Factions in Japan

Waikato Times, Volume 119, Issue 19887, 16 May 1936, Page 15 (Supplement)

Factions in Japan

(G. F. Hudson ir WHATEVER a man does should be done with his heart. Therefore, for the soldier military amusements alone are suitable. The penalty for violating this provision is death by suicide.—This extract from the code of Kato Kiyomasa, a famous Japanese general of the sixteenth century, throws some light on that austere martial tradition of the Samurai which is the inheritance of the modern Japanese Army. By the Japanese Constitution the Emperor has supreme command of the Army Bnd Navy; he is also sovereign in all other spheres, but he “exercises the legislative power with the consent of the Diet.” Since 1925 Japan has had universal male suffrage, and. the Diet is thus a democratic institution. The executive authority, however, the Cabinet of Ministers (including, of course, the Ministers of the fighting Services), is responsible, not to the Diet, but to the Emperor, and the political party or group of parties holding a majority in the Diet has No Constitutional Right to form a Ministry. The Emperor can appoint as Prime anyone whom lie may choose. But so that the Imperial authority may not be compromised by the participation of the Monarch in political quarrels, the Emperor makes the appointment on the advice of persons who arte formally reh!e for it; these persons have up to now been the famous “Elder Statesmen,” a select group of the reformers of 18G8, of whom one only, Prince Saionji, now survives. The Cabinet, then, is super-parliamentary, hut it must somehow obtain a majority in the Diet if it is to pass legislation. If* the Throne appoints as Prime Minister the leader of a parliamentary majority, his task is a straightforward one; if. on the other band, he is not a party politician, lie must get his majority by striking bargains with one or more parties in tlie Diet. He lias wide powers for overriding a recalcitrant Diet; he can obtain a dissolution when relations become too strained, he can govern for a period by decree, and lie is not entirely dependent on the Diet for finance, for if the Budget is not passed in any year, the last Budget remains in force. This is not all, however. A Japanese Cabinet must be acceptable to the Army is the power to wreck a, Cabipet by Jeav - ing its particular Ministry without an occupant. The Constitution provides that the War and Navy Ministers must lie general officers on the active list, and if there are none of these forthcoming the j.osts cannot be filled. A Prime Minister must therefore select a general and an admiral whom he thinks likely to 'conform to bis general policy, but these colleagues will always be in the first place representatives of the Ser\ices to which they belong and they will resign rather than agree to measures which the opinion of their Services more or less unanimously condemns. The constitutional powers of the fighting Services would not be so important for the destiny of the nation if it were not for another factor the significance of which has been little appreciated in English comments on the recent Tokio mutiny. This is the. Japanese system of military education.' Military education in Japan means far more than training in the use of arms; it includes an intense propaganda on “The Seven Duties of a Soldier,” nn,| i imir* over llio whole field or imliiir.il theory. Those affeole.l by il are in Ihe llrs! I the professional officers, most of whom sUrl their careers l>> entering the military prep ,it,,r> schools Yonen Uakko at tli, age or fourteen, but it also takes

Soldier ; Sailor : Civilian.

in English Paper.) hold of the rank-and-file conscripts and follows them as reservists. The educational scheme is under the direction of ari Inspector-General who is one of the three highest officials of the Army, directly responsible to the Emperor and co-ordinate with the War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff. Because of the enormous propaganda power attached to this post, it is a key position in Japanese politics, and during the last few years has been disputed between the two main factions of the Army. The two Army factions, which may conveniently be called the Araki and Hayashi parties, differ in their attitudes to the two powers which are the Army’s rivals in the control of national policy—the Navy and the plutocracy. The Hayashi faction endeavours to adjust the policy of the Army to that of the Navy and to the interests of Japanese finance. Japanese capitalism is not only interested in China; it is busy extending Japanese commerce throughout the world, and while it favours military action in China up to a point, it is more interested in seapower as a support for World-wide Commercial Interests. and demands a diplomacy which will be strong but at Hie same time conciliatory towards the Western Powers. The chiefs of the Navy tend to agree with this line of policy, not so much because of any direct connexion with business interests as because of their conviction that Japan, as an insular country, should concentrate on seapuwer; they are jealous of large expenditure on the Army and apprehensive of Army moves into the interior of Asia, which they consider likely to diminish rather than to increase Japan’s national strength, especially in relation to the U S.A. The Hayashi section of the Army, including most of the senior officers, is ready without renouncing a distinctive Army line on political questions, to compromise with Navy and Business opinion. The Araki faction, on the other hand, with a large and zealous following among Ihe younger officers, most of whom in the last twenty years have come from impoverished Samurai, lower middle-class or peasant families, and who arc keenly aware of the widespread distress in the rural areas, is strongly, though Vaguely, anti-capitalist, and claims to hold to the true “Spartan” tradition of the military class. At the time of writing a new Cabinet to replace OUadu’s murder-shattered ministry has not yet been formed. Prince Saionji lias come to Tokio from his country villa at Ihe age of 8< to make his life’s most momentous decision, the nomination of a Prime Minister for what General Araki prophesied three years ago as “the crisis of 1936." Three courses appear to be open to him: He may continue the sequence Saito—Okada by choosing another admiral or a civilian of high standing who will rely for support on the Navy, the principal commercial interests and the Minseilo majority in the Diet. This would Involve a Bitter Struggle with the 'Army malcontents. Alternatively, he may give power to one of the Army , “Fascist” leaders. Araki or Mazaki, either in Ihe belief that il is impossible to resist • them or in the expectation that they will be sobered by the responsibility of office or else discredit themselves by incompetence. The danger of this course is the precipitation of war against the U.S.S.H. Thirdly, he may call to power a general who can command the confidence of the Army, bill lias not been involved in recent feuds and can make a fresh start in policy. It is likely that the next few months will produce either a war or a definite rapprochct ment between Japan and Russia.