PACIFIC STRATEGY

Wairarapa Times-Age, 22 September 1943, Page 4

PACIFIC STRATEGY

STATEMENT BY GENERAL MACARTHUR AUSTRALIA AS BASE PREFERRED TO UNITED STATES OR INDIA INDICATED DIFFERENCES OF OPINION (By Telegraph—Press Association— Copyright) (Received This Day, 12.25 p.m.) SYDNEY, This Day. Wide differences of opinion on the strategy to be used in the drive against Japan are revealed in a statement issued in New Guinea by General MacArthur. The statement implies that Australia is the most natural and effective base from which to direct a major offensive against Japan, because it has industrial, agricultural, communications and resources, arsenals and other facilities to support massive strokes, using the methods of the Lae campaign. General MacArthur contends that such a conception is the very opposite of the “island-hopping” strategy, involved in drives from Hawaii or the Aleutians, or from China, by way of the Burma Road. General MacArthur made his statement when shown recent Press reports from the United States and Britain that Lord Mountbatten’s appointment means that General MacArthur’s part in the war is to be progressively curtailed and reduced to a subsidiary role. “It makes little difference whether I or others wield the weapon just so the cause for which our beloved country fights is victorious,” said General MacArthur, in his statement. “My strategic conception for the Pacific theatre contemplates massive strokes against only main strategic objectives, utilising surprise and air-ground striking power, supported and assisted by the fleet. This is the very opposite to islandhopping, which is the gradual pushing back of the enemy by direct, frontal pressure, with consequent heavy casualties. Keypoints must, of course, be taken, but a wise choice will obviate the need for storming a mass of islands now in enemy possession. Island-hop-ping, with exertavagant losses and slow progress (some reports are indicating that victory will be postponed to as late as 1949) is not my idea of how to end the war as soon and as cheaply as possible. New conditions require for solution, and new weapons require for maximum application, new and imaginative methods. Wars are never won in the past. I have no personal military ambitions whatsoever and I am perfectly content in such a role as may be prescribed for me.”

It is believed that the main strategic objectives mentioned by General MacArthur include such areas as the Philippines and Malaya. Island-hop-ping, it is argued, would be involved in naval and air attacks from Hawaii, the Aleutians, or from China via the Burma Road. Drives from these directions would have to be based either on the far distant west coast of the United States or equally distant India. In addition, the Burma Road could not support operations on a major scale. General MacArthur considers that the success of the co-ordinated campaign against Lae was a small-scale illustration Of what could be done further north on a bigger scale. There is reason to believe that Lord Mountbatten's command includes part of the SouthWest Pacific area, although this has not been officially confirmed or denied. Some observers link the present obvious differences of opinion between General MacArthur and Washington on Pacific strategy with the tendency in some political circles in America to sidetrack General MacArthur.