Wairarapa Times-Age MONDAY, MAY 17, 1943. PACIFIC CO-ORDINATION.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 17 May 1943, Page 2

Wairarapa Times-Age MONDAY, MAY 17, 1943. PACIFIC CO-ORDINATION.

QF various comments on the visit Admiral Halsey made about a month ago to General MacArthur in Australia, one 01. the most interesting is that of a correspondent who said the admiral’s visit “was in the nature of paying a personal visit to the boss.” Admiral Halsey succeeded last year to the South Pacific command, in the area extending south from the Solomons to New Zealand, which was constituted in the first instance separately from the South-West Pacific command entrusted to General MacArthur. Probably few New Zealanders have ever understood this separation of commands, or why it was decided upon. In the actual conduct of operations, the separation appears to have counted for little. Both naval and air forces of the two commands have co-operated in a number of engagements from the Battle of the Coral Sea onwards and bombing. planes under General MacArthur’s command have been in action frequently® against the Japanese in the Solomons. There is still no official answer to the question whether the division between the South-West and South Pacific commands has been abolished, but there is a good deal to suggest that to all intents and purposes it has been. In a cablegram from Sydney at the end of last week, for instance, an official spokesman at the South-West Pacific headquarters was reported as stating that: “There need be no fear regarding united action between the two commands if and when the necessity arises.’ Associated with the publicity given to the meeting of the two American commanders there has been a good deal of speculation and gossip as to the prospects of early Allied offensive action in the Pacific. It is likely, however ,that the position in this respect remains pretty much as when it was outlined by the Australian Minister of External Affairs (Dr. Evatt) in Washington last month. Observing on that occasion that the so-called Beat Hitler First” strategy was much misunderstood in the United States, Dr Evatt added :— It does not mean that the war against Japan is not be prosecuted with the utmost possible vigour . . . that our an craft, in particular, are not «to sweep forward and destroy the enemy wherever he or his ships or installations are to be found. It does not mean that limited but important offensives are not to be undertaken. It does not mean that preparations cannot be made even now for a great offensive. As a matter of fact all of these points were fully recognised and publicly expounded at the time General MacArthur received the directive that it was part of ms mission to prevent enemy consolidation by destroying his communications and by preparing an offensive. The Australian Minister added that it was inevitable that the flow of vital munitions and equipment to the Pacific should at times be inadequate and that even where it was adequate bottlenecks and delays would occur. It was partly to discuss practical problems of,this kind that he had been asked to confer with the highest authorities in the United States and in Britain. With the facts thus stated, it would hardly be reasonable to expect any sudden and spectacular expansion of Allied offensive action in the Pacific. On the other hand grounds appear for believing that, although action on the greatest, scale in this ocean is postponed for a time, the Allies may be able to bring to bear against Japan an increasing power of attack in spite of their being committed to the policy of beating Hitler first.