"THE EDINBURGH REVIEW" ON THE AMERICAN NAVY.

West Coast Times, Issue 391, 24 December 1866, Page 1 (Supplement)

"THE EDINBURGH REVIEW" ON THE AMERICAN NAVY.

(PEOM THE AXG-LO-ASIEEICAN TI.MES).

We had occasion lately to allude to an article on American matters in " Blackwood's Magazine," written in that prejudiced, one-sided manner, so much to bo deplored in notices on America by foreign periodicals. The article now before us is of a very different stamp. The subject begins by a remark of the Prince de Jomville, showing' the enormous magnitude of the task to be undertaken by the United States ~Navy when the Government became fairly entangled in the great war, which by every means in their power they had tried to avoid. The American Navy was unprepared, and a less energetic people would have given up the tusk in despair. The few ships in commission weie nearly all abnud at foreign stations, and the difficulties were increased by a wholesale desertion of the service by the trained officers, who were mostly Southerners, casting in their lot with the States in re.volt. Captain Fox, who had retired from the navy, was the first officer who submitted a plan to the Government, and this was for relieving Fort Sumpter, then held by Major Anderson against the militia of South Carolina. Finding little enI couragement and great vacillation from the Executive, under President Buchanan, he laid his - scheme before some merchants at New York, where it was well received, and much encouragement given. Although President Lincoln sacrificed this officer in carrying out another pbn, the energy and pluck exhibited by Captain Fox so won the Preoictent that that officer was appointed Under-Secretary for the navy. The great fertility of resource developed by him in conjunction 1 with his chief, Mr Welles, quickly made the American navya most formidable instrument iv the hands of the Executive. The extraordinary vise of (he United States iMvy is faithfully detailed in the " Review," and the services performed by the fleet are briefly and truthfully noticed. It would require volumes to give in detail the series of naval actions — the attacks, bombardments, blockades, river fights, and combinations with the land forces, which have added so vastly to the renown of the United States Navy during the four years' war. One of the earliest and most important operations, and one solely due to the fleet, was the capture of New Orleans, and the consequent occupation of the Mississippi from Vioksburg to the sea. The "Edinburgh 1 ' calls it ""the greatest success, as a purely naval engagement, of the whole war — the greatest in naval history since Exmouth's victoiy at Algiers." C lptain Farragut, whom Welles had especially selected, as fitted by his resolute character take charge of the active operations in that auarter, arrived at the scene of action on the 20fch February. The Western Gulf squadron, hitherto under the command of M'Kean, had been gradually increased ■ from a fey blockading vessels to a powerful fleet of six steam frigates and twelve large gunboats. To these a flotilla of twenty homb vessels, under Porter (raised to Commander rank for his earlier services), were added hy the 18th March. But the obstacles to be overcome were of the most formidable character. Two strong forts — Jackson on the West bank, and St. Philip on the. east — were connected by 51 huge boom of rafts and hulks, the approach to which, tp be made against a powerful "current, they swept with a fire of eighty guns, and seemed thus to bar wholly the way up the stream. Above this obstruction a flotilla of gunboats was ready to support the fire of the works, and ironclad rams were known to have been some time in preparation, iv order to employ in the coming warfare that use of the blow of the prow, disused for so many centuries, but now revived by the power of steam.

An attempt of this kind bad already been tried for the first time in modern warfare by Hollins in the Confederate ram Manas9as with partial success. Though General Bufcler with 18,000 men was present, the navy, unsupported, were to effect the capture of New Orleans. The War Department, with Pakenham's failure before them, set «side all thoughts of employing troops, and gave to Farragut the following instructions: — '"When you are completely read}' you will proceed up the Mississippi River and reduce tlv> defences which guard the approach to New Orleans ; when you will appear off that city and take pos>se-sion of it under the guns of your squadron and hoist the American Hag therein, keeping possession until troops can be sent to you. A-. you have expressed yourself satisfied with the forces given to you, and as many more powt rful vessels will be added before you cai commense operations, the Department and the country will require of you — success." Had the Confederate re^i&tance been as perfectly organised as was then supposed, this success would have been all hut impossib'e. The official report laid before the Richmond Congress show that not only was much of the material preparation left undone, but that the commanders were wantingin the vigor, unity and activity of their formidable assailants. Farragut on the eve of the action went the round of the fleet. lie saw that each ship understood what her part was to be, and he picked up ideas from his contact with the commanders, which he carried into practice. The first of these came frdra. the engineer of the Richmond, who proposed that the sheet cables should be stopped up and down the sides in the line of the engines. It will be remembered that great credit was given to the Kearsage for adopting this plan, which in England was supposed to be original, in her conflict with the Alabama. Every expedient the commanders could think of was adopted to cover the crews from the fearful fire they looked for, hammocks, coal-dust, &c, were used to strengthen the defences ; some rubbed their vessels over with mud to make them less visible at night, the period for the desperate pas•sage; some whitewashed their decks that the men might see the better around them. The assault was preluded by a bombardment from Porter's heavy mortars, the flotilla being towed into position on the morning of the 18th of April, and on that day 3000 la.'ge shells were thrown into the forts. Tne Federal preparations and the decision and vigor of their attack contrasted strongly with the divided counsel and insufficient armament opposed

to them. The Confederates appear to have been alive to the use of iron-clad vessels, of which two large specimens, intended both lor ramming and carrying guns iv shot-proof batteries, were being prepared a( New Orleans. Happily for the success of the Federal fleet, the mechanical means which their foes controlled were by no means equal to their powers of conception. These iron-clads designed for the Ist February, were unprepared when the fleet, three months later, burst its way through the faded city. A storm, accompanied by a flood, parted the chains and damaged the. raft as an obstruction, but the continued efforts of the commander of the forts obtained three 10-inch and three 8-inch Colombind hollow-shot guns and five large mortars, and these were just mounted befoie the assault. For six long days the garrison endured the pitiless fire rained on thim by Porter. The casemates were injured and sevci'al gun-* disabled by the 13- inch shells, and the unprotected barracks almost immediately destroyed. But the vast expenditure ot Federal ammunition determined Farragut to hurry on the endeavor to pass the batteries by main force in the hours of darkness. On the third night, uuder cover of a furious fire, two gunboats essayed the destruction of the barricade by means of petards. "This duty," says Admiral Farragut, " was not thoroughly performed in consequence of the failure to ignite the petards with the galvanic battery." At this- time no officer of the American services had been trained to the use of the powerful engines of destruction to which they afterwards so fully attained. " Still," he continues, "it was a success, and, under the circumstances, a highly meritorious one." A schooner in the bai-ricade was grappled by the Itusca, boarded and detached from the chains, and a way was then laid open. She was seen, and a heavy fire from the forts forced her to retire. On the following night the garrison were cheered by the descent, from j New Orleans, of the Louisiana, mounting sixteen heavy guns, one of the two iron-clad rafts. The junction of this vessel, however, only brought out more prominently the split in the counsels of the Confederates. Of course the military and naval authorities were at loggerheads, nor was this all. The Navy were divided ajriinst each other. The Volunteer officers refused to obey the commander of the regular service. Ln vain the military urgently advised that the Louisiana .should be brought prominently forward to tike part in the action. She was still incomplete, and her motive power was insufficient, ho she was carefully kept in a place of safety. Even the fire ships, of which there were abundance, were not sent against Porter's fleet, as the tugs allotted for the duty were still under repair. General Lovell writes as follows :—": — " The river defence fleet proved a failure, for the vncy reason set forth in my letter to the Department of loth April. Unable to govern themselves, and unwilling to be governed by others, their almost total want of system, vigilance, and discipline rendered them useless and helpless when the enemy finally dashed upon them suddenly in a dark night."- The garrison, hoping nothing from tile steamers, did what they could under Porter's withering fire to repair damages. The 23rd April broke warm aud clear; but as night drew on the Federal fire slackened, and Duncan interpreted the ombti correctly, and earnestly pressed Mitchell to move the Louisiana into a position where the guns could aid the defence. He pointed out that the enemy were marking by a line of white flags what he knew must be their advance, and received the fatal reply — '"that disastrous ' too late' ;" the ironclad would be ready the next evening. Before that evening arrived she was prepared to be blown up by ' her commander's orders, and having been kept carefully out of harm's way, the only damage she did was the injury caused to the garrison by the explosion. At 2 o'clock on the morning of the 24th Farragut gave his pre-arranged signal, and the advance began in two columns. The cunboat Cuayaga led the right under Bailey, followed by the steam frigate Pen«acola and five other gunboats in succession. The gunboat Sciota led the left, followed by the Admiral in the Hartford, two other frigates and five gunboats. They had no knowledge of the divided counsels of their opponents to give them confidence, and the attack was considered one of great desperation. A general order had been published to the fleet, which ran as follows :—": — " When, in the opinion of the Flag Officer, the propitious time has arrived, the signal will be made to weigh and advance to the conflict. If, in his opinion, at the time of arriving at their respective positions of the different divi1 sions of the fleet, we have the advantage, he will make the signal f>r close action ' No. 8, and abide the result — conquer, or to be conquered — drop anchor, or keep under weigh as in his opinion is beat."

At half-past 3 the fleet approached the barrier which, severely damaged, gave way to the rush of the leading gunboats. The bomb-vessels, maintained their heavy fire, and now the forts opened op both the columns, and one of the most fearful scenes began which naval annals record. The darkness of the night, the closeness of the

action, and the tremendous calibre of the Federal cannon, made it hopeless for an officer to do more than control the movements of a single ship. The energies of the flag officer were soon tasked to the utmost to save his own vessel. A fire-raft came down on him, and the ship was run ashore in the attempt to avoid it. The ram Manassas guided the rait, and before the Admiral could back off the frigate was on fire half way up to her tops ; but with his ship in flames his battery never ceased, and Fort St. Philip, opposite to which he had got, was almost silenced under the fearful cannonade. Terrible as was the position of the forts the gunners bravely maintained the fight. Driven from their guns the slackening in the fire brought them forth instantly to reply with their feebler pieces to the storm of grape hurled at them from 9-inch and 11 -inch guns. The combat was one of giants, and both North and South gave conclusive proofs of that dauntless gallantry which was destined to come out so brightly hereafter, and almost to cover with its dazzling brilliancy the great crimes perpetrated by this wanton rebellion.

The gunboats Itasca,- Kennebec, and Winona became entangled in portions of the barrier after the frigates had gone by, and unable to endure the fire of the forts were compelled to head down stream, and thus separate themselves from the fleet.

The columns were now beyond the barrier, and so far the way to New Orleans was open, but Mitchell's squadron had yet to be encountered. The Federals estimated this force at thirteen gunboats and two ironclads, but the truth was far within this, and the action which ensued quickly settled the points of comparatived strength. The Governor Moore, and Quitman, attacked the Varuna, which had got ahead of the Federal fleet while in chase of a steamer, on board of which was G-eneral Lovell. The Governor Moore fired her bow gun, and disabled thirteen of the Varuna's hands — then charged her on the starboard side. The Federals succeeded in bringing an 8-inch gun to bear on the assailant, and disabled her in a few minutes. The Quitman at the same time rushed at the Varnna on the port side, butting twice, and on the second collision driving in her side. After delivering the final blow, the Quitman swung round, and before the Varuna sank she sent five of her 8 -inch shells into the new enemy and left her in flames as she disappeared from the scene. The Defiance was the only vessel of the Confederate squadron saved under the guns of the forts, the others having either been sunk, burnt, or driven ashore disabled by the overwhelming batteries which the frigates had opened on them. The Manassa3 continued her pluqky career to the end. When she sawi the flagship on fire, she turned and charged the Brooklyn full oa the starboard gangway, but with little effect beyond, breaking sonip of the links of the cables stopped' up and down her Bide, and driving in three planks above water line. Wedged in between her-- huge antagonist and the bank, the ram found herself uir--able to get up speed for a fresh charge, and was glad to drop down stream. She then crossed over to attack the Mississippi, and struck her with a very partial effect, inflicting injuries Bimilar to those of the Brooklyn, then passed down the fort, where she lay for a short time. The grey of early daylight now succeeded to the flashes of the hostile guns which had lighted up the scene, and Farragut, discovering the completeness of hia victory, formed and steamed slowly up the river. The little ram singly pursued the fleet aud prepared to renew her assaults. The Mississippi was ordered to turn and" attack her, and, aided by the gunboats Pinola and Kines, charged full at her. Captain Warley, seeing the huge bow 3of the frigate coming straight towards him, steered to avoid the shock, and ran the ram aground, exposing her to the broadside of the enemy. From this helpless position the crew escaped ashore, and the famous ram was fired by the boats of the Mississippi. This was the last episode of the battle, for Farragut leaving behind him the shattered forts and the relics of the enemy's flotilla, went upward on his path of conquest. New Orleans fell, and wab held without a break by the Federals to the close of the war. The next day the forts sul rendered to Commander Porter, and as Farragut pushed his conquest up to the guns of Vicksburg, the whole line of the Mississippi, from that port to the sea, became a highway to the Federals. • Our space will .not allow us to follow the "Review" through the numerous brilliant actions of the civil war. ■ The tone in which these sea fights aud river operations arc described is frank and fair to both sides, and the writer does not disguise the admiration with which the gallantry, skill, and energy of the actions inspire him. Before closing the article the Reviewer touches ou the cruisers which the Confederacy had managed through the connivance of Great Britain to get to sea and maintain there. The question we have discussed elsewhere in our columns, but we will add to our remarks those of the " Review :"— "Long before this affair (the capture of Wilmington) the efforts the South by sea had been reduced to what appeared to all the world rather a mere form of revenge than any useful warfare. Failing- utterly in the purpose of embroiling the North with any neutral nation, their doings have left a seed of bitterness such as it will need much enduring patience to stay from becoming bitter fruit in the future. From the Fall of Wilmington the advantages of block-ade-runners and the mushroom growth of their trade became things of the past. For the rest of the war the Confederate flag only covered what was, after alL T an ignoble piracy, legalised in default of provision made against it by jurists. The exdbinet of Richmond, which sanctioned this system to the end of their rule, have left as a legacy one of the most difficult problems on international duties ever offered for statesmen to solve. The Alabama, Sumter, and Florida roamed unchecked over the ocean, At the close of 1864 the capture of 193 vessels, valued with their cargoes at 13 y millions of dollars, bore testimony to their activity, and the danger to which, under the new conditions of naval warfare, an unprotected commercial marine is exposed. That these losses were not from expenditure being too narrow, but from the peculiar direction which it had taken under Mr Welles, is abundantly shown by his report of that date. The navy, which but four years before had counted but 76 ships, in and out of commission, and of these about one-half sailing vessels, were increased to a total of 671. Of this number no less than 71 were ironclads of different classes, 37 of them of formidable strength, and carrying heavy Dahlgren guns ; and only 112 of the whole were without steam power, being, in fact, used for transport purposes."