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Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 7, Issue 349, 25 June 1863, Page 3

to find fault„ with, that the habit became almost chrohic. In the conduct of the present waV we sincerely believe that We small have'to congratulate as often as \ve lia'd previously to censure. \\ e can, however, the whole cotuniuhity will entirely'forget the habit, they have acquired, and we are not surprised that there should be a few who do not accept, IVI ajor-General Camerons maiden exploit as being of that satisfactory ’character' which most persons conceive it to be. They, sec in its composition so much of. that which they had to complain of in the last war, that they fear lest the. future conduct of the present one should be, iu any wise hishioned after the model of Generals Bratt and Gold. Thus, sohie notice that the range of Captain Meter’s guns was exactly tliat of the L stockade—Booyards. Others: call to mind the repetition of the great blunder' in attacking pas in the - front, •without stationing a force in the rear to cut off retreat.' Others, again, ■ wonder, if a temporary advantage is always to sa tisfy, and therefore regret that Geueral Cameron’s force did make'a_ day of. it; instead of marching hurriedly hack to town. Hence they conclude that the affair of the 4tli June would have been more decisive if it had been, more original, and they-regard the evils of the last war as already iucipiently manifesting themselves in tlie present. To cast a stone at those who conducted the late attack-is far from our desire. So far from it, that we Have hesitated much in noticing the opinions to which we have alluded, lest it should be thought that we •were-disposed to father them. We are persuaded that these opinions are the result mainly of ail over anxiety on the part of some that the war should be sharp and short, and that this over anxiety warps their judgment. Wej in common with,.the rest! of this community, also believe that the sharper the war is the shorter it will be ; but we are far from endorsing the belief of the .few who think, that sharp as was the lesson lately given it might have been sharper; We admit that nothing is easier than

for persons to show, from their: after knowledge; how far more effectively this or that could have been dime. We now know from native letters that if the troops,: instead off opening a! fire at 800 yards and then doubling across the gully, had crept quietly round they could have secured every native in: the redoubt, as the latter were quite unprepared for an attack. We now know that the redoubt •was one of little, strength, and that the occupants knew it also—Topia, who had gone there the previous evening, -having endeavoured to induce Hore Batene to retire, from it. until made tenable. But ■while nothing is easier than for persons so to argue from their after knowledge, we may be permitted to remind them that a wise commander never disposes his

forces in action on the chance of liis

-enemy feeing weak arid unprepared, if ilxere .is rieason fco. suppose to the contrary. We» think we may fairly conclude :, |rom the guerilla mode- ofwarfare pre viously introduced that; there is no want fef dash in The Gerieral’s cornpositiori, and ; that with the joint' experience and coil , suliation of such men as Cameron, AVarre, . and; Logan, all that was practicable to fee . done was done. We may certainly con- : elude that Captain Mercer’s Armstrong battery was placed as near as circumstances permitted,' and that it was infi- : nitely more effective at 800 yards thari -General Gold or Pratt’s ordinary pieces would have been at close quarters. We may be equally sui’e that the 600 men, • - -composing the attacking force, were placed • as favourably as their strength and their ,< knowledge of the enemy’s position would ; alloy f and wehmay be under no doubt 'whatever that while pursuit was possible pursuit did. not slacken. It it were possible to have inspired the General with a fore-knowledge equal to our own. 'after knowledge, then the result of the attack would have certainly been all that could be desired by the most sanguine. To say that all was not done that- could be'tlonej would be an injustice to-those who, to use the natives’ :own expression, “came up like a wave on the beach.”

, We have already remarked that we scarcely' liked alluding to this subject, lest it should be thought that we were in any way detracting from the merit of those who took part in the attack of the 4th June. Yet we have done so because of the-- opportunity it gives us of ■declaring that, having confidence in the ability and pluck of the General —confidence that that ability and. pluck has not feeen, nor is intended to be, fettered by any undue official interference —and con.deuce also in such subordinates as Colonels Nelson, AVarre, and l.ogan, we rest satisfied that all that is in the power of military genius to do will be done. We wish to inspire the settlers with the same belief, although we scarcely, think there are many but what are thus inspired already. The few who. are not canuot fail to notice that, however’ much Genei’al Cameron riiay, like , his predecessors, dislike the troops being out ’* after dark, he has on the very;first occasion shown that he has sipt the slightest objection to their being •out before daylight. That there will be plenty of scope for the action of -all the military genius the forces possess we gather from - the-fact that Rewi, the Ngatimaniapoto chief, was the real instigator of the ambush which proved so fatal- to the unsuspecting escort. The extensive preparations this chief has made at Rangiriri, with a view to command the lower’ Waikato, coupled, with a certainty that it was at his instigation, an«d with a view to bring on war, that the murders were committed, lead, to the conclusion that General Cameron s services will, in -due -course, have to be less entirely devoted to Taranaki than they now It is, ilietfefoine,' most