NAZIS FOILED

Wairarapa Times-Age, 5 April 1943, Page 4

NAZIS FOILED

PROVISIONING OF ARMIES BY AIR SOVIET COUNTER MEASURES. FAILURE OF THE LUFTWAFFE. This account of how the Red Air Fleet improvised tactics to meet the German attempt to provision by air the encircled 16th Army at Staraya Russa last year was written for the “Aeroplane” by Air Major General D. Kondratov. Similar tactics were probably used when the Germans attempt-' ed to supply their forces trapped at Stalingrad. The Luftwaffe’s air transport squadrons played no small part in the German victories in the countries of western Europe. The rapid capture of Norway was carried out precisely with the support of massed transport aviation. The Germans were successful in the complicated Narvik operations because they made extensive use of transport aeroplanes. The same Junkers 52’s landed the German divisions which captured Crete. While the Luftwaffe’s fighters secured command of the air its transport aeroplanes landed tommy-gunners, whippet tanks, light cannon, and supplied munitions in quantities to enable the Germans to crush the island’s defences by numerical superiority. The Germans suffered heavy losses, but they achieved their aim. Along the Soviet front, where swamp and woody terrain enabled Soviet units and guerillas to blockade and encircle both separate army units and whole German formations, we saw ' German self-confidence waning and then vanish when transport aeroplanes ceased to arrive. Just as during winter snowstorms and spring floods, so also, today, through difficult communications, the Germans have been compelled to resort to transport aeroplanes to maintain the fighting capacity of their units. In the course of six months or so _ of ceaseless and resolute fighting against enemy air transports the Soviet. Air Forces acquired valuable experience, destroying no fewer than 600 Junkers 52’s in the air and on the ground. HEAVY TRAFFIC. The history of this struggle dates back to the time when Soviet land troops isolated a Fascist formation from the main forces and encircled it. This group was so hard pressed that Hitler dispatched his aide-de-camp with an order to use the full might of the Luftwaffe to relieve it. Shortly afterwards a heavy traffic of Junkers 52’s began to go to and from the positions of the encircled group. Aeroplanes capable of carrying two tons of freight or 15 soldiers with their equipment were actually able to maintain the vitality and fighting capacity of a great number of troops. Soviet fighter aeroplanes were detailed to intercept the transport aeroplanes, while Soviet bombers and Stormoviks were dispatched to destroy them on the ground. Originally the transport aeroplanes flew without protection in small groups, or even singly trying in various ways to slip past the ‘Soviet patrols. They constantly changed their routes, but chiefly selected the shortest cuts and followed conspicuous landmarks. The aeroplanes took advantage of clouds and temporary snowstorms, or flew at a low level, taking cover by flying alongside the forest. The Soviet pilots needed, great endurance and skill in the struggle against them, and it was necessary to dispatch experienced airmen. Provisional aerodromes were brought closer to the scene of operations. Making several flights daily, the Soviet pilots kept in close contact with most frequented routes, and every hour Junkers crashing in flames made fresh landmarks on the ground. TACTICS REVISED. Heavy losses compelled the Germans to revise, their tactics. The air line shifted further south, over a deserted woody district which had neither Soviet landing grounds nor Soviet troops and was held only by guerillas and a small detachment of skiers. Led by the most experienced navigators and ?safc from anti-aircraft ma-chine-guns, whole caravans of Junkers 52’s flew at low levels. When passing inhabited points they opened fire, soldiers dropping grenades and. firing tommy-guns in order to terrorise the population below. The struggle became more complicated. The preparation df aerodromes in the district below the air line demanded much time, inasmuch as access to it was possible only by sledge. This period saw an intensification of the raids on enemy aerodromes and the destruction of transport aeroplanes on the ground. The Fascists had several landing grounds, for every lake could be utilised for this purpose. But the Soviets soon discovered that the Germans had one principal aerodrome, having made it into a winter aerodrome. Concentrating heavy anti-air-craft forces there, the Germans hoped to secure themselves against Soviet raids. The Soviet Air Force succeeded in establishing a constant observation of this aerodrome and repeatedly surprised large groups of transport aeroplanes. HIGH LEVEL BOMBING t As soon as observers reported the arrival of a large group, the Soviet Command would dispatch a few PE-2’s which bombed the aerodrome from high level, giving the transport aeroplanes no chance either to take off or to unload. Thus they presented good targets for the Soviet fighter aeroplanes and Stormoviks which followed. More and more frequently anti-air-craft gunners were found in enemy aeroplanes brought down en route to relieve the encircled groups. For example, in an aeroplane piloted by Lieutenant Mossrugger, Red Army men found anti-aircraft gunners from Stuttgart. They had shaved in Berlin, breakfasted in Konigsberg, and surrendered near Saraya Russa. The haste with which they had been dispatched showed that all was not well with the German ground defences. The Germans then began to fly in big groups at twilight, and to leave at daybreak. In reply, the Soviet _ Air Force intensified its night operations. For example, on the report that a large group of aeroplanes had landed one night, Soviet aeroplanes ceaselessly attacked the aerodrome. While light bombers dropped bombs at the extreme ends of the aerodrome and attacked hangars and anti-aircraft nests, heavy bombers wrecked the aerodrome. Fires helped their operations and by hiorning the- aerodrome had been made completely useless. At day-

Soviet Stormoviks scattered labour crews who were at work filling the bomb craters, and for a few days the aerodrome was idle. Air photographs brought in by Soviet scouts showed more than 70 damaged aeroplanes on the outskirts of the aerodrome, on the forest edge, and on the aerodrome. Subsequent photoI graphs showed that aeroplanes abanI doned in the centre of the airfield re- | mained there. “DEAD” AERODROME. Thereupon the Soviet Air Force made a search for temporary landing grounds which could be used as bases, but failed to discover any, although enemy aeroplanes continued to fly in small numbers to the encircled troops. This compelled the Soviets to maintain a closer watch of the “dead” aerodrome. Brilliant work by Soviet scouts helped to discover the Fascist trick. For the aerodrome which seemed abandoned continued to function. The aeroplanes were scattered over the airfield in order to mislead the Soviets. Buti a narrow strip along the forest edge allowed the transport aeroplanes to take off. In seeking safety from the Soviet bombers, they had camouflaged them amidst a vast heap of wrecked machines But, thanks to aerial photo--graphy, the enemy’s cunning was soon discovered and appropriate measures were taken. Finally, after new airfields had been cleared and roads cut towards the lakes, and after losing more than 100 machines, the Germans found that attempts to use the aerodrome were futile and abandoned it. The encircled group continued to be supplied but with great interruptions. The Germans were compelled to unload in the air. A large part of the food and ammunition was either lost in snowdrifts and forests or fell into the hands of guerillas. Every day the German air transport squadrons lost many machines but they persisted in flying with a maniacal stubbornness. Yet, in spite of all this stubbornness, the Germans did not succeed in adding victory to the encircled group. As a result the troops, who were trying to reach important Soviet communications, spent all the winter and spring in a cul-de-sac. Hundreds of transport aeroplanes were lost, and not a victory won.

The experience of this struggle has shown that, deprived of its air transport service, Hitler’s army loses the greater part of its manoeuvrability. Without such a convenient means for landing troops, supplies, fuel, and technical personnel, the Luftwaffe would be unable to effect a speedy shifting of aerodromes and would lose a strong trump card.