Wairarapa Times-Age FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1943. THE LOSS OF LEROS.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 19 November 1943, Page 2

Wairarapa Times-Age FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1943. THE LOSS OF LEROS.

it is not an event of large importance by the standards of. this; war and is unlikely greatly to, influence' the course of events in the Mediterranean or elsewhere, the loss of the Dodecanese Island of Leros and of the gallant garrison by which it was- defended against impossible odds cannot but awaken keen and undisguised regret throughout the Empire and in Allied countries. It has also occasioned some criticism, in Britain and elsewhere, most certainly not of the garrison, but of those responsible for the strategic planning which worked out to such a melancholy result. All that has been told of the forlorn hope defence of Leros indicates that the troops of the garrison, both British and Italian, and their leaders, did all and more than could have been asked of them and gave, in a famous phrase of Abraham Lincoln’s, “the last full measure of devotion.” The question is being raised, however, whether there was any justification for occupying the island and imposing on. the garrison the impossible task of attempting to hold it against an enemy enjoying, in that region, a virtually undisputed air supremacy. London newspapers are demanding an explanation of the facts. The action taken in the Dodecanese group evidently should be investigated and if unwarranted risks were taken the responsibility for taking them should be determined. Whether, however, any full explanation of the facts can be made public while the war continues seems rather doubtful. Meantime it is stated by General. Sir IT. Maitland Wilson that the figure of German casualties in the attack on Leros, including those drowned at sea, exceeded that of the British garrison and that the occupation of the island yielded a good dividend 'from the diversionary point of view. It is hardly to be assumed as a matter of course that the risks which undoubtedly were taken in the occupation of Leros and other Dodecanese islands were unwarranted. Risks have been taken often in the course of this war, in Britain, the Middle East and elsewhere and allowance no doubt has to be made always for what Mr Churchill has called the incalculable chances of war. There is no obvious parallel to be drawn, however, between the occupation of Leros and the campaigns in which British and Dominion troops, including the New Zealand Division, engaged in Greece and Crete in 1941. These campaigns were hazardous in the extreme and from the outset it was obvious that nothing more could be expected, in the circumstances then ruling, than to occupy and delay the enemy for a time. It is now very generally agreed, however, that the time thus gained, at a heavy sacrifice, was precious to the Allies, particularly in delaying the German attack on Russia for about six weeks —in all probability with decisive effect on the whole course of the war. As information stands, there is no similarly important gain to be set against the loss of the Leros garrison. More facts than are meantime available are needed, however, to determine the merits of the action taken in the Dodecanese group. Leros and'bther islands were occupied two months ago, at the time of the Italian surrender. It was at that stage very difficult to estimate the extent to which German plans and dispositions in Italy, in the Balkans and in the Aegean would be affected. To a definite extent events no- doubt were then hanging in the balance and there may well have been anticipations of more favourable developments, in war areas garrisoned entirely or mainly by Italians, than have in fact occurred. The whole question awaits elucidation, but it seems rather unlikely, as has been said, that it can be elucidated in full detail and publicly until the war at least has advanced well beyond its present phase.