THE BATTLE BEFORE METZ.

Westport Times, Volume IV, Issue 735, 10 November 1870, Page 2

THE BATTLE BEFORE METZ.

August 14,

The scene of the battle is situated between the eastern ramparts of Metz and the villages Ars, Laguehexy, Borney and Colombey. On the morn' ing of the 14th the French army were stationed east of Metz, occupying three different camps, and stretching over a space of at least nine kilometers'. It is probable that General Bazaine intended to fall back upon Chalons, and that it was only owing to sundry difficulties with which he had to contend that he was surprised at Metz. At two o'clock in the afternoon General Steinmetz ordered the 7th Corps d'Armeo, IVestphalians, General von Sastrow, to proceed to the attack. As on previous occasions, the assailants found the French behind earthworks and in rifle-pits, which, while protecting them from fire, exposed the Prussian troops to the fall effect of their deadly aim. One after the other the pits and entrenchments near Ars, Laguenexy, Griquy, Borney, Colombey and some other hamlets which, surrounded with hedges, presented considerable difficulties fcr attack, had to betaken The fight was long, vehement, and very sanguinary. As the French stood on the defensive, and only popped up out of their shelter to fire, their dead have nearly all been shot in the head. In ono riflo pit alone 781 wore found, all laid low by the Prussian sharpshooters. The German losses, too, are considerable, as they did not break off the engagement till lato in the evening, by which time the French were driven into the very glacis of the fortress. When they began to yield immense confusion set in.

After a short time they had entirely disappeared, most of the slightly wounded mauaging to effect their escape with the rest. As prisoners have been taken of nearly all regiments of the three principal corps united under Bazaine, respectively commanded by Generals Decaen, Fossard and Ladmirault, it seems that nearly the entire force was engaged. "By a further report from the Prussian headquarters, dated Pont-a-Mous-aon, 16th August, we gain the following additional particulars. This report states: —"The Royal head-quarters having been removed to-day from Herny to Pont-a-Mousson, are now stationed in the midst of the three operating armies, of which the one under G-eneral Steinmetz is before Metz ; the other, under Prince Frederick Charles, has got far beyond Pont-a-Mousson; and the third, under the Crown Prince, has reached Nancy. The basis of future operations is now the Moselle, between Nancy and Metz. There is little doubt that the engagement near Pange, on the 14th, will be attended "With the most important consequences. Marshal Bazaine, being obliged to fight by our troops coming up with him, probably kept quiet on the 14th, because he had determined to celebrate the 15th, the Napoleon's day, by a battle. He accordingly, in the night from the 13th to the 14th, drew his troops together into one continuous line, and, it seems, waited the arrival of the Imperial Guard, under General Bourbaki, on the loth. However, we left him no time for the execution of his plans, but ourselves proceeded to the attack, on the afternoon of the 14th. We found ourselves in front of the four corps Ladmirault, Failly, Decaen, and Frossard, the latter of which, it is true, could no longer be called a corps, having been almost crushed at Saarbruck. Of the three corps d'armee forming the first army, under General Steinmetz ( Westphalians, Rhineiauders, and East Prussians), the 7th or Westphalian corps opened the fight. The engagement at first was little more than a skirmish, but by the new French practice of fighting from rifle pits became very bloody, and assumed unexpected proportions. Eventually portions of the Ist (East Prussian) Corps d'Armoe became involved, when the French were driven from pit to pit, from intrenchment to intrehchment, and at length were compelled to seek shelter on the glacis of the outworks of Metz. As we advanced upon them, they left their ditches soon enough, but only to seek cover in another trench prepared a little further back. This, and the telling effect of the Chassepot, when managed wliu more deliberate aim, as it usually is by the French from under cover, retarded our progress. Still, as we steadily gained ground, we reached the glacis by the time darkness set in. It was owing to this very gradual advance of our men that the French had time allowed them to retreat. The fact of their retreat is sufficiently proved by their not reappearing on the 15th. In all probability they have since joined the Guards under Bourbaki, and are at present drawing off on the high road from Metz to Chalons. It is just possible they will have to encounter our Second Army, which has turned to Thaincourt from Pont-a-Mousson, and is likely to stop them long before they come in sight of Chalons."

FRENCH ACCOUNT. At Paris, on the 15th August, a despatch of the Emperor, dated Lougeville, 10 p.m., 15th August, was received saying that the French army commenced to cross over the left bank of the Moselle. This morning reconnoitering parties announced the presence of the Prussian vanguards. When one half of the army had crossed, the Prussians attacked in great force, and after a fight, which lasted four hours, were repulsed with considerable loss. A correspondent, who seems to have been in the thick of the fight, gives us a more connected account of what took place, upon the army under Bazaiue. leaving Metz, on 14th August. He says, writing under date Verdum, 16th August:—" From good information I heard that the Quarter Imperial was leaving Metz at one on the 13th August, and I was advised to leave the place to avoid the probable chance of being blocked in it, or of being deprived of all means of communication. My resolution was soon taken. I left on 14th August for the camp of the Garde Imperiale, and it is to that circumstance I am indebted for the opportunity of assisting at a regular battlo. At one o'clock on the 14th the French army, ISO,OOO men strong, was encamped all around Metz. Since the day previously a battle was considered as imminent. Several atteinps had been mode to draw the enemy out of the woods they occupied. The Prussian army of Prince Frederick Charles, or rather the corps, now united, of Field Marshal Steinmetz, 150,000 men strong, had taken its position on the road to Boulay, at the point intersecting that to Borny. The road from Bellenoir to Borny, up to the forest of that place, was occupied by the Prussians, part of their divisions being concealed by the woods. At two o'clock the French avantgarde division were crossing the Moselle on a pontoon bridge thrown across a few hours previously, and the luggage, material, and provisions of the army were crossing the othor bridges in the direction of Longeville. The equipages of the Emperor had already left; and Prince Napoleon first, and half an hour after the Emporor himself, were leaving Metz on horseback in the same-

direction. One hour after the corps Decaen, the 4th corps Ladmirault, and la Garde Imperiale Bourbaki were preparing also to leave their encampments, when suddenly the Prussians were seen to prepare for battle, some of their regiments taking positions as tirailleurs, some athers preparing offensive movements in front of the woods of Borny, and in the direction of Grizy and Mercy les Metz. The intention was unmistakable. I was in it, in the very heart of it. I made up my mind to remain ; in fact, all retreat was for me impossible. The troops, under the command of Marshal Bazaine, were composed of the 3rd and 4th corps and la Garde Imperiale. They were fronting Borny, Grizy, and Mercy les Metz, the Imperial Guard forming the reserve near the Fort de Quentin. At a quarter past four the attack commenced; a heavy fire of artillery was at once heard in every direction, the soldiers of the Prussian Landwehr heading the Prussian corps n'armee. The mitrailleus3B began their deadly work on each side. For me, confusion all around, men falling in every direction, columns whirling around us, bullets whistling their deadly work through the ranks. A battery of artillery with a mitrailleuse was making fearful havoc in the Prussian ranks. 1 heard frantic bravos announcing its new exploits. The fire was so well directed, the precision so treat, that each fire was positively mowing the Prussian ranks, who were fighting in a desperate way, their artillery replying to the other, and destroying French battalions right and left. At seven p.m. the Prussians were making a movement of retreat. A mitrailleuse had been twice taken from the French, and although it is only one of the hundreds of incidents of the battle, I mention it as it led to an important result. For the last hour, one of the greatest efforts of the French had had for object, to dislodge the Prussians from the woods of Borny, their troops being protected by that natural rampart. The brave colonel of the 41th Infantry, 2nd division, in retaking the mitrailleuse, was the cause of an immense body of Prussians emerging suddenly from the woods, and precipitating themselves as an infuriated torrent upon the French divisions ; it was only a pretext, for it was expected that the Prussian* would follow the same tactic as at Forbach and Froeswiller, which Consists of keeping out of sight their masses, their best divisions, and when the result of the battle seems to be in favor of their opponents, to change defeat into victory by that powerful movement of immense bodies of troops, plunging suddenly on the enemy, but this time Marshal Bazaine had* prepared a match for them. The Imperial Guard, commanded by Bourbaki, had beei kept in reserve; their artilery, from a strong position, began the defensive, the grenadiers advanced, and from that moment till a quarter to nine you might have thought you were in the middle of the eruption of Mouut Vesuvius; Fort de Quenton sweeping with its powerful batteries the flanks of the advancing columns, regiments of cavalry charging on the wings ; at a quarter to nine precisely the Prussians were retreating, leaving from 23,000 to 24,000 men hors de combat. The French have lost close on 4000 men killed or wounded. 140,000 Prussians took part in the fight against 70,000 Frenchmen (positively). Owing to the Fort Quenton slaughtering tho enemy, the Guard, except its artillery and a brigade of Grenadiers did not fight; they were kept in reserve to the last. During the combat the rect of the French Army was returning on the route to Verdun, and at nine o'clock I followed the Imperial Guard. General Decaen has been wounded in the leg; General de Castaguy had an arm cut, and Marshal Bazaine himself received a slight contusion on the head. I heard the sight of the champs de bataille was horrible in the morning. In returning they marched over dead bodies, which were in heaps in some spots.