INVASION POINTS

Wairarapa Times-Age, 23 July 1943, Page 4

INVASION POINTS

FRENCH WEST COAST OFFERS MOST OPPORTUNITIES. FACTOR OF SUPPLY ROUTES. The strategic location of the invasion springboards will have the most important bearing upon the speed and success of the United Nations campaign against the Nazi-held Continent, writes Robert Wertheimer in the “Christian Science Monitor.” Although Allied operations can be foreseen which will be independent of the Russian 2000-milc front, the use of this front for the crushing of German resistance would have offered many advantages. No bridgeheads would have to be established, and the invasion forces could be interwoven into the active Russian Army. Troops and war material, using existing channels of transport, could be shipped with hardly any more difficulties to the Russian front than to any coastal region of Europe. Gains on the Russian front, in the Ukraine, for example, would weaken the Germans economically to a greater extent than the occupation of either the Balkans and Italy together or of the whole of western Europe. Germany would lose a potential annual coal production of 100,000,000 tons, and facilities for the production of sym thctic oil. Furthermore, it would lose 20,000,000 tons annual production of high-grade iron ore, or considerably more than the Reich is receiving from either Sweden or Lorraine, and several hundred thousand tons of manganese ore without any possibility for replacement.

BREAD BASKET OF EUROPE. Moreover, this region is being developed into the bread basket of Europe, and it is vital that the invaders be not permitted to settle down in it with an unlimited reservoir of slave labour. . As the United Nations appear to have chosen a direct attack on the Continental fortress, accompanied rather by severe bombings than preceded by the smashing of the German production from the air, it is necessary to secure the greatest advantage by the selection of the right invasion spot. An initial error in the selection of the right region to be invaded could menace the success of the campaign, without, however, any lasting influence upon the course of the war. In the- invasion of the Continent, the German army will have to be defeated by greater numbers of .men, guns, and aeroplanes, as has been the case throughout the whole North African campaign. These elements of a successful attack must arrive in a continuous flow on the largest scale immediately after Allied forces have established the necessary bridgeheads. The basic postulates for a successful invasion are:—• . 1. A long invasion coast which can absorb enormous amounts of supplies and which ean be reached safely; 2. A region offering the least natural and relatively fewest number of fortified obstacles, and 3. A territory which can be isolated from the German supply lines by a curtain of bombing. The requirement of the third point is fulfilled once the perimeter of the defence is reached. MUST HIT VITAL REGIONS. Not all invasion prospects can combine these three requirements if it is considered further that the invasion must strike at the vital regions of the enemy in order to be effective. Otherwise, it could be not more than a preliminary to a subsequent invasion.

Safe supply lines cannot be established as long as German U-boats can interfere with Allied shipping. The main bases of the enemy for Üboat warfare are located on the coasts of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, and France. If the Allies could control both sides of the English Channel, at least at its western end, they would gain an enormous advantage. U-boats could be confined to the less important North Sea area in the triangle between the German coast, the East coast of England, and the Norwegian coast, being bottled up in the north by patrol services between Greenland-Iceland-Scotland, and in the west between Brittany and Cornwall. Consequently, only the north and west coasts of France can give satisfactory solutions. The least natural obstacles and fortifications are to be found only in a few regions. The south and south-east of Europe have been less fortified, but •offer more, natural barriers to invasion because of mountainous terrain, a limited nurr?ber of suitable airfields, and limited transportation systems. Western Europe, which is most suitable for invasion because of its character as a plain, has been held longest under German occupation and has been prepared for attack. However, the Channel coast is more heavily fortified than the west Atlantic coast of France from Brittany to the Bay of Biscay. The perimeter of German defences can be reached first in Italy and Norway. Not much less favourable are the regions of western France. Much closer to the German production lines and “nerve centre” of their strength are Belgium, the Netherlands, and the Balkans. Although the Balkans would offer these advantages, they are much closer to the bulk of the German Army than any other theatre of war, and, consequently, German troops would be shifted there unless a Russian offensive could balk such a move. With Turkey as an active ally, the whole situation would change and favour greatly a Balkan invasion. •

Finally, the heart regions of the enenjyi, where the bulk of the German people live and where the centres of war production are located, could be reached quickest from the Netherlands or Belgium. Western France and the Balkans offer fewer but sufficiently favourable opportunities, while Norway and Italy are farther remote because of the North Sea and the barrier of the Alps. FRENCH COAST BEST. Considering all requirements of a successful invasion, at sacrifices not too high, the western French coast offers the most opportunities. It is located nearest to Great Britain, from where the main troop and supply shipments must come. It is closest to the United States base in Northern Ireland and best accessible from United States home ports. The foothold; once established in the regions of the Bay of Biscay, could be extended to the north until it reached the Chan-

nel.' Then the destruction of the most dangerous submarine nests would have been accomplished. A simultaneous invasion qf the Mediterranean coast of France, between Perpignan and Marseilles, would help to join Allied Atlantic with the African forces through the Valley of the Garonne, Canal de Midi and Gap of Lauraguais. The' south-west of France, the Aquitania of the Romans, offers few natural obstables to invasion. The Germans would have to pour troops through the French Massif Central and could make little use of the French railway system radiating from Paris. The city of Poitiers, south of Tours, which has been famous for two decisive battles fought there, might witness the destruction of barbarians anew. Clovis defeated the Visigoths on this historic ground and Charles Martel the Saracens. Once the Atlantic bases arc in Allied hands, the Anglo-American air force's would control the seas and could carry pulverising attacks on an enormous scale into Germany. Today’s air attacks could easily be duplicated from fields in western France. As long as the Germans face the struggle in the East, the Atlantic aoast will remain close to the perimeter of German defences, perhaps closer than any other invasion coastWhile Italy, the Balkans, and Norway should become additional objects for invasion, Western France must be used as the key to the liberation of the Continent,