THE CZECH CRISIS

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 83, Issue 39, 16 February 1939, Page 7

THE CZECH CRISIS

GERMAN STRENGTH WAS AIR FORCE SMALL? Now that it can be told the Supreme Germany Army Command has revealed the extent of the military preparations that enabled Chancellor Hitler to conquer the Sudetenland and with it complete Greater Germany without firing a shot, at the same time keeping all other Powers in check, reports Otto D. Tolischus from Berlin to the New York Times. The revelations made simultaneously over the radio proudly emphasised the decisive role that German armaments played in the drama that shook the world. All these revelations assert that Herr Hitler was determined to have his way even at the risk of a general war, although by a slrange coincidence two other publications cast a curious light on this assertion.

One is the Voelkischer Boebachter’s announcement of a series of articles on "The End of the Second Reich” (the German pre-war empire), in which it is said the fact that in 1914 Germany went to war against a constellation of Powers, including Britain, France and. Russia, marked the “bankruptcy of German politics.” The other is the Essener National Zeitung’s citation of an article by Mario Muratori published shortly before the Munich conference in the official Italian aviation periodical, the Ala d’ltalia, according to which at the time Germany had but 3000 first-line planes, as against the mythical 10,000 whispered in the highest official quarters in Britain and the United States. And that the National Zeitung accepts the Italian figures as more or less correct is illustrated by its annotation that this figure "does not include any reserves, training machines utilisable in war, etc.” The Figure Accepted. In any case, speaking on the radio, Major Hasso von Wedel, of the Supreme German Army Command, made the following statement:— “We are fully aware that besides the Fuhrer’s will power and energy there are two faeiors that brought success. First, the fact that now in 1938 we are armed in the most extensive sense of that word. Second, that the Fuhrer was ready to use this armament to the full for the defence of German rights and the German people were ready spiritually and materially to go all the way even in

case of war. Only to these two facts do 10,000,000 German national comrades owe their liberation." Lieutenant Captain E. Hahn, writing in the B. Z. am Mittag, says:

“ ‘lf you want peace prepare for war.’ This old proverb never was truer than in this year 1938, at the creation of the great German Reich through the Fuhrer.” According to all accounts, the German march into the Sudetenland was undertaken by five army groups consisting of ten army corps with nearly thirty divisions and 500 planes. Almost half of these divisions were motorised or armoured. These figures, however, were reported not to include the "not unimportant army forces held in readiness in case Czech opposition should have converted a peaceful march into a warlike operation.” It is added that the 500 planes were "only a small fraction of the air force held in readiness for the entire operation that could have been employed in case of warlike operations.” Defensive Preparations. Part of these air forces, however, it appears, consisted of "hundreds oi anti-aircraft batteries with thousands of guns of all calibres that had been placed in a ring around Czechoslovakia and which, together with numerous available pursuit planes would have rendered it impossible lor Czech or Soviet bombers to penetrate the German homeland and there execute their destructive work.

But in addiiion it is stated that all preparations had been made by the army, navy and air force "to meet any intervention from other Powers at any time with prospects of success.” In this connection special emphasis is laid on the western fortifications, which, as now revealed, were not ready; but accounts say that "these fortifications were and are in the position to protect German territory against any attack by land; the necessary strong troop units for use in and behind these fortifications were, of course, available without in any way affecting the action against | the Czechs.” The accounts furthermore acknowledge the value of the Czech fortification lines in conception and construction, but add: “The opinion of all experts," however, is that the entire system of fortifications was completely unfinished and individual sections furthermore were still under construction and either unarmed or armed only for an emergency. Those German troops prepared to march in were fully equipped with all means to overcome these defences, including guns up to the heaviest calibres and tanks of all sizes.” >