It relates to the position in Eastern Europe; It raises the colonial question; it has Its economic side; and it concerns, more generally, Germany's status and influence In the oouncils of the nations. There is nothing wicked or malignant in this demand in itself. The severity of the Versailles settlement, and the repudiation of the thesis of sole war guilt made its emergence eventually certain. But It is highly Inconvenient and disturbing to more fortunately situated nations, and it Is very dangerous In face of the Inherent difficulty of peaceful treaty revision, on any extensive scale, especially revision of territorial frontiers. Moreover It tends to bring not only France but also Great Britain Into the picture as ttoe obstacle to what Germany regards as her legitimate right. The answer of France to Germany’s repudiation of the unilateral military discrimination of Versailles . . . was to form a military combination of sufficient strength to maintain the status quo and to deter even an armed Germany from attempting to modify It by force or Matchpolltlk. This combination, however, has proved of doubtful worth. Russia is 500 miles from the German frontier, and her army Is probably of little value outside her own borders. And Italy, largely thanks to the Abyssinian episode, has praotically gone over to the German side. But the strength or weakness of the French system 1s not the whole story. Recently many of the German leaders. who have hitherto been extremely cordial In their attitude towards Great Britain, have begun to feel that ultimately it Is the British Empire That Stands In The Way of a solution of Germany’s difficulties. Germany is acutely aware of the disproportionate territorial place she occupies tn the wider w’orld. Almost every other great Power has either, like Russia or the United States, far larger resources within Its own borders, or colonial possessions to exploit, like Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, or even smaller Powers—Holland, Belgium, and Portugal. None of these Powers—naturally enough from their own point of view—is ready to hand over any of its colonies to Germany. At the same time, Germany feels that there are adjustments to be made in Europe itself. Danzig and Memel are German cities. The Austrian people, she complains, are not allowed to decide their relations with Germany for themselves. The Germans In Czechoslovakia and Poland are still, in their own view, treated as oppressed minorities, very differently from the manner In which British minorities are treated in countries they inhabit overseas. No doubt the first obstacle to the solution of these questions In a manner satisfactory to the new high-spirited Germany is France and her eastern allies, with Russia In support. But the unwillingness of that, combination to make concessions is reinforced by the belief that Great Britain tacitly stands behind the status quo both in Europe and in the colonial sphere. Great. Britain, therefore, In Germany’s present mood, Is beginning to appear to her once more as the ultimate obstacle that prevents her from getting what she Regards As Her Just Rights. Of course it Is easy to produce a score of arguments on the other side| The extreme racialism of the nationalsocialist movement, its treatment of the Jews and of its own internal opponents, are alone almost a sufficient coun-

terweight, In many people's eyes, to Germany's claims to control fresh territories and their inhabitants. But the serious fact Is that we are witnessing the reappearance of the dilemma that confronted European statesmen, particularly British statesmen, at the beginning of this century—a dilemma that led eventually to the pre-war alliance system and the world war. In some ways the situation Is less dangerous than the equivalent situation in 1904. Germany was then intent on building a navy to rival the British navy. She has now accepted, for the time being at least, a ratio of 35 per cent. Pre-war Germany was violently Imperialist, and as such suspicious of and hostile to Great Britain. Modern Germany, on the contrary, is at heart extremely friendly towards Great Britain. Friendship With England Is a first article In Hitler's creed, and the friendliness of the mass of the people towards the English, whom they regard as a kindred race and their only friend since the war, Is manifest to every visitor. The German people are not today Jealous 'of or hostile to the British Empire or resentful of its rearmament. In some ways, however, the problem to be solved Is more dlffloult than before the war. As a result of Versailles, Germany occupies a far smaller place In the world than she did in 1914. The loss of her colonies, her foretga Investments, and one-seventh of her European territory Is the more seriously felt because economic nationalism Is everywhere stronger than In 1914. It Is more difficult for Germany—as it Is for every other country—to purchase by exports to the outside world the supplies she cannot produce within her own boundaries. Moreover, the armaments race Is already far more Intense than It was In 1914, and Germany is better equipped than ever before, physically, psychologically, and governmentally, to use force to achieve what, she believes to toe her legitimate ends. There Is the dilemma that confronts the statesmanship of the world • . . Modern Germany is nationalist, not Imperialist, and Is quite prepared to reoognise the rights of other nations and their title to live. She does not want war, for she knows what modern war means. Her people, indeed, are opposed to war. But Germany is dissatisfied, and she Is determined sooner or later to get what she believes to be her rights. The National-Socialistic revolution and Its aftermath during the last five years have Profoundly Alarmed All Her Neighbours. They suspeot Germany’s Intentions. They suspect her methods. They do not know what her ultimate demands may be. To the natural selfish reluctance to give anything away Is added the belief that concessions now would be DanegeM. They feel that they must re-arm and stand together to resist their own destruction and the spreading of an anti-social creed. A reconciliation between the German and non-German points of view Is not Impossible, If common sense and goodwill can prevail on both sides. If Germany really accepts the national independence of the true nationalities *of Eastern Europe, Jiust as Great Britain accepts the independence of the Dominions, It ought not to be impossible to transform the Eastern European situation so as to satisfy Germany's legitimate desires. And, provided the strategic and the economic aspects of the colonial problem can toe kept separate, a solution may perhaps be found. The first condition of relaxed tension and a cessation of armament competition is that the whole problem, and the tremendous dangers It involves, should be far more seriously considered than has yet been the case. Nothing but good could come from personal contacts between responsible leaders. The difficulties In the way of a settlement are clearly very great, but precisely because they are great they can be surmounted only when relations of understanding and confidence exist, between principals on both sides. Not until a full explanation of motives and viewpoints has taken place will it be possible to arrive at conclusions about the future. If an agreed settlement proves to be possible the World Will Move Into Smooth Waters and the League will revive. If an agreed settlement Is not possible we shall at least know whether the obstacle lies with Germany or with her neighbours or with ourselves. We shall be in a better position t>o judge whether our right policy Is a refusal to join either side in a new Euro-