Wanganui Chronicle. AND PATEA-RANGITIKEI ADVERTISER. "NULLA DIES SINE LINEA." SATURDAY, AUGUST 14, 1880.

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume XXII, Issue 9190, 14 August 1880, Page 2

Wanganui Chronicle. AND PATEA-RANGITIKEI ADVERTISER. "NULLA DIES SINE LINEA." SATURDAY, AUGUST 14, 1880.

The later intelligence which has come to hand iregarding the, disaster to General Burrows' Brigade, in Afghanistan, confirms our suggestion that the British troops had probably been surprised. A good deal of the sting of the defeat is removed by the fact that a large proportion of the brigade were not English soldiers. There was only one European regiment of the line present, but its number is not given in the telegram. The remainder of the brigade was made up of native infantry, some squadrons of cavalry, and some horse artillery. The above were all apparently British troops — that is, in British, pay — but there were in addition, a body of Afghan troops belonging to Shere AH. A considerable number of these appear to have deserted to the enemy before the attack wns made, and as soon as it was known that Ayoub Khan was approaching, which wag some days before the surprise was effected. The troops which gave way in the attack were 6epoy3 of the Queen's Indian army, and their flight caused a panic amongst their comrades, and necessitated the retreat of the English infantry regiment, who were unable to stand against the twelve thousand troops with Ayoub Khan. After the brigade gave way the slaughter was very, great. It will be observed that even now the particulars relating to the affair are very imperfectly given. We do not know what line regiment of Englishinfan try wag engaged, or what was its strength. ; and the same may be said with regard to the cavalry and horse artillery. Tlie artillery may have belonged to the Queen's Indian army, but the men would be Englishmen, for unless we are in error, none of the artillery in India is at the present day manned, by natives, the change having been effected as a necessary precaution since the mutiny. Some assistance appears to Lave reached General Burrows from Candahar, and enabled him to get the remnant of hie command into that fortress. The immediate result of this defeat has been that the whole province of Candahar is ready to rise, and that the British in that part of Afghanistan are shut up in a fortress which is both naturally and artificially strong, but which was said at the time of the attack to be provisioned for only twenty-five days. Tlie relief of Candahar was expected to be effected by General Phayre in three weeks. Putting the two pieces of intelligence together, we learn that, if all goes well, he may arrive at Candahar in time to prevent a yet more serious and crushing defeat of the British. The fall of Candahar before the arrival of General Phayre would mean the surrender o£ at least four or five thousand soldiers — partly Europeans »nd partly Sepoys. Let us be ever so much inclined to take a hopeful view of the case, it is nevertheless evident that the situation is one of extreme hazard. There seems also reason to fear that disaster may overtake the small British, force posted at Kehlat Gelzai, on the road between Candahar and Ghuzoee. _ At that spot there are two companies of EL.M. 66th. Foot, some squadrons of Native cavalry, and part of a battery of tho Royal Artillery. If rescued, it must be either from Candahar or from Ghuznee, and the issue is apparently doubtful in the extreme. Candahar may be considered safe provided supplies hold out, but should they be exhausted the only hope for tbe garrison would be to cut their way through Ayoub Khan's army, numbering at the present time far more than on the night of the surprise, and endeavour to effect a juncture with General Phayre, It is obvious, however, that such an attempt would be the last resource of desperate men, and as the line of march would be through a hostile country, the effort could scarcely be successful. Allßeems to depend on tlicsj.eod of Gen. Pliayre's march. Before very long au overwhelming number o£ Brjfcjsli troops can

be pushed forward towards Candahar, but moments at such a crisis are valuable, and anxiety will not bo allayed until certain intelligence has been received of the relief of the fortress on which so much depends. It is evident now that General Burrows' advance to Kirishk for the purpose of intercepting the advance of Ayoub Khan was, to say the least; premature. When the latter left Herat, he was reported to have with him only four thousand troops. The number must have been greatly underestimated, or he must have been largely reinforced before he reached Kirishk, for on the night of the attack he had with him more than twelve thousand troops, many of them of excellent quality. False intelligence will probably be urged as an excuse for a movement which has already brought about so large an amount of evil, and may lead to a great deal more. It will not be accepted as a sufficient answer to a charge of rashness, either by professional or non-professional critics. How far General Burrows is to blame, and how far bis superiors, will have to be determined hereafter; but public opinion points to one man as the fitting leader in Afghanistan at the present time. Englishmen in all parts of the world would experience a feeling of relief if they knew that Sir Garnet Wolseley was in command. His antecedents forbid the idea of any such mistakes occurring in his generalship.