THE MAHDI'S PLAN OF OPERATIONS.

Waikato Times, Volume XXIV, Issue 1978, 12 March 1885, Page 3

THE MAHDI'S PLAN OF OPERATIONS.

1^ an undated letter from Dongola the special correspondent of the Daily News gives the following details lel.ithe to the position of the M.ihdi and his probable policy:— "The Mihdi has pitched his camp near Mai gait, either in the plains at the foot of Jebel Fei eld or on the reverse slopes of that mountain. His reasons for selecting this particular spot are olnious Hence he can command the wells of El Goz, and to a certain extent the direct caiavan route between Debbeh and Khartoum, which he doubtless thinks will be threatened by a British advance ; he cm keep a watchful eye on the doubtful Hassanyph, Sowarab, and Hau-hau lnu tiibes, whose adhesion to his cause or desertion to our side depends veiy much on the weakness or strength of ths foice we may be able to concentrate quickly about the neiphboiuhood of Meroe. He can, if need be, stretch out a hand to the Momssir A/abs, one of whose sheikhs was lesponsible for the recent m.issacio of Europeans and natives coming down from Khartoum. He has a firm grip of the heights where the Nile runs through a narrow ravine, with precipitous cliffs on each side, and he is in the best possible position for harassing by fiequent attacks the defendeisof Omdermann, a stronghold to which Gordon naturally clings tenaciously, because it at present covers, and would, in aneuemy"s hand, dominate the most exposed face of Khartoum. By all thtse reasons the Mahdi has evidently been influenced, and thcrp cannot be a doubt that he has shown considerable strategical skill in electing to make Margait his head quarteis. Nor is he content merely to assume a passive attitude and wait the issue of events. Either by direct orders from him, or in obedience to their own restless proclivities, which make inaction irksome to them, many ot his followers, in numbeis that cannot be accurately estimated, have begun to menace all the caravan routes by which traders have Inthei to been able to bring large heauls ofKoidofan cattle and camels for Loid Wols( ley's troops. The tradeis in question aie mostly Kababish merchauts whose enteipiise in this direction has been \ery substantially rewauled, and it is jn&t possible that such high-handed lnteiference with a profitable traffic may have the effect of lousing them and the neutral sections of their formidable tribe into active hositility against the Mahdi. It is at present veiy doubtful whether thr latter can carry out the programme he is said to have promulgated, and closed effectually the roads by which supplies have hitherto been fieely bi ought to the depots established by Sir Herbert Stewart at Debbeh and Abu Goisi, If he did attain this object, it would probably have the effect of completely alienatiim from him some thousands of the Southern Kababish, who have never given moiethana half-hearted support to his pretensions. Theoretically they may hate the Christian with a fervour scarcely less than his own; but piactically their fanaticism is no doubt tempeied by shiewd business instincts, and a tolerably keen appreciation of the first principles of domestic economy. Some natives who should be trustworthy authorities on Arab tactics say that the Mahdi will do no more than harass our line of march until we get near Khartoum. Whether he may be able to gi\ c us battle there must greatly depend on the action taken by tribes that at present show some inclination to throw in their lot with us. Every possible means of winning them over is being tried. Upon their friendliness and the possible disaffection of tribes farther south, with whom the Mahdi is even now reported to have some trouble, the speedy relief of Khartoum must mainly depend. If we had to fight for every well before encamping, and were to be kept in a state of restless watchfulness night »fter night, the maich would become a very serious undertaking indeed. The most recent accounts that reached here, however, lead one to suppose that Mahommerl Ahmed is in no position to dispute the ground with us to this extent. He is just now much excited with the southern Kababish, who. without showing signs of actual hostility to him, are by no means avowed allies, and might at any moment be induced to declare cause against him. He cannot move far north of Khartoum, for fear of provoking the Hassanyeh, Sowarab, an 1 Hau-hauhin tribes into a similar declaiation. His only active adherents are the Wonassir, an 1 they may be overawed by a display of force on our part before they can make head with him against us. On the return journey, in all probability, the river w ill be followed, and should the Mahdi reserve 1113 attack, as natives say he will, until the English are retiring, he would find them a nut too hard to crack then "

He who is slowest in making o promise is generally tl c most faithful in the performance of it. It is only by labour that thought can be made healthy, and only by thonuht that labour can be made happy ; and the two cannot be sepaiated with impunity. John Ruhkin. Feels Youvg AC/Ain.— " My mother was afflicted a long time with nauralgia and a dull, heavy, inactive condition of the whole sjstem hradache, nervous prostration and was almost helpless No phjsn wins or medicines did her Ar\y (food Ihree months apo shr lirean to use Hop Bitters, with surh tfood effect that she s( eras and feels younir a^ain, although over Jtvwity years old. —A Lauv in R. I, Look up.