FRIDAY, JUNE 22, 1866.

West Coast Times, Issue 234, 22 June 1866, Page 2

FRIDAY, JUNE 22, 1866.

The interests of peace and "war Europe, have been so long trembling in the balance, and the Continent hns so uniformly, for years past, apparently been on tho verge of a general convulsion, that, however threatening tho present aspect of affairs, there is still somo ground for hope that tho crisis way once more bo averted, That the existing settlement of Europe cannot bo permanently maintained may bb conceded. The ambitions, and the thirst for territory that liavo constantly prevailed, have had the effect of stimulating warlike preparations, and of maintaining tho i armed establishments of the Great Powers on a basis most exhaustive of national resources, and most injurious to the development of peaceful industries. But so overwhelming would be the consequences to either of them of a decisive defeat, that although always in a state of preparedness for war, each has been reluctant to strike tho blow. One of the most menacing features of the present situation is the ambition f Italy, inspired by the new place her successful prosecution of the war 0 Independence has assigned her in Europe, and the natural craving of that power for the acquisition of Venetia. This province belongs to her by geographical relations, and by identity of race and of historical associations. But the kingdom of Italy, comprising Venetia within its borders, would rise to the dignity of a first class power, and such a consummation would probably be as distasteful to France as tho loss of her Adriatic provinces would be humiliating to Austria. The one consideration that probably keeps Italy under restraint, at a moment when the dissensions of Austria and Prussia would seem to give her the favorable opportunity fot striking a blow against her old enemy, is the doubtful attitude which France might assume in such a contingency. The dreud of the presence in her confiness of too powerful neighbours has always been a marked political characteristic of the French people ; and it is notorious that there is a large and powful party amongst them by whom the rising fortunes of Italy and the progress of the wovk of uhifaction have been viewed with extreme jealousy. That Louis Napoleon is A toll participator in the feeling— if he is not its leader — we may safely infer from the stand he has always made as the representative of French ambition, and from tho demeanor he has followed towards Italy fyoni the day when the sudden descent of his armies upon the Auatrianß turned the tide of victory in her favor. The Emperor seemed dismayed by the very magnitude of the revolution he had effected by his dashing movement, and has always manifested a suspicion and fear . of the powerful nationality to which he was instrumental in giving a new life. Instead of accepting the idea of a new kingdom, he devised an elaborate scheme for a confederation of Italian States, with the Pope as its president, , and Austria as a member, in, virtue- of her Venetian principality. This scheme rejected, with a vehemence which showed how much the people of Italy were in earnest, the Emperor has shown himself since but a cold friend. Here, then we see two conflicting influences affecting the critical game that is being played. Italy finds the embarrassments that press upon Austria opportune for a descent upon Vehetia. But it Avould be madness to incur the anger of France, and give the Emperor occasion for an intervention that might undo all the work that the last few years have painfully effected, and give back Italy to the regime of tho past.

There still remains, again, room for doubt whether the " opportunity," upon which the ambition of Italy for playing her great card depends, will be afforded by the actual outbreak of hostilities between Austria and Prussia. There is no special reason why the long standing dispute as to the disposal of the Duchies, should at this moment any WiQre than on any previous occasion,

be forced lo a settlement by an appeal to tho sword. In this matter there &re ninny doubts as to the side on which tho balance of allianoes would preponderate. Tho three great conservative powers aro Great Britain, Franco and Austria. The former has indeed separated itself from European politics, but its interest in tho maintenance of peace is so strong that all the weight of its moral influence — for what that may now be worth — will be exerted to the uttermost to bring aboutapeaceful solution of tho problem. Franco operates as a check upon the warlike tendencies of other powers ; because it is. known that hostilities once opened, her policy will bo to come in for a share of whatever spoil there may bo going ; so that there may be as much or more to be lost than to bo gained by either disputant as the final result of a war. Nor can the^n-obable attitude of Russia — vastly augmented m resources and military strength since the pence of Paris — be regarded by either sparty without grave misgiving and apprehension. In fact, the whole position is so complicated — there are so many parties to the game and so many onlookers who may be ready to seize their own opportunity to become parties to it — and the effect of any false step would be bo disastrous — that there exists indirect but powerful guarantees of (he continuance of peace, which cannot bo overlooked, however portentous may be the tho aotual omens of war.