Wairarapa Times-Age FRIDAY, JUNE 18, 1943. GERMANY’S EASTERN PROBLEM.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 18 June 1943, Page 2

Wairarapa Times-Age FRIDAY, JUNE 18, 1943. GERMANY’S EASTERN PROBLEM.

FOR some weeks it lias been a feature of news Irom the ’ Eastern front that each side has been predicting early olfinisive action by the other, ({rounds no doubt exist lor both the Russian and German predictions . That this state ot.altaiis exists in itself indicates how greatly the outlook in the wa has changed and how much Germany’s problems on the Eastern front are complicated by her difficulties and anxieties in other Avar areas, particularly in southern and western Europe. In view of the rising power of her enemies in east and west, it fe more than ever plain that unless Germany is able to strike a crippling blow at the Russian armies during the present summer, she will be faced by the certainty of overwhelming del eat. The need of striking that blow is intensified by the extent to which German war industrial areas are being laid n ash. air attack and bv the imminent menace of an Allied invasion or invasions of Europe. Germany’s ability to strike is, however, another question.

The prospect faced by Germany, as the Leningrad radio has said, is that of herself having to meet simultaneous blows Irom east’and west. This does not of necessity mean that she will not launch another offensive against Russia with all the force she can muster for that enterprise. To all appearance it does mean, however, that if she strikes once again in the east she will do so with prospects terribly impaired. It has been argued very reasonably that in attempting to build upon any remaining hope she may entertain on the Eastern front, Germany will be bound to develop a major attack in the south—that is to say, she must concentrate on the drive into the Caucasus in which she failed disastrously last summer and winter. Her essential, aim is as it has been to cripple the Russian armies. She no longer has apy hope ol achieving that aim by capturing Leningrad or Moscow, or lioth these cities, even ilTslie were equal to the tremendous effort entailed.

Germany has an incentive to strike in the south in the fact that a sufficiently far-reaching success in this region would enable her to augment her own oil supplies and to cut oil the Russian armies not only from supplies 01. oil on which they are vitally dependent, but from a great and increasing flow 01. Allied war material. It is of commanding importance that of the routes by'which American supplies of Avar material of many kinds reach Russia, the Persian Gulf route now takes first place. On this subject, Mr Joseph C. Harsch wrote recently in the “Christian Science Monitor”: —

There are two main American supply routes to Russia, the convoy route to Murmansk and the rail route over Persia. The northern; route is important to Russia, but not so important relatively this year as it was last year, because in the interim the facilities for moving supplies from Persia have been improved enormously. New docks have been built, the railroad has been extended and made capable of carrying more traffic, and American locomotives and cars have arrived to carry the freight. The tonnage capacity of that line has gone far upwards. ... Supplies must be moved into Russia from both ends of the line (i.e., the Eastern front) because it is too long for what enters at one end to reach the other. But the southern line now carries the heaviest share of the burden, and therefore it is the southern line which is most important for the Germans to cut.

There can he no doubt about the advantages Germany would derive from a successful drive into the Caucasus and across the line of supply from Persia to Russia. The question now is, however, whether she dare attempt such a drive in view of prospective developments in western and southern Europe and possibly also on other parts of j.he Eastern front as well —the simultaneous blows from east and west predicted by the Leningrad radio.