TURKEY & THE WAR

Wairarapa Times-Age, 27 November 1943, Page 4

TURKEY & THE WAR

A COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF PAST AND PRESENT POLICY. ATTITUDE OF GOVERNMENT & PEOPLE. No comprehensive view can be formed on the present state of AngloTurkish relations, a special correspondent of the “Manchester Guardian” wrote recently, unless it is borne in mind that at the time when Britain, France, and Turkey signed the tripartite declaration of May 12, 1939, which was converted into the Treaty of Alliance of October 19, 1939, none of the three signatories had more than a vague conception of the technique and requirements of modern warfare; all three were still under the influence of tactics used during the last war and were more or less imbued with the Maginot complex. The collapse of Poland and later of France opened their' eyes to the grim realities, with the result that the two remaining allies, Britain and Turkey, arrived at a tacit agreement whereby Turkey, although abiding by her treaty obligations, should not be pressed to execute them on account of Britain’s inability at that time to supply her with the weapons required for putting the Turkish Army on a war footing as stipulated by the Treaty of Alliance. That situation continued till the autumn of 1942. it being admitted that Turkish neutrality, assured by the Turkish-German pact signed on June 18, 1941, was useful to Britain and later to Russia as covering from German attack the British positions in the Middle East and even 'the Caucasus from the south.

AN ITILIAN DEMAND. It was suspected then, and it is definitely known now, that in the spring of 1941 Italy had pressed Germany to pass through Turkey and to attack Britain in the Middle East, but that the Germans had preferred to postpone this operation till after the removal of the Russian danger, which they hoped to effect within a few weeks. Hitler’s miscalculation resulted in EL Alamein and Stalingrad, which altered the situation completely. Turkish neutrality, which till then was favourable to the Allies, now began to be profitable to the Axis. Moreover, it was feared that Germany, frustrated in Africa and in Russia, might try to retrieve her lost prestige by launching a brusque attack on some weaker spot, and Turkey was considered to be a possible target. Mr Churchill’s visit to Adana, the supply of war material in large quantities to Turkey which followed the Adana meeting, and the later visit to Ankara of British Army, Navy, and Ail- Commanders were all part of an effort to meet the new situation created by the Allied victories in Libya and Russia. The Germans were much perturbed by the new impetus given to the Anglo-Turkish alliance, and last April they made representations to the Turkish Government, which replied that it did not contemplate any change of policy. TREATY OBLIGATIONS. The position remains the same today, but several questions are hovering in every mind, questions which might be condensed in these terms. In view of the changed and ever-chang-ing war situation, has the time come when Turkey may be called upon to fulfil her treaty obligations towards Britain, and, if so, how? Is Turkey in a position to fulfil those obligations and would Turkish co-operation be of substantial assistance to the Allies? Before any attempt is made to reply to these questions it should be pointed out that, in Turkish opinion, whether this country enters the war on the Allies’ side or whether she simply concedes to them facilities such as the passage of Allied troops through Turkish territory or the use of Turkish airfields by Allied air-craft the result would be the same. Turkey would cease to be neutral and would be considered and treated by Germany as an enemy. AXIS FORCES VERY CLOSE. Turkish reaction to these questions may be summarised under the following heads. First, thanks to the Allies’ ungrudging assistance in war material and supplies Turkey’s national defence is today very efficient for defensive purposes but could not be considered adequate for an offensive war. Secondly the Axis forces are at present very close to the Turkish frontiers from the Agean Islands to the Bulgarian border, and they would therefore be able to attack Turkey and certainly to destroy by bombing some of her more vulnerable towns, like Istanbul, before the Allies could move their forces to Turkish assistance, handicapped as they are by inadequate land transport and by the Axis possession of Crete and the Dodedcanese, with the result that Germany would be provided with a success she so sorely needs for home consumption. Thirdly,, after four years of neutrality it would be difficult to persuade the Turkish people to join the war now without being attacked and knowing, as they do, that their Government fosters no ambitions for territorial acquisitions. Fourthly, as everybody in Turkey is aware that Germany is beaten Turkish participation in the war at this stage would look like a “stab in the back” similar to that which Italy dealt France, an act loathsome to the Turks, especially if perpetrated against their former ally in ' the last war. I

What, then, is the conclusion of this survey of Turkish policy? In shaping that policy during four years of war the Turkish Government’s primary concern was naturally to safeguard Turkish interests and assure the welfare of the Turkish people. Besides that, so to speak, selfish object, they endeavoured to fulfil as far as possible their ruminitarian duties, as in the case of the exchanges of prisoners, the dispatch of food relief to Greece, and so on. One further step would be for Turkey to make her contribution towards the new and better world which the leaders of the United Nations are striving to create.