FRANCE AND ENGLAND—FROM A FRENCH POINT OF VIEW.

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 4, Issue 179, 23 February 1860, Page 3

FRANCE AND ENGLAND—FROM A FRENCH POINT OF VIEW.

[From the Times, Nov. 12.] Englishmen have been discussing for several weeks now the probabilities of a war with France, what are the preparations on either side of the Channel, and what is likely to be tho issue of the conflict. One day we see a panic; then the panic is laughed at; next we seem to be taking matters coolly ; then again we argue the point seriously, but without fear ; we go to work with vigour, we say that an invasion is not very probable, but it is best to be prepared, and we watch narrowly all that our neighbours are saying and doing. They, in turn, have their eyes upon us, and now sneer, now criticise, now remonstrate, now threaten. In the midst of so much that is, if not alarming, at least menacing, it is pleasant to come upon a party of Frenchmen who thoroughly sympathize with us; who regard with horror the prospect of a war between tho two countries ; who agree with us in thinking that the attitude of France is quite unjustifiable ; and who arc most anxious that England should place herself in a position of so much force as (o prevent the possibility of an attack. It will at once be divined that such sympathy cannot at the present moment find full expression in France. We find it in the pages of a French review published in London, and conducted with no small ability'-. The Revue Independante (issued by Jeffs) is a monthly magazine

devoted to politics, philosophy, literature, science, and art. It was started in July last; it is edited, in part , at least, by M Gustave Masson, the French master at Harrow, and it represents the opinions of tho most sober Liberals. Of course, a Frencli review conducted in this country is exceedingly interested in the question of peace, or war, and the antagonism of the party which it represents to tho Imperial policy gives a •warmth to its denunciations of what in any aspect,must be regarded as a calamity and a crime. There are few new facts to be gleaned from these pages. Z’he interest of the articles to which we refer! depends almost entirety on this, that the views' which they advance run parallel-with the views of Englishmen, and are expressed with all the vivacity for which the French are distinguished. It may not ho amiss to give some of these opinions in detail. The point which is most strongly enforced is, that a war with England is inevitable, — ; that in France it is the universal topic of con- ; versation, —and that it would be very popular. 1 If it were not popular mea.ns could easily be 1 taken to make it so. Notwithstanding forty 1 years of peace, the old national jealousy has not been extinguished. Especially on the : wlmlc of the coast from .Dunkirk to Bayonne !

tv this jealousy remains in full force, and tlie r people regard- their implacable animosity as a 3 patriotic virtue. This is perfectly evident in j the diatvibes of the journals which receive their 3 inspiration from the Government; and, from c an intimate acquaintance with the coasts of 3 the Channel, of Normandy, and of Brittany, i one writer declares that these envenomed effu- . sions meet with a hearty reception from the . maritime population. It is the same in Paris. j The feeling against England is gaining strength . on every side, nobody can tell through what 3 inspiration, and English- who have to' trail's- . act business in the metropolis find, we are 1 told, that they are not received as before. The- ? writer who publishes this unwelcome news t would be more entitled to credit if, in the next ; sentence, he did not proceed to enter intor details.—“ Uu do mes amis, Anglais, qui res viont de la Touraine,” he says, “ y a recomiu. » les monies symptomes ; et son doraeatique lui 1 a rbpetc des conversations vraiment treS- . alarmantes qu’il a en avec des domestique3> t Francois.” The opinion of John Thomas had 3 better be kept in the background. It can only I excite the laughter of Englishmen, 'who at ■ once perceive that Nanette and Baptiste uiseof vered ‘he tender places-of his manly bosom ■’and stuck pins into him without mercy. The • other informants of the Revue Independante l are more respectable, and there is reason to r believe that the war feeling is really growing., 5 The project of a war with England, we are • told, is everywhere the order of the day in i France. In "the high places of power, in the ' army, in the navy, aud among men of business, -it is incessantly" discussed, and the universal i belief is, that if ever the design seems to bo ■ abandoned it is only because the preparations ; are incomplete and it is necessary to gam time. , French co-operation in "China is only a make- ; believe, and the more ardent that co-operation--1 the more certainly is it a snare. That the army should desire war we canwell understand. Apart from any particular feeling of hostility to England, a great army of 600,000 or 700,000, well clad, well fed. intoxicated with flatteries, and greedy of advancement, must have-work; but, from theprivate to the general officer, the entire force ; is. especially bent upon a war with this country . As a singular exception we are told of a general officer who had the courage to declare, that if there was to be war with England he would break his sword and refuse to obey ;, but the general feeling is enthusiastic in favour of a descent upon our shores, which' the first empire failed to effect, but which the second empire is destined to achieve. On the 20th August last there was a dinner given at Versailles to 6500 of the Imperial Guard. The tables were laid in the Orangery, and each soldier was in his place under the command of i his chief. At the end of the banquet the 1 public was allowed to mingle with the soldiers,. and indulge their faculty for hearing and ask-ing-questions. One of these goes up to Ur Zouave, who had - an enormous gash in his i face, and says, “ My fine fellow, you have a wound to be proud of, and it does not disfigure you, though you have lost your eye. , Where were you wounded ?” “• At Magenta,” was the answer, and we have the. whole history of it. “ JVe 11, then, I suppose you. have had enough of war?” proceeds the admiring civiliau. “ Moi, monsieur ! Si dans quatro moia, comrac nous l’esperons bien, on. nous meno en Angleterre, je demauderai encore a etre lo premier.” We have the records of many such , conversations. Another Zouave astonishes the women in. a. railway carriage by the announcement that the French army will be at ; it again next spring. “Wo are going to Eng * i land.” “7o England !” crie3 the astonished i woman. “ Yes, madams, wo go to England ,in the spring, or a little later.” “ And why there ” “ And why there i Dame, dame, pour nous revenger,” cries the excited Zouave. “To revenge what ? France and England, • are allies; they cannot make war.” “ Ah, oui, madame ; I k now the English well; they fight well, they stand weli ; we esteem them*, but we hate them, don’t you see? This can’t last.” “ But uffiat is it all about ?. I don’t understand.”' “Look here, madame, I will tell you. We licked Russia because she laid her paw upon Turkey ; we licked Austria because she was playing the deuce with Italy. (i'e shall give it to England, next becausewe are not going to stand her treatment of theIndies and that unhappy Ireland.” “It is not; easy going to England,” observed the lady quietly. “ Ah, bah ! we shall go all the same, et moi qui vous parle, je demaede a y aller lo

i premier. . J’espere bien que je ne serai pas lo seal!” Can anything be conceived finer than , that climax ? How sublime, and how tho- , roughly characteristic! “ J’espere bien quo jo ne serai pas le scul!” His enthusiasm fired- ■ a sergeant of the chasseurs, who exclaimed, “ Certainly not; you shall not be alone ; all. the world will go with you.” This is a fair specimen of military conversation. Z’he army. , is unanimous for a war with England, and so is the navy, which, indeed, has a special 6tako in the venture. If we are to bo invaded, it is. on the French fleets the first dependence must be placed. It is the French navy that in thejlast war suffered the greatest reverses, and it. jowes us a much deeper grudge than the army does. The thirst for vengeance, accordingly, is doubly strong in this arm of the service. In the,navy the desire for war amounts to a tyOnzy. The sailors cannot name England Without going oft' into fits, and we can infer what is their ardour when they speak of crossing the Channel. The more sober among , them, however, think that a war cannot bo hazarded between the two countries till 1861,. as eighteen months will at least be required to complete the accumulation of coals. Brest,, which ordinarily requires between 4,000 and 5,000 tons of coal, has in store at least 50,000, and Cherbourg .is '-upposed to be equally well.

provided, but these quantities are not considered sufficient.

The Church is as eager for war as either army or navy. Everybody will be convinced of this who looks at the Unive^s , which is possessed with the idea of England, and works up its readers into great excitement by the mere mention of our name. The most insulting statements appear daily in its columns, and, spite of the inexhaustible eloquence of the editor, it is evident that words fail to do justice to the force of his emotions. The Univers may be regarded as the genuine organ of clerical opinion. It has led the clergy in important junctures, and given them the tone. On one remarkable occasion, when the majority of the clergy revolted in a manner against the journal, then less powerful than it is now, the Pope himself took its part, and tinder the pontifical shield there is almost nothing which is too outrageous for the journal to commit. A crusade, against Protestant England would delight the clergy; and, as they chanted //osaunahs for the Grand Turk in the Crimean war, we can well believe that they are prepaved to fulminate most vigorously against heretical and perfidious Albion. At the present moment, especially, this temper ought to be watched. It so happens that the Imperial Government is, through its revolutionary , designs with reference to the Holy Father, in very bad odour with the French clergy, and the goodwill of the clergy has hitherto*'been deemed essential to the safety of. the Empire. How is that goodwill to be recovered ? Nothing would so effectually re- ' instate the Imperial Government in the affection of the Church as a war waged with the most conspicuous opponent of Roman Catho licism. Missionaries would fight side by side with Zouaves, and when the bayonet had done its work we should have the sweet consolation of'the priesthood. Public opinion was at first strongly opposed to the war in Italy, and, even when this sentiment had completely changed, there were large numbers of pious Frenchmen who regarded the Imperial policy with extreme jealousy. There would be no such hesitation as to a war with England. JV hen the clergy and the army go hand in hand the combination is irresistible.

It is maintained, also, that even those classes ■which we might suppose committed to ft ceaseless contest with the Imperial policy look on with favour—we mean the Legitimists.’ That the Legitimists hate us- we have long been aware, but it might be imagined that they must hate the French Emperor still more. If, howeyer, we might form a judgment from the sort of articles that appear in the organ of that party, it would appear that nothing does it so much desire as the humiliation of England. XFhy ? it may be asked. The Legitimists owe more to England than to any other nation in, the world, and they are more indebted to us than any other party in France. They ought to be our best friends. .Those who argue to such a conclusion, however, forget that no burden is so galling to a,rival &9 the obligation of gratitude, and that if between man and man the duty is difficult and the burthen oppressive, between nation and nation the duty is impossible and the obligation intolerable. Parties are not actuated by ingratitude as individuals are. The necessities of the parties survive when the benefits that have been con-; ferred on previous members of the party have long been forgotten, or are remembered but as a hateful proof of superiority. The Legitimists hate us for the service we have done them, even more than for the original rivalry -—the old French feeling towards England, which, in right of their historical precedents, they are supposed-to represent. Nor must it be imagined that this Legitimist party is without power. It has little direct, but a great deal of indirect power. If it is weak in politics, it is strong in society. It is very wealthy, enlightened, and religious; it has possession of the soil to a large extent; it has great influence in agricultural districts; and, in reckoning the forces opposed to us in the event Of a war, we must not overlook an element so potent. In such an event, it is maintained in the Revue Judependante, that, more from passion perhaps than policy, the Legitimist party will give their hand to the Imperial Government. It will be a national opportunity of reconciliation, and they will bs only too glad to seize it.

'Thus, in a war with England, the French Emperor has the power of satisfying army and navy, of gratifying the clergy, of winning over the Legitimists, and of securing the suffrages of a united people. The object is so tempting that naturally one catches at every little indication of the Imperial purpose, beginning, of course, with the words uttered long ago, “ 1 represent a cause, a principle, and a defeat”— the defeat being Waterloo, which remains to be avenged. If’hen President of the Republic, Louis Napoleon is reported to liave said to more than one person that the restoration of the Empire could have but one object—the avenging of Waterloo and of St. Helena. When the Empire was restored, it is true that he disclaimed all warlike intentions, all revengeful motives, and announced himself as a perfect lamb,—“ The Empire is peace.” But the world had soon an opportunity of. seeing what he meant by peace. There was tlie war with Russia, and, no sooner was that war brought to. a close, than an event occurred which was the flist overt sign of the Emperor’s real intention towards England. It is urged that the creation of the St. Helena medal just at that moment was an unmistakeable proof of ulterior views on the part of Napoleon 111. Why select such a name to commemorate the glories of the First Napoleon and the empire which he created ? Wh at does the name of St. Helena recall ? Does it signify that which was most characteristic in the history of Bonaparte ? On the contrary, it signifies his de-

feat; it signifies the power of England; it signifies the humiliation of the Empire. And why commemorate such an.event with a medal, if not for some ulterior object ? That object, it is argued, must have been to rekindle the feeling of antagonism to England, and gradually to prepare for the war when the time should come; and Napoleon had the skill to effect his purpose while remaining our ally “ Pourquoi, in 1856, fonder une croix de ce genre ? Ou en etait le besoin ?—a quoi bon?—-qui la reclamait? Personne, ni en France, ni surtout en Europe. II n’y avait qu’un seal homme qui y put songer, et e’etait Napoleon 111. le seul qui put en profiter. Raviver, sous appareuce de recompence patriotic, toutes les coleres nationals .contre Albion, rallumer les haines, sans paraitre faire autre chose qn’un acte de reconnaisance au nom de la Famille Bonaparte, e’etait un merveilleux stratageme; et je vous reponds qu’il a porte ses fruits, C’est depuis cette epoque que la fureur contre a repris de plus belle.” Our conduct to Napoleon when, in the commencement of last year, he. demanded a Com spiracy Bill, has added flame to fuel, and has given him the motive of personal vengeance to strengthen the motives of family pride and national hate. It is, in fact, the crime of Orsini, we are informed, that has decided him to make war on England, as if England were an accomplice in the attempt of the 7?ue Lepelletier any more than in the celebrated ex- . pediiion to Boulogne. Accordingly, we see preparations on foot, and it is noted that, on the last occasion on which Napoleon referred to the English alliance, he dwelt bitterly on the sacrifices he had made in order to maintain it. The war is universally believed in by official men in France, who think of it triumphantly as about to be the crowning proof of the wisdom and the power of their Imperial chief. M. Dupin, in his address to the Department of Clamecy, tried to conceal the aggressive 1 nature of the French preparations for war by 1 turning the indignation of his hearers upon this ' country. It is we who are arming, we who 1 are troubling the stream. From these, and 1 many such statements of the public men of France, the conclusion is drawn that an order < has gone forth, and it is doing its wicked work 1 most rapidly, raising all the bad passions of 1 our nature, so that when the auspicious mo- 1 ment arrives the explosion will appear to be as 1 spontaneous as it must be terrible. AU is < prepared for it, and one might not unreason- t ably argue even that the amnesty which im- < mediately after the peace of Yillafranca was 1 offered to all political offenders, and which ( many persons interpreted as the inauguration < of a change in the Imperial policy, the pledge < of peace, was essentially a step, and a most < important step, towards a war with this < country. It wu 3 . necessary to. pardon the refu- ( gees, in order that England might not have a < chance of saying that Napoleon .makes’ war < upon the country - which -is the asylum of his < liberty-loving subjects, in order that no part of the French nation might, in the event of a i war, bave-any excuse for remaining in Eng- J land and giving her the moral value of their i presence. i It will not be difficult to find the excuse for a war-r-be it Ireland, be it India, be it Egypt, i or be it some naval collission like that of the J Charles et Georges The question is, how are - we to he prepared for it ? On the most ob- J vious answer to this question we need not dwell. We must arm. Besides - arms, howwe have another defence, which we are . glad to see recognised by our French friends, : and the full force of which none knows better : than Napoleon himself; it is the force of public ■ opinion. This is a weapon which, as far as Europe is concerned, is of modern date, and which is every day acquiring more and more vigour. As the weapon of a statesman, Canning was perhaps the first of our Foreign Ministers who made much use of it for the furthering of his views, but in his time the weapon was blunt of edge and soft in temper. Lord Palmerston inherited Canning’s confidence in the weapon ; Europe had in his time been so much opened up to English influence that he could use it with effect, and lie has lelietl more upon it than any other of our statesmen. His peculiar hold upon this principle, indeed, which he enumerates in speech after speech throughout Hansard, is the key to much that is enigmatical and apparently derogatory in his foreign policy. It has been said that he has all his life been talking one policy and acting , another, that he has uttered brave words ; which have never been followed by brave ! deeds. This is so far true that from his point ' of view opinion is a tremendous power, and words are living things. We may not have a . right to draw the sword, but we have a right ) to, express opinions, and opinions are often as , good as cannon-balls. No man knows this > better than the French Emperor, who, in the f manifesto of Milan, professes to understand ; the value of moral influence on his epoch, and 1 in the defence of the Yillafaanca treaty showed 3 clearly his sensitiveness to public opinion.; [ But, with a fettered press (and, were we to t state some of the reasons why the French 1 press is fettered with half the licence which 3 the Revue Independante has used in its latest 1 issue, we should be accused of unparalleled t delinquency and a malignant partiality for 3 scandal) the Emperor has a weapon which is . not nearly so efficient as that which an Engt lish statesman enjoys in the perfect publicity tof our affairs. That publicity is a protection f to us, and, as we have no reserve in the ex- , pression of our opinion, it will not be supposed 3 that we say one thing and mean another. We 3 thank our French friends for reminding us that, 1 if there is to be a war with England, the i greatest enemy with which they will have to - contend is the simple truth, and that our best ■ ally will be the light of day.