Wairarapa Times-Age TUESDAY, MAY 4, 1943. DANGERS IN THE PACIFIC.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 4 May 1943, Page 2

Wairarapa Times-Age TUESDAY, MAY 4, 1943. DANGERS IN THE PACIFIC.

— ♦ ASTONISHINGLY different and even sharply contradictory X estimates of the war situation and outlook in the Pacific are at present being made by commentators in the United States. One cablegram from New York yesterday’ contained references to a coming Japanese offensive and attributed to C olonel Kaye, aide to the Governor of Hawaii, a statement that the danger in the Pacific “is so terrible and so immediate that its real nature cannot be disclosed till steps have been taken to meet it. On the other hand the American semi-official ‘ Army and Navy Journal” was quoted as reporting the occupation by American forces of certain undisclosed points in the Pacific and as adding that the encirclement of Japan was in process of completion.

These and other reported comments in the United States swing almost to opposite extremes, of pessimism on the one side and optimism on the other. It seems very probable that the truth is somewhere in between —that the situation in the I acific still holds very definite dangers from the Allied standpoint, but that there is little likelihood of these dangers being neglected to the extent that one set of American commentators is suggesting.

One overshadowing feature of the existing situation is that while the Allies are committed to the policy of concentrating the bulk of their resources meantime against Germany, Japan has every incentive to make the most of whatever opportunities she is thus afforded. It is well understood that Japan will strike no blow in concert with Germany for Germany’s sake, but she may feel strongly impelled to do so for her own sake.

.It must be particularly clear to the Japanese war lords that with Germany overthrown, their own country will speedily find itself exposed to an overwhelming weight of attack. On the other hand if Germany were able to lengthen out the war in the hope of obtaining compromise peace terms, the rulers of Japan would expect to derive material advantage from that state of affairs.

The whole of the facts have long been visible to the directors of Allied strategy and it is crediting them only with reasonable foresight and prudence to assume that in developing thenpolicy of concentrating primarily on the defeat of Germany, they made adequate provision for holding Japan effectively at bay until the major task had been completed.

A great deal of what is going on at present in the Pacific of necessity is veiled in secrecy. On the. particulars meantime disclosed, for instance, it is impossible to estimate the importance of the Japanese submarine attack on Allied shipping in the South-West Pacific regarding which an announcement in general terms was made during the weekend.

There is -.some evidence, however, that in the factors of shipping, shipbuilding, aircraft production and some othei vital branches of Avar production, Japan’s position is deteriorating steadily. According to an apparently careful estimate, Japan started the v-ar with just under five million tons of merchant shipping and now —setting gains by seizure and new construction against losses—probably has about four million tons. These' figures exclude wooden and other ships of comparatively small size unsuitable for long-distance transpoit service. In conducting campaigns over vast and extending distances, Japan has increasing needs of shipping transport. It is computed that in order to keep her mercantile marine at its present level she must reduce her shipping losses to about a quarter of last year’s rate. That she will be able to effect anything like that reduction seems altogether unlikely. This, with other factors, has its obvious bearing on her prospects of offensive action. It remains true, however, that she has a strong incentive to strike as hard as she is able before the balance of strength turns decisively against her.