THE OCCUPATION OF HERAT.

Waikato Times, Volume XXIV, Issue 2005, 14 May 1885, Page 2

THE OCCUPATION OF HERAT.

Lath caliie messages convey the intellig. me that aßntish army is to occupy the stionghold of Herat. Writing on the siilijt ct of a piobable ocuipatioiijtheTimes ot India of March 13, his the following: — Whether Russia decides for peace or «ai, the main difficult) will remain. The Att'gh.in ami Kussnu frontiers are now virtually conterminous, and e\en if the pre-fiit difficulty wore tided o\er by the withdrawal for a few miles of the Russian troops, the Russians would still have the powei at any moment, when the British 'Jovernnient happened to be engrossed elsewhere, of pouncing upon Herat. The Aftghan frontier is, to all intents and purposes, the frontier of India, for if Kixi v once established herself within the holders of Afghanistan ah" uoul I lie a >lrt to awe the AfFghans with Irr nnlitny prestige and dazzle tin m, as Skobdeff suggested, with the pio^pect of lieiiig led to plunder Hiudoo!.t.iii. Any intelligence, therefere, that St Peter Lnnnden has been forced to ciny '>ut his throat of entering Herat will be very fir from unwelcome, .-vxrioi or later Herat must become a Bntish fortie-ss, and the sooner the better. Thu peace of the great Continental Powers i< sifeguarded by powerful forti esses, which no enemy would dare to leave in their rear until they were cither m isked or ciptured. The delay t'nis entailed nff udd tie time necessary to prepare an nrgmized defence Henceforwi'd we sh ill hive t > a lopt the same p. coalition* on the Affghati frontier, which may, for all practical purposes, be rcjirded as the outer edge of the Indian Empire. The telegrams of the last few days show that our Government are quite alive to the importance of this precautionary measure. Herat U strongly situated, but its fOlf 01 tifieationi are notoriously defective The Amir has now in the most formal manner besought the British aid to strengthen ita fortifications, and Sir Peter Lumsden has, says the Times, been instructed by the Government to accede to his wishes. A week ago our London correspondent telegraphed that an application of » startliog nature had been receiv ed from the Amir, which confirmed his confidence. The application miy have consisted merely of this invitation to fortify and iMrnson Hsrat. But it is not improbable that it may have had a much wider significance. The Amir knows, as well as any European diplomatist can do, that his authority would be shaken throughout AtFghanistan the moment the Russian eagle floated o\er the walls of Herat. He knows also that if Russia occupied Herat. England would lie bound, co«t what it might, to occupy Kandahar, and to make Kandalnr, in default oJ Herit, an outstanding fortiess for our own protection. But Kandahar is his wealthiest province, and he would be niaturally loth to part with the control of its capital city, the cmpoiiiim of all the trade of Southern Afghanistan In comparison the valley of Herat is a poor, remote, outlying leyion, which his only of late years IjLen identified with the reigning family of Cabul If we do not occupy it or control it, it is now absolutely certain that Uiiss'u intends to do so. and of the two neighbours Abdul Rahman would naturally prefer England. Russia would only sei/e Herat in the deliberate intention of making it a stepping-stone to Kandahar, and to the conquest of the whole country between Sarakhs and India. If England occupied Herat, it would be with no view of any possible conquest, but merely with the objttt ot di fending her own frontier and incidentally of defending Affghanistan. This view of the que->tion cannot but present itself t) the mind of Abdul Rahman. He would never have invited us to occupy Herat without having carefully considered that the occupat'on must almost of necessity become permanent, for after repelling Russia fo r a moment we could scarcely leave our new ally at the mercy of Russn, whenever she thought the time was ripe for a renewal of the attack. But the nu re military occupation of the city would be a measure fiaught with danger. Indian soldiers and Avghan officials could never work Mile by sidi\ .mil after the first enthusiasm evoked by the defeat of the Ru-S'an piojects have evaporated, our little garrison miyht find themselves surrounded by a hostile'population, who would natui all j lay at our doms the results of their own oppressed Government A militiry occupation of Herat would not suit the British (iovernmeiit, unless the civil administrations also were in their hands. On the other side, the Amir, like all Eastern potentate 1 ?, is extremely if-alous of his sovereign rights and dignity. Hat if Abdul Rahman is not willing to cede to us the Valley of Herat we should not at all be suipiised toleain that he was not willing to assign it to us on precisely the sime terms is it happens that we actually hold our present frontier outpost, Qnette. When it became advisable to garrison Q.iette. which stands in the extreme noi them limit of the Khan of Khelat'l dominions, it was explained to the Khan that its occupation bv the British would piotect its territory as well as ours from any chance of invasion through Affghanistan, to which lie stood in much the mine position as Affghanistau now stands to Russia. He saw the force of the argument, but was very unwilling to be depiived of any of his sovereign rights. He wts ready enough, however, to a-'siun it on the annual pa) ment of the icvenue he already received. This plan ha* worked capitally. Quetta has been of the greatest service to us as a starting point for the two last Affghnn campaigns, and when the Sibi railway is completed it will be more valuable still as a half* way house to Kandahar, and to to Herat. The Khan has always acted as ft loyal friend, and his countty his benefited by the introduction of English trade, by the more peaceful atmosphere which surrounds an impoitant British outj ost, and by a railway for which neither the mliT nor the people have had to pay a rupee. The 3aine arguments might easily appl) to the Valley of Herat. The revenue of Quetta, when it was first assigned to us, was only 20,000 rupees per annum. It is now more than one and a-half lakhs of rupees (Clo.OOO). The revenues of the Herat Valley are aaid to be fourteen or fifteen lakhs of rupees, and they too, would increase with order and good government, and justice, and the increase of English trade, not perhaps at the same rapid rate as the revenues of Quetta, but still sufficiently largely to leav e over a very broad margin after the Amir had received his regular dues. The surplus might be utilized to defray part of the cost of the garrison from India, and what is even moie important, to equip and maintain a little local army. The Quetta experiment should be followed in every detail. The railway from Jacobibad to Quetta would be the prototype of the railway from Quetta to Kaadahai, and eventually from Kandahar to Hciat. The feeling that w e were performing an important service would soon make the Affghans as friendly as the Beloochees are now, apd the Herat Contingent, or whatever-flf* , might be called, would probably become as popular as our present Beloochee regiment*. This scheme has, at all events, the merit of a permanent measure of defence. With a stiong fortress at Herat, ana with perhaps two other first class fortresses at the other important points, the Russian advance would be thoroughly checked. They could never advance beyond their present boundary without capturing or masking Herat, and this would necessitate such a delay J as would give us ample time to make our preparations. Hitherto the Russians nave gained everything by the stealtbinesa of thrir approoch. Our blindness to their movements is now happily over, and as we are heaceforwaid to stand face to face on either side of an imaginary frontier line, and it is as M-ell that we should be in a position to " talk to our enemy in the gate." The gate to India must be Herat, and no pains should be. . spared to make it unassailable.