THE FAR EAST.

Waikato Times, Volume 121, Issue 20271, 13 August 1937, Page 6

THE FAR EAST.

The crisis in the Far East is the most threatening since 1931, when Japan took action in Manchuria. The relations between China and Japan ever since have been troubled. Things became serious toward the end of last year when the Japanese Ambassador at Nanking presented a series of demands. These included the autonomy of the provinces of Hopei, Chahar, Siyuan, Shantung and Shansi, suppression of anti-Japanese agitation, the recognition of Manchukuo and joint action against the Communists in China. Nothing like that had been presented since the famous demands during the Great War, and to the surprise not only of Japan but also of the Powers the Chinese returned a prompt refusal. They went further and presented counter-demands, including the suppression of the puppet administration Japan had tried to create in Hopei, the cessation of smuggling, the withdrawal of surplus Japanese troops in North China and noninterference by Japanese militarists with Chinese internal affairs.

Neither side secured any diplomatic advantage at the time, but it has been stated that the aggressive attitude of the Japanese army leaders has been much more marked since then. When the recent dispute arose the Japanese insisted that the matter was one for settlement with local authorities, and the Nanking Government retorted that the issues were not local but national. The Shanghai correspondent of a leading American journal, in a recent despatch, said: “Chinese observers are virtually unanimous that the Peiping incident was provoked deliberately for military and diplomatic objectives, involving the railway network south-west of Peiping and the firmer establishment of Japanese control." On the other hand messages from Japan stress the provocative attitude of the Chinese, and the “bristling antipathy" of the 29th. Chinese Army. Officials of the Institute of Pacific Relations state that it has been the fixed policy of General Chiang Kai-Shek to delay open resistance as long as possible, but that “the pressure on Nanking from great masses of Chinese in all walks of life for immediate resistance may force him to make his stand now. That would mean war."

But it is not at all certain that Japan will declare war. She did not do so when her forces invaded Manchuria, and there are many reasons why she may desire not to have China dealt with as a belligerent. These reasons, however, would be swept aside if China were to declare war. An outbreak of hostilities would probably force the Japanese to blockade Chinese ports. The Chinese have no navy worth mentioning and it seems incapable of dealing effectively with pirates along the coast. A blockade would inevitably involve both Hong Kong and the International Settlement at Shanghai, and that would place the Japanese Government in a very difficult position with respect to the European nations and the United States. The British not only hold Hong Kong but they hold Kowloon, which was ceded to Great Britain by China in 1860, and another area on the mainland, 356 square miles in extent, is held under a long lease. The British possessions on the mainland are divided from Hong Kong only by a narrow strait. Unless that avenue were closed by the Japanese it would be difficult to make any blockade completely effective, and the difficulty lies in the fact that both territories are under the British flag. In the same way many nations have extra-territorial rights in Shanghai and a blockade would interfere with their trade and communications. There already have been exchanges of views between Washington, London and Paris and it is said that the Japanese are aware of “the inflammability of the position."