Science. The Genesis of the Human Mind.

Waikato Times, Volume XXV, Issue 2045, 15 August 1885, Page 6 (Supplement)

Science. The Genesis of the Human Mind.

Tvso lectures, bearing the title " Is tho Human Mind of Animal Origin ?" havebien lately delivprert at the London Institution by Mr. Georce John Romanes, M.A. , LL.D , F.R S., Secretary of the Linnrean Society. Assuming tho truth of the general theory of evolution, both an regards bodily ptructuro and mental organization, bo far as the lower animals are concerned, the lecturer explained in kig opening lecture last week that evrn among evolutionists there was still a difference of opinion on thP question whethor the mind of man admitted of beim; re<: nrOen a<! the product of a natural genesis — in other wouls, whether^ the human mind was of animal origin. Considering; the question firßt on purely a priori grounds, Mr Romanes observed that if it were admitted, in accordance with his original assumption, that the process of organic and of rnentalevolutionha3be-r continuous throughout the whole region of lifo and mind, with the one exception of the mind of man, it becomes antecedently improbable that the process of evolution should have been interrupted at its terminal phase. And, indeed, looking to the very large extent of the analogy on which this consideration is founded, he thought that the presumption raised could only be fairly counterbalanced by some very cogent and unmistakable faots proving th" virtual impossibility of animal intelligence passing into human. Next he pointed out that in the oase of every human being there is presented to actual observation a process of gradual development, or evolution, extending from a zero level of mental life in infancy and oulrmnatinf?, perhaps, in genius. Moreover, bo long as the human mind ia passing through the lower phases of its development, it ascends through a scale of mental faculties which are pan 'imam identical with those that are presented permanently by the psyohological species of the animal kingdom. Lastly, it is a matter of actual observation that in the history of the human race, as recorded in document^ traditions, antiquarian remains and flint implements, the intelligence of the race has been anbjeot to * Bteady p/oce33 of gradual development. Thus, on the whole, a strong prima facie case is made out in favor of the view that the human mind, like everything elee in organic nature, has been evolved. Leaving the (i priori side of the question, Mr. Romanes next turned to the side of direct evidence. Here the problem that ptood for investigation was that of comparing the faculties of brute with those of human intelligence, in order to ascertain the points wherein they agree or differ ; for thus only can the probability be finally determined as to whether the one order of intelligence is continuous or discontinuous with the other. If we had regard to the emotional faculties of brutes, we could not fail to be struck by tho broad fact that the area of psychology which they cover is nearly coextensive with that which is covered by the emotional faculties of man. After showing that instincts are common to the brute and the man (although preponderating in tho former), Mr. Romanes passed on to consider the faoulty of reason. He maintained that although this faculty greatly preponderates in man, it is also true, in the words of Milton, that tho lower animals " reason not contemptibly." The only explanation of there being any difference of opinion upon this point ia, according to Mr. Romanes, because different writers use the term " reason" in different senses, it being often understood to include self -consciousness and introspective thought. But it the term were restricted to its only proper meaning, there could be no question as to the rationality of brutes. This meaning ia that of ratiocination, or the drawing of inferences from the perceived equality of relations, i.e., of inferring results from past experience. The lecture was profusely illustrated with examples of emotional and rational aotions on the part of animals. The second lecture, which was delivered yesterday evening, was devoted to a consideration of all the points of difference between animal and human intelligence whioh had ever been alleged. Of these the only valid one was held to be the high power of abstraction whioh was characteristic of the human mind, and which constituted the basis of all the other differences. The question, therefore, for evolutioniBta was to explain the growth of abstraction; and, as all psychologists were agreed that abstraction depended upon language, the whole question became resolved into this— Why had man alone of animals been gifted with the Logos? Now, in its essence the Logos consisted in the pewer ef predication, or of expressing a judgment ; "if the brute could think 'is,' man and brute would be brothers." Was it, then, conceivable that the power of predioation could have been developed by way of a natural genesis ? To answer this question in the affirmative, Mr. Romanes argued that animals undoubtedly possessed in germ the faculty of making signs for the purpose of intentionally communicating feelings and ideas. The signs which they made were necessarily restricted to those of tone and gesture, except in the case of the talking birds, where alone the anatomical conditions required for the uttering of articulate sounds were present. Evidence was then given to show that talking birds and children when first beginning to speak learned by special association correctly to name objects, qualities, actions, and desiree. This first stage of spoken language Mr. Romanes distinguished as the denominative stage, and observed that it would certainly be exhibited by domesticated monkeyH, peeing that they were both more intelligent and more imitative than birds, if any of them had happened to have been able to articulate. Now, if once the name of an object and the name of a conspicuous quality belonging to the object were used in apposition, the copula was latent in thought, and only required a further advance of abstraction itself to become an object of thought. The only requisite to this further advance was the growth of selfconsciousness (whioh was shown to arise in children from the naming of self as an objeot), and thus the denominative utage of language passed into the predicative stage. Mr. Romanes ooncluded by arguing that, given a species of anthropoid ape with tho power of uttering articulate sounds, and there would he no more reason for wondering that this passage from the denominative to the predicative stage of language should have taken place in the brute, than there was foi wondering that it took place in theohild.

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