The Wanganui Herald. [PUBLISHED DAILY.] THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1911. SOME ASPECTS OF WAR.

Wanganui Herald, Volume XXXXVI, Issue 13522, 2 November 1911, Page 4

The Wanganui Herald. [PUBLISHED DAILY.] THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1911. SOME ASPECTS OF WAR.

The observant and thoughtful mind will find much food for reflection in tho war now being waged between Italy and Turkey. When war is desired, the pretext is never far to s»ek; and when war has once been precipitated, tho demand for peace may be long postponed. Only within recent months the author of “The Great Illusion” has argued that, in existing economic conditions and the interrelation of Finance, Credit must destroy War; and a second edition of his volume goes so far as to assert that war between European nations is nowadays impossible. Almost before the books had been circulated, this comforting theory was ruthlessly slain by a simple concrete fact. Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine a clearer proof of the folly and danger of indulging in dreams of .universal peace than is afforded by the wav between Italy and Turkey. The grievances which were quoted by Italy in justification for ‘her attack on Turkey were flimsy and shadowy in the extreme; delays of justice to' Italian citizens in Turkey. That was Italy's assigned cause for war, but diplomatists generally remember that there is reason in Turkey being regarded as the “Sick Man of Europe,” and they not unnaturally suggest that Italy expects the Turkoman estate sooner or later to be divided between various European beneficiaries. Tunis has already gone to France, Bosnia and Herzigovina have been appropriated by Austria, and Italy has now taken Tripoli. “The best preventive of war is to be prepared for it” is the wise advice of an eminent American. And when the advocates of universal peace again point to tho Hague Arbitration Tribunal they will doubtless be met with a reminder that Italy, the champion of the Hague, so far defied its principle as to enter on a war 'of aggression which the European Press almost universally condemn. Then there is tho vital import of seapower for a European nation possessing oversea colonics or dependencies. By land, Turkey is probably the; superior of Italy. Her military forces have been described as the “finest fighting material in the world,”, and Europe has good reason to accept the truth of the assertion. By sea, however, Turkey is altogether inferior to Italy, and her fleet of obsolete warships needs only to come into conflict witli the Italian flotillas to court inevitable destruction. Turkey cannot get to close grips with Italy by land, wliereas Italy can transport and- is transporting her armies to Tripoli' at leisure. Admiral Mahan pointed out the advantages of sea power long since in his luminous writings on the subject. Particularly he instanced Britain. “Once the command of the sea is gone, or lost, through naval reverses, a nation with 'oversea dependencies,” he . said, “must expect-to see her dominions, wrested from her without so much as a struggle by her naval vanquisher.” Even with

“Two Americas” in defence of the Monroe doctrine, he anticipated that without overwhelming sea power aggression could not successfully bo resisted.

Yet another lesson lies in the treachery of diplomacy where international relations are concerned. Germany has posed as the friend of Turkey, and the Kaiser has even professed “brotherhood” for the Sultan’s predecessor. Austria and Russia, less effusive in friendship, have anticipated the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, and have made ready for the inevitable spring upon the Balkans when the time and occasion shall be deemed opportune. And Germany and Austria are partners with Italy in tho Triple Alliance. How, then, is Germany's brotherhood with Turkey to be reconciled with neutrality when Italy is engaged in a deliberate grab of.a slice of Turkish territory. Is it, as an astute Japanese put it a while ago, that treaties are a convenient pretence under cover of which the high contracting’ parties make uninterrupted preparations tor . breaking them? In every instance, in spite of protest and in spite of the pledging of national honour, force is still the ultimate resolvent of all international relations. The friend of to-day is the prospective enemy of to-morrow-—when the preparations shall have been completed; and the old order remainetb.

There is still tho grave significance of the Mahomcdan peril, which we have referred to on other occasions, to be considered. The Tripolitans, numbering perhaps 600,000, may fall a prey in tho beginning of the campaign. But those who have studied the Asiatic problem in the Near East and in Africa warn us that tho long foretold Jehad or Holy War needs only some such incident as this to precipitate it. A cable on Monday stated that Enver Bey is reported to have traversed Egypt to visit the Scnussi tribesmen, who are expected to wage a Holy War on the hinterland. These -tribesmen are warlike and well led, drilled, and equipped, and declared to be the most formidable guerilla fighters on earth. And who is to say that they may not convert Italy’s initial successes into the'most overwhelming defeat—or succession of defeats, similar to what Italy suffered in Abyssinia. And if those reverses arc now to be repeated, is there any foretelling how the Jehad that will follow will end. France, Britain, and Italy, and to a less degree perhaps Germany, have interests in Africa which will be imperilled, and the struggle bi'twoen East and West may, as Dr. Di’tion has suggested, been converted into an awful war of extermination, the ultimate result of which no one cares to conjecture. And what of the Mahoraedaus in India, seething with discontent at this moment? The situation undoubtedly gives occasion for grave concern. The war may just as likely and at any moment spread West as East, through the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. But, while we criticise the attitudes and movements of the nations most directly concerned in what is taking place, w r c may admit the possibility of tho concert of neutrality arranged amongst tho Groat Powers of Europe before the war began being influential enough to prevent the conflagration spreading. !