POSSIBLE INYASION OF ENGLAND.

Waikato Times, Volume X, Issue 776, 7 June 1877, Page 3

POSSIBLE INVASION OF ENGLAND.

At the Boyal United Service Insti- , tution, Majpr-V>eneral T B Ooliinson, R. 8., has jf v ut forward a very elaborate paper «on " The present facilities for the invasion of England and for the defence thereof." Part 1. of ths paper, divided into heads,, treated of the', powers nations ' like France,. Germany, and Russia possess for invading this Country, and how our present condition of unpreparednesa would assist an enemy; The military power of these three great nations, known to be so considerable, enabled each to send 150,000 picked troops, fully drilled, armed, and equipped m every respect, to invade a foreign country. In the case of Germany, she could

even spare 300,000 men for tho en-

terpriae, and yet leave hey own ter- * rifcory secure against attack. An enemy, or enemies engaged m such ' an expedition bad to consider the means available for moving such an army, and the first question was the means of transport by sea. MajorGeneral 'OolHasoii calculated that'a single army corps of 30,000 men with necessary horses, baggage, carriages, &c, would require carry* . ing capacity to- the extent of 52,500

I*of 1874 gave the total tonnage of vessels m th eGerman mercantile marine as ltf7,Qoo, Resides that, 'she had a fleeb of ujnarnioured vessels, ] part available ibr transport, of | 38,000 total tonnage, and, further, Germany, deliberately • intending to go to wai:.with Great Britain, and to commence by invading England, would /undoubtedly do what had always been done by^ maritime powers .on - such occasions — i.e., seize all the British ships m her ports. Looking at the fact that every . month m the summer British steamers of about 100,000 total tonnage traded into the Baltic and "North Sea ports, Major-General » Collinson came to the conclusion that Germany alone could, at the '-moment of declaring war, lay her hand on transport sufficient for three army corps, instead of; one. France, m 1873, according to a 'history of merchant shipping, possessed a Mercantile Marine with, a total tonnage of ? 18^,000, In addition to' that, she had 300 nnarraoured steamers, with a carrying power of 170,000 tons, and, making the same allowances for her as for Germany, France, he thought, could, on a-declaration of war, find transport for nearly four army corps; Russia, less advantageously circumstanced, could yet , be calchlatod to convey two .. army corps from the Baltic to the coast of England- In considering the question of time m preparing troops for transport, Major-General Collinson said that with regard to Germany, her system of mobilization gave her a power for war stronger than that of any other Continental nation. " Decentralisation to .the utmogt practicable extent " was its great principle. That it was not a mere paper organisation was shown m 1870. The order for war was issued on the night of the

15 th of July, and eleven days later there were assembled- m complete campaigning order 'on the west frontier, 300 miles from the capital, 3.56,000 men, 87,200 horses, and

1446 carriages.. In the face of 'thai, he believed a fortnight would suffice fpr- the- assembling of five army corps complete for embarkation. France could, without much strain ' upon her present condition, for she was used to sea expeditions, and badgiven notable examples m 1830 and m 1849 of her celerity m that rospcefc, easily prepare four army corps and Russia two army corps for such an invasion. " A n:ival officer had calculated that 50,000 men could be embarked from Germany and landed on the shores of England iv fourteen days from the declaration of war ?" The crucial test of that part of the question no doubt was, " Could an enemy elude the British navy." Major-General Collinson'had invariably found the answer to be that our navy was larger than that of any two other nations; or it was said, that if it was not enough we could make it so. The: first part of tfiat answer he dealt with m two ways— first, by means of instances were British fleets had been successfully eluded ; and, secondly, by showing that an enemy would not make an open - announcement of its intentions to invade, but would seek to^drayv away a large portion of the fleet to guard our distant posessions. To the second part of the answer, that we could enlarge our fleet, he thought it would be putting our resources into one lineof defence, and that a very expensive line. He did not think we were in-, a better conxlition to* cover orir coasts by naval means than we were m 1805, when Napoleon, tereatened invasion. Two of the alterations m naval warfare , —merchant steamers, and. ironclad men-of-war -were against it.. The nrak allows an invador to calculate

his plot with precision,'and the lat--kev has reduced tho number of war ships. The guv would no doubt b*it the armour eventually, and then a, 'definite type of war vessel be settled for a time, but not till after some .years, of heavy, .war. The three great Powers .mentioned could 1 each provide -ironclads, to protect an invading army more than a match for the war ships we had at home. Those nations, moreover, had each a conscription for naval as well as military service. We had not ; but, he said, " Continental Governments are not weakened by divided popular opinion as we are m this .country." Why should not Great Britain have her reserva of war ships, equally manmed. and equip ped, before a declaration of war? The^ answer was that the records of her history show that she never, during the last 100 year 3, had chosen so to prepare as to raise tho note of alarm. Major-General Ooliinson next set out at considerable length the difficulty, as he said, England would have Hi equipping her reserve fleet, and said that it Rad been calculated that wi should not get' in the' course three months more than 8500 men for the purpose. " Our organisation for raising men to man our ships, or preparing our reserve quickly for service, is obsolete, as compared with that of our neighbours." The first part of the paper was brought to a close by a review of the "probable course of invasion," the paper touching on the points of the English coast most accessible, 1 and assuming that the first tactics of an intending invader would be to draw off a great portion of the British fleet.