THE FAR EAST

Waikato Times, Volume 119, Issue 19891, 21 May 1936, Page 13

THE FAR EAST

l JAPANESE POLICY. E THE POSITION EXAMINED. . ._____ i BRITISH COMMUNICATIONS. t ______ i i “it is idle to ignore the tart that iihe threat of an eventual war does exist" (says the ltmnni 'i‘ablei. “\\t the present moment. and as long: as Japan continues to pursue her con—tinentnl course. the danger is one, lhnl concerns ltussia more urtirolv than icither America or the British tinni—‘monweaith. ’l‘heret‘nre. in the shorter jv'icw, Australia and..\'e\v Zrninnd are Justified in hollering that Japan‘s pre—sent commitments in Maili'iitii‘il and .\vlongolia give them relief i't'util the risk of Japanese expansion. south. ward by sea. which liiiKlli sever their comn‘iunieaiimis with Europe and the home country and leave them at the mercy of Japan. - i “ But the situation will rhnnge when Japan discovers that her economic ex—pectations from her .\[alil‘hurian-Mon—-‘g‘olian policy cannot be realised: for then. whatever she may believe to be necessary for the strategic defence ‘of her expanded frontiers facing: the Soviet Union. she will 'he driven to divert her programme of territorial ‘and economic expansion towards other goals. ‘ Situa‘itons to Meet. “ For the British Empire there are three possible situations to meet: First: A struggle between liussla and Japan in the north, which would re—lieve the threatened pressure on the oceanic interests of the overseas limpire and .\merica; second. Japanesc‘ expansion towards Ilong Kong. Manila and Singapore. that encounters .\mcrican resistance; third. the stunt: expan—sion not encountering an American Veto, which would brim." .iapnn upon the exposed iiank of British imperial communications from the indian Ocean to the South Sons. “The iirsl of these—assuming Japanese victory. which is not iv): any means certain—would postpone .lap—anese expansion southwards for u ron~ sidemblo time. and might L‘llé-iifll‘ .iapan so deeply in continental commitments in north—enst Asia that she would lie unable to pay much attention to anything else. \Vhat the consequences of -a Russian Victory would the for in—dia we do not for the moment prunes-e to inquire, but the -mn.~:etluem-os in the Far East. would probably bring the whole Far Eastern queStion into ciosul' connection with Europe than has been ‘the ease for many years. ‘ “The second eventuality would at—most certainly find the British lim—piro supporling America in the deter—mination to resist imperialist aggres—‘sion outside the Asiatic mainland. ‘ “If that he a true diagnosis. it is ‘desira'ble that the English-speaking iPowers should forestall the threatened conflict by showing Japan that, in the llast resort and undeterred 'by’ditferien‘ces of interest. in other fields, they will be found standing together, and by showing her also that this cooperation is not designed to encircle ther with iron hands to stifle her life. but: solely as an insurance against an intolerable inroad on their vital inter—-est-s. “ There is here a genuine basis of Anglo-American co-operation which does not exist in any other region. .

The Most, Crl'tlcal.

“ The third situation is the most critical of all, and, although it is not immediate, it cannot ‘IJC regarded us so improbable as to he ignored in a review oi‘ l,he.l<‘nr l‘lustern nmi Paciilo' ‘ocean policy of the llritish Comm-ou—-‘wealih. Nukedly stated, it presents the British nations with the possibility 01' a threat to the communications Ibetween them, if not to their very existence as partners in a common peaceful enterprise of economic growth and political development. Douhtless it would anect them unequally; and it it be admitted that. the immediate threat must be felt first Iby the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. with India, Burma. and Malaya in danger, in the final resort every corner of the Empire must the involved. “ Cold realism so far compels-us to face these formidable prospects in terms of eventual appeal to force. But in so presenting the case the Round} Table is not Iprophesying‘ inevitablel war. Rather is it attempting to fore—see the ultimate fate of war, if certain conditions obtain in the future. land it, . meanwhile, policy, of which war is but one expression, fails to deal with the developing situation and thus to fore-stall by adequate measures the resort to force. "One of these measures is cer—tainly the readiness for self—defence, within both the League-wide and the British collective systems. But a policy that rests soler on the deter—mination to meet force with force is quite inadequate. \Vilhout exaggera—ting the importance of the economic tartar in the Japanese problem, we are convinced that it plays a part in Japanese policy [o—day that requires us to shape our policy to meet ii." __