Reviews.

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume XIII, Issue 1027, 15 May 1869, Page 2

Reviews.

An Explanation of the principal causes which led to the present war on the West Coast of New Zealand, in defence of the action taken by Lieut-Colonel M‘Donnell, &c. —Wanganui, 1869.

Writing of a midnight surprise of a Pakakohi village and the peaceable proposals that ensued, Col. M‘Donnell says at page 20 of his book : “As a proof of their sincerity they presented me with a fat goose, and requested me to return with my men to Patea. As a prognostication of coming events this unfortunate gander [was it not a goose, as mentioned before ?] shortly after, during my absence, committed suicide by tumbling over the Patea cliff [Qy. If a man or goose tumble over a cliff, is it suicide 1 ?], but subsequently had the honour of supplying my friend Mr Booth and a few others with material for a hearty dinner.” We shrewdly suspect that not only the company mentioned but many others have been all along looking upon this melancholy war as a fat goose from which to feather their nests, irrespective of the feelings or resources of the settlers. In another part of this pamphlet there occurs this passage : “ Just before leaving Wellington for Patea, I had another interview with Col. Haultain, and again expressed myself confident of a speedy settlement of affairs in the Patea district. To this he replied (perhaps with a view to encourage me to perform my duty) that as soon as peace was restored, the surveys completed, and the settlers located on their land, I should cease to draw the pay and allowances of Lieut-Colonel which rvas [sic] £630 a-year, and my pay and allowances would be reduced to £4OO a-year, which left the impression on my mind that high pay and allowances were entirely dependent on the continuance of the contest.” Is this subtle sarcasm 1 We can scarcely suppose that Col. M‘Donnell would thus seek to give direct confirmation to insinuations in the direction indicated.

The pamphlet before us, though purporting to be an “ explanation ” of some formerfy inexplicable things, is rather disappointing. It is a mere rechauffe of old, old stories, and tiresome details, unrelieved by any dash or piquancy, but distressingly defaced by typograpical and grammatical mistakes. Although the gallant Colonel has been bred to the “ sword as a profession,” as he terms it, and not the “ pen,” we had hoped that another party, who puts forth some illusive claim to use the latter, and whom report has repeatedly associated as Col. M‘Donnell’s confrere, would have taken some pains to set the Colonel right before the reading public. This has not been the case, yet it is perhaps after all a minor matter, and we do not blame the Colonel, as in the preface he disarms criticism by declaring his inability to wield what he evidently regards as the more powerful weapon, but that his province is in meeting the rifle and tomahawk of the rebel, which he prefers to the invidious attacks of those he had confidently looked to for support. In glancing through this “ explanation ” we were quite prepared to hear and indeed believe much against the Government in connection with the unfortunate war on this coast ; but (passing over, as only distantly relevant to the present question,more than half of the “explanation ’ as having to do with former and bygone troubles), we find that the gallant Colonel has only skimmed his subject and refrained from penetrating to any depth in the matter. His narrative commences in June 1866, but it was only on the Ist of April, 1868, that, after returning from Hokitika and the Fenian trials there, with a small force, that he heard of the doings in the Patea district during his absence. Mr Booth, R.M., had been unfortunate enough to lose a horse, along with the horses of some other settlers, and he immediately called upon the Colonel to exert himself for the recovery of the stolen property. Into the intricacies of this quarrel we cannot follow him. His version strongly criminates

(no other word can apply to those who brought war and rnin on aprosperous district) Mr Booth, whois represented asbeing supine and threatening by turns. The affair soon grew into a matter of colonial importance. At this point, we think it proper to allow him to tell his own story as to how the difficulty was met or attempted to be met : I immediately went to Wellington, to represent this state of affairs to the Government, and to ask for reinforcements. On the day I arrived in Wellington I had an interview with the Hons Messrs Stafford, Haul tain, and Hall. I told them how it had come about, and begged Mr Stafford to reinforce me to enable me to proceed against the murderers. Mr Stafford said, in rather an unpleasant manner, ‘ I won’t give you a man; you must abandon all your posts in advance of the Patea redoubt, and. concentrate your force there.’ I was astonished and pointed out to him that such a step would be virtually to abandon the whole of the Patea district to the enemy; that the settlers would at once be obliged to leave their honses, farms, horses, cattle, and sheep, and in fact, that they would be ruined. Further, that all the natives in the district now friendly, would have no alternative but to join the enemy, whose ranks would thus be swelled; that the ruin of the district between Patea and Wanganui would necessarily follow, and the disaffection spread to other districts. Mr Stafford said, ‘ The sooner the better; I don’t care, the Assembly would not vote the money.’ . . ■ It was arranged that I should call the following day. I did so and saw Colonel Haultain, who told me I could increase my force to four hundred men, and enlist them /or three months. . . . Finding that I could get no better terms, X agreed to this arrangement, but insisted on having the sole control, and not to be interfered with and kept under the control of Mr Booth as I hitherto had been. Colonel Haultain promised me carte blanche , which promise as usual, was not carried out.

While finding little in this statement to take exception to in so far as it relates to others, we must be allowed to correct the Colonel if he thereby means it to be inferred that in carrying out his plans he was merely obeying the instructions of his superiors. We would remind Col. McDonnell of his intemperate boastings that in three months the rebellion would be at an end. Yet ninety days and Maoridom would be destroyed ! There would have been considerable merit had this been actually accomplished, but in the face of such extravagant assurances as he took every means of promulgating, we were not prepared for the utter ruin that has overtaken so large a district. Colonel McDonnell has many excellent qualities, and at the time we regretted very much that he should have allowed himself, through listening to designing and sycophantic parties, to speak and act as he did. It put him in an entirely false position at the outset. It is when men are doffing, their armour not putting it on, that a little boasting is allowable. We are quite sure he had many difficulties to encounter; it could not be otherwise ; and it requires no great stretch of imagination to see that the Civil Commissioner and he did not get on very well together. What he says also about the demoralisation of the force is very true •

To raise a revenue they [the Taranaki Provincial Government] had passed a “ Bottle Bill ” under which every store-keeper in that province, on paying the license fee, could sell liquor by the bottle. Almost every shop and store in the Patea district at once became a “ groggery,” and when the men’s money was spent gave them credit, sometimes receiving orders for their forthcoming pay. I wrote to the Defence Minister for power to close those grog-shops, seize the liquor, and place it in safety. Ministers refused to grant me that power, as each store-keeper had paid for his licence. Thus I was powerless, as the greatest punishment 1 could inflict on the militia portion of my force was seven day s hard labour and no cells to put them into. One Government opened the floodgates of intemperance, the other refused me the power to shut them, and both held me responsible for the result.

But what of the Colonel’s own example and the example of his officers in the way of repressing intemperance ? On that point there is nothing said. The Colonel proceeds to contrast, from, of course, an interested stand-point, the military rule of himself and of his successor, Colonel Whitmore. It is here, in the only part where a case is attempted to be made out, that Col. McDonnell most signally fails. Colonel Whitmore came into command of a disordered and panic-stricken rabble, and — whatever eerrors of judgment he may have committed—he is at least entitled to all the credit of having made an army out cf it — an army, moreover, that has managed to make its power, to some extent, felt by our enemies. Colonel McDonnell is entitled to be heard on the subject of future operations, and we close this review with an extract from page 43 : “ There is but one effectual course open to us now, and that is, to put the East and West Coasts in a state of defence ; then muster our European forces and Native allies and strike vigorously at the Ngatimaniapoto country, seizing Kaiohia, and making it a basis of operations on the one side, and sending a strong force on the other side from Maketu and Tauranga through Patotere, advancing at the same time on the present Waikato frontier. Thus we would devastate the Ngatimaniapoto country, locate a force at Taupo, permanently cutting off the enemy’s communications; and then, we could finish off upon the East and West Coasts.

When these and other vigorous measures are undertaken under a determined and resolute Administration, and a judicious. change in the laws which now protect rebel natives is effected, then, and not until then, may we hope to see this conflict finally ended, and the settlers all over this Island enjoying peace and prosperity. The Colonel, or rather his Editor (for we acquit the Colonel of such bad taste) closes his pamphlet in the following grandiloquent sentence :—“ I would, had the means been placed at my disposal, and had I been unfettered and left alone, have brought natives affairs in the Patea district, to a proper and peaceful issue.” Provisoes and ifs are very useful. If he could have got any amount of men —if he could have got his own way —if , and still we have our doubts of what the result would have been. No one better than Colonel McDonnell for heading a dashing party, but an army, however small, requires administrative as well as fighting capability, and he has not shown that he is possessed of the former. Indeed, the officer possessed of it has not yet made his appearance. We have more to say on this pamphlet, and shall return to the subject.

The Christian Messenger. —Published monthly by James Mitchell, Roxburgh Street, Wellington. This is a cheap periodical, printed at the office of the Wellington Evening Post, and published as above. The first number is now before us. It is well got up and sensibly written. The reason why so little interest is taken in Missions in this country is frankly acknowledged to be the little benefit that has resulted from them among the i Maoris. No doubt the distance which lends

enchantment to the view has been wanting in our case, and hence to a large extent — not altogether—the utter indifference manifested. Numbers of good people at home still dream that there are devoted self-deny-ing men labouring away for the’ conversion of Maoris, who are pictured as a tenderhearted race of beings —the last relic of a time when wild in woods the noble savage ran. To use a phrase more expressive than elegant, we are bound to say the thing is all rot. We take leave, however, to commend the Christian Messenger ; we know that there is much apathy with reference 1 o all such ventures ; but this periodical brings religious literature within the reach of all, and we would fain hope that it will be a success.