THE ROYAL CHARTER.

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 4, Issue 182, 15 March 1860, Page 4

THE ROYAL CHARTER.

[From the Times, December 5.] The official report upon the loss of the. Royal Charter is now before the world, and all is known that ever can be known of the circumstances connected with this tragical event. The report does not add in the smallest degree to our previous information upon the immediate j incidents of'the wreck, and, to a very slight extent indeed, furnishes us with any practical suggestions as to the means by which the calamity might have been avoided. This, however, is not the fault either of Mr. Mansfield or of Captain Harris, the gentlemen charged with the burden of the 'inquiry. They appear to have carried it through with great diligence,

with perfect impartiality, and with a very anxious desire to arrive at the truth. The few poor creatures who succeeded in getting om shore outlie morning of the fatal-26th of OcTober last told us within a few* hours as much ns we now know of what passed during the Inst six hours of the existence of the Royal Charter. From their statement it appeared that Captain Taylor, from the moment he had made up his mind to trust to his anchors and -chain cable, instead of running out to sea, did the best he could for the salvation of tire ship. We are informed in the report that this ‘is not a. case in which it can .be said that the ship was lost by (he default of the master.’ Difference of opinion may exist as to this or that particular act of Captain Taylor—as to this or that particular step which be adopted under the full pressure of the emergency. It must aiot, however, be forgotten, that those who challenge his discretion have the advantage, of being critics after the event, while he,, who might have much to urge in explanation of his conduct, can no longer be heard in, his own defence. At 5 p.m., on the. 25th, the Royal •Charter might have run for refuge to Holyhead harbour. She was abreast of it at the time, .nnd until then the weather had ljeen fine with ai light breeze ahead. We now know that it would have been well if Captain Taylor had, .adopted Ibis course, althptigb Holyhead harbour was not without its own, peculiar perils on that •terrible night. But just at that hour, and when his ship was in that position, was. Captain Taylor bound, as an able and competent seaman, to know that within a, few hours such a tempest would be abroad as had not been known for a quarter of a century and upwards, •even in, that stormy sea,?. He had his barometer, he had the eky above him, and the •experience of a life to, teach him how to read these signs. Was he bound to know that the

issue was Holyhead harbour or the death of 500 men, women, and children ? This point has never been, muqh ins'sted upon even by those who have challenged the conduct of the late master of the Royal Charter. The next suggestion in the report is one of so obvious a kind that we ventured ourselyes to offer it the day ufter thp calamity occurred ; it is, that the Royal Charter’s head might have been put to the westward, and the Irjsh Channel kept open during the pressure of. the gale, or rather hurricane. Novv we read in the report that at 6 p.m. the /Skerries, were rounded, and the wind increased to a gale. ‘ At. 9 p.m. the wind aud sea had increased so much that, though under full steam, the ship refused to answer her, helm, 5 From that , moment we presume there was no choice but to abide the event. Thp Royal. Charter was drifting bodily to leeward- It was a question of a bolding chain, or of. grim. de,uth among the breakers.

Now. with'our present information, and with the awful knowledge of the result before us, we know that, as it would have been better that Captain '.Taylor should have taken the Royal Charter into. Holyhead harbour at 5 p.m, on the 25th of October, so it would have been, better if between 5 p.m. and 9 p.m. be had stood out tp sea, and borne the buffet. He thought otherwise, and. he was wrong, hut there xpoy well have been circumstances, connected with the capacity and behaviour of his ship pf which lie could take account and we cannot. I;n the report we find it stated, that had; Captain Taylor, immediately the ship was brought up, cut away hi? niasts and spars, and so eased, the .strain upon his anchors, the safety of the. ship might- have been secured. This was the very course adopted, with regard to the Pi;i.uce, off Bajaklaya, in 1854, and which led to her destruction, for the drift, rigging and spavsTpulpd the. screw. It. is. said that the-.fan

of the Royal Charter , might have been readily hoisted up, inasmuch as it was but a'two-bladed one, and upon this point Captain Taylor’s.discretion is impeached. It is also state,dj and apparently with reason, that at such a season of tho year, and in so dangerous a sea, more care should have beep taken to make all ‘ snug : j up aloft, for the Royal Charter came up Chan-j uel with ‘ her skysail masts on end and yards! across.’ 7’his seemed reasonable enough, and! probably to this extent the late master of the'

Loyal Charter stands fairly amenable to.the } rebuke of the nautical assessor in this inquiry. ( Captain Harris also comments upon the unusual J practice of steaming ahead to the anchors in a < gale of wind and in a seaway. He considers I that as during a gale of wind there are .intervals of violence and lull, a ship under steam, < as described, is apt to shoot ahead under a lull, ■ land to be violently jerked back upon her anchor i and cables under a gust. This jerk is the i [most dangerous way in which force can be (applied,.and he considers that possibly nay, probably —its occurrence may explain the parting of the chains in the case of the Royal Charter. JFhen all is said, it would seem that with the exception of not sending down his upper spars, Captain Taylor did all that an ordinary master of a merchantman cf, approved experience and ability would have done-under the circumstances in which he was placed. When we have enunciated all the resources and palliatives whiclr human ingenuity , can suggest, now that the matter is calmly considered in comfort of body and repose of mind afier the event, we must assign their own fair share in the calamity to the. impenetrable gloom! of the night, and to the awful fury of the elements. It is stated in the report, * All the evidence concurs in showing that the force of the gale was terrific and unexampled on that : coast.’ Any time during the last quarter of a , century the precautions taken by Captain ; Taylor would probably have been sufficient to ■ insure the safety of his ; but on the night of the 25th-26th October something more than I ordinary precaution was needed. The Royal 1 Charter was lost; whether further and extra- : ordinary precautions would have saved her we , cannot say.

One suggestion which has been made to us by a correspondent who signs himself ‘ Circumnavigator,’ is well worthy of attention. It is clear enough that if the chains of the Royal Charter had held the safety of the ship would have been secured. Now, even with the encumbrance of the upper spars which had been kept on end, even despite of what Captain Harris appears to consider the disadvantage of steaming ahead to her anchors, it seems that it would have required but little more strength and the cable would have held. It is proper, upon so capital a point, to quote the very language of the report ‘ At 1.30 a.m. of the 26th the port chain parted outside the hawsehole. . Orders were theji given to get up the stream anchor, which weighed only 15 cwt., and was stowed in the after orlop. The sheet anchor of 50 cwt. was stowed in the forehatchway. It took about an hour to get up the stream anchor, and when this was done, at about 2.30 a.m., the starboard cable parted.’ In less thau an hour the Royal Charter was a wreck. - Now, our correspondent notices as an enormous defect in the construction of merchant vessels that few* of them, even of the largest class, have more than two hawse-holes. Even with spare anchors on board, they can only use them in detail. Now, if the Royal Charter, had been able to let go three anchors in place of two, it is probable that all would have held. At a,ny rate, the vessel rode securely to her starboard cable alone for about an hour, during the utmost fury of the gale, so the fair inference is that a little assistance would have enabled her to hold on by it throughout. Moreover, when the spare anchors were wanted, where were they ? Just where the oars and fittings of the boat? most commonly are when sudden calamity strikes a vessel —not at hand. All vessels required to carry three anchors

should have three hawse-holes, and all three ■ anchors ready to let go at a minute’s warning. In one other respect we had looked for more ■ ample information from the report—namely, ias to the construction of the slr.p. The two gentlemen, however, charged with the inquiry i have considered that when they had satisfied ; themselves that the Royal Charter was as good ;as any iron ship pf her class.and year they had gone far enough. The loss of the Royal ; Charter should, however, be turned to more : profitable account. In the course of tlie cort respondehce which it has elicited it lias been ; broadly stated by very competent authorities > that the material used in the construction oi , iron vessels is not so good as it should be, aud ) that they are not generally constructed on ) sound principles. At present underwriters > insure tffem at the same rates as wooden r vessels, but if they are not equally secure they i have the remedy iu great measure in their own bands.