PUBLIC OUTCOME OF THE EASTERN QUESTION.

Waikato Times, Volume X, Issue 724, 6 February 1877, Page 2

PUBLIC OUTCOME OF THE EASTERN QUESTION.

(From the " United Service Gazette.")

In the present crisis of the Eastern Question, the points of the picture upon whieh observation is being chiefly focused are Constantinople and the Bosporous. At prerent the Turks are masters of the Bosphorous and are fully able 1© remain so. The two Powers most affected by this fact are Russia and Austria, But no naval strength that they ! are likely to possess should e'ver be able to force the passage of the ; Bosphorus and protect Constantinople, even supposing" that that city i fell to their armies. We do not enter into the question of policy for Austria to act with Russia, we confine ourselves to possible eventualities. Supposing, however improbable the supposition mW be, that the passage of the Bosphorus is forced, and even that Constantinople is occupied by the enemy, their work has only been commenced. Hitherto, we have left the Turks to do the work so far. Russia and Austria may be masters of the Bosphorus and hold the Black sea, but as a matter of fact they are as powerless as ever, in being able to get aeeess to the Mediterranean. The Dardanelles in the possession of England and France, or of England alone, would be mpregnable and impassable. The combined fleets of the two Powers would thus hold the Mediterranean againgst any combination. But the Bosphorus I must not be foreed, if the integrity of Turkey is to be assured in more than name only. If we return' and come north about, there is nothing of sufficient strength to force an exit through the Baltic. (For Continuation of news see Supplement.)

It is not too much to say that England and France, - with the smaller European States that would of a certainty join them, could blookade every enemy's -port in Europe, inclusive of Germany. It is not by vast armies in the field that the war now threatening, if it becomes a reality, will be fought out. The Powers that are, likely to be arrayed against England, even with their admittedly vast resources on land, will find that they cannot rely upon the , sea for aid. Every seaborne source of supply will be cut off from them. It will doubtless be a war of giants — afightfor national existence, but we have no fear for the result. Should England and France find Rnssia, Austria and Germany arrayed agairist them, their first act should be to cast the Declaration of . Paris to the winds, and thus leave their fleets and cruisers free and untrammelled to act. With the empty exchequers of Russia and Austria, the interruption of their commerce by the action of our fleet and those of its allies will soon bring their power of aggression to an end. England may be called upon to put forth all her energies, and there will be no doubt of the lesult, backed by her immense wealth, and also her credit, should she have to fall back upon the latter. We have been speaking of the eventualities. But neither the passage of the Bosphorous nor Constantinople must fall into other hands than those of their present holders, excepting perhaps into our own. England, of all the Powers, stands at this moment alone in her disinterestedness. She has no desire for territory, or to dictate to the world. Her action is purely one of self-defence. She knows that the neutralisation of the Bosphoius and the Dardanelles would be a standing menace to her Indian Empire, if not to her own very existence. With the experience of Russian aggression during. only the past five or six years— to say nothing of the teachings of history — it would be courting self-destruction for this country notto hold the key to the Mediterranean. It is almost beyond comprehension that any Englishman should be so truly blind as not to appreciate the dangerous consequences that would arise by letting such an unscrupulous Power as Russia have command of the Bosphorus. No! The castles of Europe and of Asia on the Bosphorus m.ust be held by other hands, and the political position must remain as unchanged as the physical. In the face of the powerful fleet England alone can bring to bear against Constantinople, that city would, if held by an enemy, be untenable. But above and beyond all this, there is the one point about which no possible difference of opinion ought to exist, and that is the immediate occupation by England, in the event of a declaration of war, of the Dardanelles.