NATIONAL DEFENCE.
A cnitnivsi'ONDKNT of Truth, au officer of experience, who knows what he is writing about, thus gives his opinions oil the question of national defence :—Fortifications have never played other than an insignificant part in war. Campaigns have always been decided in the field, not behind walls. Napoleon never cared a rush about fortresses. He used to go straight for his enemy, find him out, and thrash him in tiie field. Take one instance. In 1800, when Massena was holding Genoa for the French Republic, Napoleon actually allowed it to fall under his very eyes without moving a man to its relief. A few day? afterwards, however, ho beat tin; Austriaus at Marengo, and demanded, as the price of victory, not Genoa only, but every other strong place iu Italy. Again, alter the battle ui Jena he did not wait to take the Kibe fortresses, but allowed the Prussians to the Oder and hunted down every remnant of a Prussian army that remained in the field. Berlin was occupied, and the Elbe fortresses forthwith capitulated. Fortresses have always prove the tombs of armies. Mack at Ulm, Bazaiuc at Met;:, MaeMahou at Sedan, are witnesses to fie truth of this assertion. The presence of fortresses weakens rather than strengthens the hands of a commander. Instead of striking out a bold offensive plan of campaign, ho is always thinking of keeping up his communications with the fortress behind him, aud he never seems to be able to get away from the shadow of its walls. English soldiers in particular have no aptitude for fighting bthiml fortifications. Wellington taught hia men how to " mount a breach," but not how to defend one. The graves at San Sebastian, Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo
are a witness to this. No sane man who lias studied the conditions under which a force of 100,000 men could be landed in England really believes in the possibility of invasion. Danger, if it comes at all, will come to us abroad to our foreign possessions and foreign commerce. Abroad we may have 111 the future to strike some severe blows 111 order to retain our commercial supremacy. For thu purpose we must have plenty of ships and troops organised for counter attack. You must remember that passive defence is of no use, considering the scattered condition of our foreign possessions. We must prepare means for counter attack. The true policy of Imperial defence should undoubtedly be that which Lord St. Vincent followed so successfully during our last maritime war, when lie scaled np the enemy's ships by blockading all his ports. This we could do again, keeping a sufficiency of light, swift cruisers patrolling our coasts both at home and abroad, to guard against the incursions of any stray ships which may have escaped the blockade, l'or the further protection of the militaiy and commercial harbours at home and coaling stations abroad trust to submarine mines and a few long-rango guns mounted behind earthworks or in cupola towers. Level all fortifications which are useless for defence, and organise any available troops in mobile army corps ready for embarkation when and where counter attack may be thought advisable.
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Waikato Times, Volume XXXIII, Issue 2680, 14 September 1889, Page 5 (Supplement)
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529NATIONAL DEFENCE. Waikato Times, Volume XXXIII, Issue 2680, 14 September 1889, Page 5 (Supplement)
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