THE WANGANUI CHRONICLE AND RANGITIKEI MESSENGER. “Vèritè sans peur.” WANGANUI, SEPTEMBER 17, 1863.

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 7, Issue 361, 17 September 1863, Page 2

THE WANGANUI CHRONICLE AND RANGITIKEI MESSENGER . “ Vèritè sans peur. ” WANGANUI, SEPTEMBER 17, 1863.

We are by no means reconciled to the delays which* mail after mail, continue to manifest themselves in the conduct of the Waikato wai. We are.obliged to acquiesce in these delays ‘simply becausewe

can do nothing to mend them ; but we are far too much interested in everything that relates to the war, to sit down quietly and resignedly. Notwithstanding the numerous little devices with which so many attempt to blind themselves to the difficulties of the struggle on which General Cameron has entered, there is one fact to the contrary which ought to read us all a lesson, and that is the vast difference between that which General Cameron thought he could do, and that which he actually finds himself able to do. We allude to this difference with no desire to dispirit. Our most manifest duty is to inspire 'the settlers with hope and confidence, hut this can only be doue, legitimately, by clearly revealing their position, and inducing them to act accordingly. Danger cannot be avoided by shutting our eyes to it ; iu that case we shall only walk into it the sooner. Perhaps no one saw less difficulty in the way of crushing the spirit of native rebellion than General Cameron did when he first arrived here. We regret we have not the blue book at hand to quote from, but we remember distinctly that, at an Executive Council held a few days .after his arrival- in 1861, he strongly recommended that the Waikato country should be attacked without further delay. It was but natural,- perhaps, that such a veteran should hold the enemy in contempt. He had learnt to regard no army in Europe as superior to that in which be served, and a horde of savages ill supplied with arms and ammunition must have indeed looked contemptible in the eyes of such a man fresh from Britain. His recommendation was overruled when it was found that the commissariat and other arrangements he required were absolutely impossible, and experience has shown how wisely it was so. At this moment, after three months’ attempt to get into the Waikato-, he has not penetrated half a dozen miles The force he has now is as large as the one he had on his arrival in 1861, and is supplemented by from two to three thousand militia and other corps. The mode of reaching the front was then through a dense forest, impervious to the conveyance of supplies, and temptingly inviting to the natives to take up their position in the rear of the force sent to Waikato ; the great danger consequent on which, however it was. at the time thought lightly of by newly arrived military men, is now fully admitted. The gunboat, on whose services so much reliance is rightly placed, was nearly finished when the present entrance into Waikato was effected, but iu 1861 six mouths must have elapsed before she could have rendered any aid. Everything that has transpired during the present war, only shows how ineffectual, if not disastrous, such a campaign must have been without the road and other means and appliances the Geueral now has and expects to have.

Far be it from us to write one word that would lead our readers to underrate the General’s ability. He was mistaken, but he is not now. He fully appreciates the difficulties he has to contend with, and because he does so we look forward to his successfully overcoming them His delay in attacking Meremere is the part of a brave, wise, and humane man. With a few hundred meu at his back he might at once, perhaps, rush the place. His. doing so, if necessity required,, would exhibit his bravery ; but as a very short delay must augment his force, in men and still more in material, true bravery, wisdom, and humanity alike combine to avoid the foolhardiness which would risk a repulse or greater slaughter of the troops than necessary. This delay; is the more justifiable because there are grounds for hoping that, if the blows to be struck at Meremere and Rangiri are as effectual as it is intended they should be, the war may come to a satisfactory end in a few months. That there may be crushing defeats and submission as a consequence, we have much reason to hope ; not the least of which is the growing disfavour with which many military men regard 4

the continuance of the wax’. If what we hear is true, it will not be very long before this will become a general feeling among those engaged in the north. The evils of a campaign are borne with pleasure when there is something to be gained by those who bear them ; but in this war (say many) there is neither promotion nor glory. The engagements are. at best but fieabites, and no one, out of the colony, regards the destruction of a few tattooed savages as sufficient to wreath the victors’ brows with laurel ; while the fatigue, disGonxfoi’t, aud hai’ass is as great (if not more so) as that which is experienced in civilized warfare. Whilst we cannot help regretting that such a feeling should in any degi’ee exist, we confess we are not surprised at it, aud therefore are the more anxious that evei*y delay and precaution should be used, that may be reasonably necessary, in order that the Genei*al may swoop down with effect on the two positions at which the natives have taken their stand. So far, however, from becoming recon ciled to the delay which we feel to have been unavoidable, we repeat that wo acquiesce in it only because we can dy nothing in the way of remedy. Verb serious evils are l'esultiug therefrom botd noi'th and south. The Ngapuhi antneighbouring tribes are becoming reseless, and will soon be eager to take part in the war. If not permitted to act on our side, it is said they will on the other ; remain quiet, when war is so near, they cannot. In Hawke’s Bay and Wairarapa the mutual suspicion of the two races is daily increasing, and it is certain that, in both places, the chief danger lies in the unceasing efforts of Wi Tako to provoke a resistance to the traiuing of the settlei’s. The longer the delay in the General’s movements, the greater the danger of collision in this and the neigh-

bouring province ; especially as the natives are beginning to believe that the troops are being kept at bay, and afraid to proceed further into the Waikato. What they have heard about , the immense force that was preparing to attack them they are beginning to look upon .as “ bounce,” so that the sooner they , are undeceived the better for all parties. The natives are not the only persons who begin to doubt; the: extent of the force about to be available. The expected regiments of India are now said to he mythical, and we are fairly at a loss to know whether they are so or not. We have been told so positively that they have been sent for, and so positively that they have not, that we verily believe that if reinforcements are coming from India at all during the next two months, they will be but a very small part of “ three regiments,” that were ouce currently eopected. Sufferingastfiis district is likely to continue to do from the forced inactivity in the North, it. is most desirable that we should know what are the, prospects of assistance which the Government auticicipates. At present it is quite clear, that Wanganui, and indeed the whole, province, has only the present iniltary force aided by the Militia and "Volunteers, to trust to. We cannot expect any further military aid from the North under present circumstances, and on that account.putting it on the lowest ground—we ought to avoid or postpone collision as far as possible. Now the local chances of collision arise mainly from the inherent design of a section of the natives to set the pakeha rule at defiance. This desire will be principally repressed or ‘ increased by the result of operations in the North, and is, therefore, to a great degree beyond our immediate control. But there is very much reason to fear that the natives cannot witness or hear of the abandonment of o'utstatious, without feeling a sense of their own superiority and falling iuto the temptation to maraud which panics give opportunity for. To prevent panics is in fact the great duty of all who are placed in the position of conservators of the peace. Experience teaches that panics are more likely to result from the want of known places of rendezvous than from anything else—a deficient supply of arms not even excepted. Without recommending that a sham alarm should be got up. as in Auckland lately, for the purpose of drilling the inhabitants iuto the knowledge of what to do and where to go, we would earnestly impress upon the settlers in all portions of this district, to select houses within easy reach of every few families as the point on which they should first fall, with a view to their com centrating on other fixed positions as soon as opportunity offers. This practice has been adopted in many parts of the district, but there are still portions where these precautions have not been so thoroughly determined on as some of the settlers could wish. We know of nothing locally that is just now of more importance. This done, the settlers will, when the supply of arms at length corresponds with the men willing to use them, and the Defence Force is stationed amongst us (as the Advertiser tells us is to be directly), feel that they have made all the preparation in their power to meet, as men should meet, whatever may befall them.