STRETCHED THIN

Wairarapa Times-Age, 28 September 1943, Page 4

STRETCHED THIN

JAPANESE MANPOWER RESOURCES ARISING OUT OF EXILNDLD OCCUPATION. LIMITS ON CONCENTRATION OF FORCES. (By Randall Gould in the “Christian Science Monitor.”) Where are the Japanese? From what point may we expect their fighting force to strike next? For some time they have been relatively dormant, militarily. We know they are in action on Guadalcanal; there are intermittent reports of heavy concentrations in Burma, French Indio-China and Manchuria, but the evidence is conflicting as to where they are assembled in force (if anywhere) and what may be anticipated from them. Doubtless the United Nations commanders on _ the spot have better answers on a basis of first-hand information known to them alone than are available to the general public. What seems beyond question is that the Japanese are spread out thin. Even if they secretly assemble large forces, as they certainly have done from time to time in Manchuria and as they are recently reported to have don* in Burma, they dare not relax entirely their hold on any part of their over-exten-ded conquests. In one vital particular they have failed, apparently to their own great surprise. They have not been able to resort in any appreciable degree to tactics of native self-policing and self-government. WATCH ON RUSSIA. In Manchuria the Japanese for years ran a •training-school, both for the army and for civilian administrators. This period terminated with the start of large-scale hostilities against China in mid-1937, but it turned out that even well-subdued Manchuria could not be left to its own devices—any more than Korea or Formosa. This for a time fitted well enough into the Japanese military program because it was thought that an attack might be launched against Soviet Russia—particularly after war began between Russia and Germany. But Russia proved almost as big a surprise in Japanese calculations as in German —not quite so much perhaps, tor the Japanese had already had lessons in Russian toughtness. Despite repeated rumours of largo Japanese troop concentrations near the Siberian border from last spring onward, there has probably never been any actual likelihood that Japan contemplated an early attack for the simple reason that what was desired was a “pushover,” Nevertheless there have been at times as much as half a million Japanese troops in Manchuria, and at present there are probably a couple of hundred thousand or more, not because Japan was expecting to attack but because Japan has never felt sure that Russia would not join forces (air forces at least) with the United States and allow use of Vladivostok as a bomber base. A late December dispatch telling of the execution by the Japanese of a “large number” of Chinese “puppet” troops in North China because of traffic with the guerilla forces is eloquent testimony as to the necessity for closely garrisoning even the areas most recently won. till more direct evidence has recently come from the Philippines Timor and many other theoretically Japanese-occupied territorities The moment Japan tries to draw out any of her armed forces, there are uprisings of the population. TRANSPORT DIFFUSION. All this adds up to a picture of Japan’s armed forces spread over thousands upon thousands of square miles, while her transport and supply service has been similarly diffused. It is true that there are constant tales of minor offensives here and there — eastern Kwangtung in South China is one of the most recent, with 6000 Japanese soldiers reported landing. But none of these instances, even Guadalcanal, seems to show that Japan is capable of concentrating decisive power anywhere. This may change, and in

fact it is surprising that it has pot changed, if Japan's leaders retain theik gambling spirit; but there are powerful arguments against such efforts at concentration because obviously any such move at one point entails a dangerous weakening elsewhere. The greatest single temptation for the Japanese at present would appear to be Yunnan Province, China's “back door.” There has been talk of a landing of 90,000 Japanese troops in Burma to try to drive through to Kunming, while there are said to be 700 to 800 planes in Burma, Thailand and IndoChina. Certainly Japan wants to strangle Free China and this is the most probable point of immediate action—a Burma drive with aid from Indo-China. But the signs of overwhelming Japanese strength are lacking and it should be remembered that Japanese leaders have counted heavily on treacherous surprise, not now easy to accomplish.