VITAL FACTOR

Wairarapa Times-Age, 2 March 1943, Page 4

VITAL FACTOR

IN STRENGTH OF MODERN FLEET THE AIRCRAFT-CARRIER. UNITED STATES EXPANSION PLANS. (By Joseph G. Harrison, in the “Christian Science Monitor.”) There is no indication as yet that the United States Navy has dropped its plans for a huge fleet or aircraft-car-riers because of the sinking of four of the seven ships of this type with which the United States entered the war. In fact, conversation with Navy officials indicates the aircraft-carrier is still considered to be a necessary and vital part of American naval strength. It seems likely, however, that the quick loss of the Lexington, Yorktown, Wasp and one other unidentified carrier (since announced officially to have been the Hornet) will force a change in naval strategy where ships of this type are concerned. Both the Americans and the Japanese have proved beyond a shadow of a doubt that it is a comparatively simple task to ram enough torpedoes into a carrier, whenever it is spotted, to send it foundering to the bottom. At the present time there is too great a discrepancy between the length of time it takes, io build a carrier and the ease with which it can be sunk, not to force a quick change in aircraft-carrier tactics. In discussing the future of the air-craft-carrier, Navy men here declare that it is the Japanese who will be forced to abandon this type of ship, not the Americans. They base this conclusion upon one fundamental point. LIABILITY OR ASSET? ? They contend that a carrier is a liability only when the enemy possesses approximately the same naval air strength as yourself. When this is the case, he is free to go after your ships as you are to attack his. If, however, you' can attain, say, a two-to-one superiority over your enemy in planecarrying ability the situation is entiely different. Under these circumstances you cannot only go after his carriers, but you send into the air a powerful force of fighter planes whose purpose is to keep the enemy’s dive and torpedo bombers from reaching your fleet. These naval officials go on to point out that since the United States has a shipbuilding capacity far in excess of anything possessed by the Japanese, it is apparent that the time will come when this country will be able to meet every enemy carrier thrust with two, three, if not four carriers of our own. The result will be, they insist, that in time the United States Navy will succeed either in sending all Japanese carriers to the bottom or in making it so dangerous for them that they will be of little use to Tckio. Once the enemy’s carrier fleet is disposed of, his other naval units will be exposed to a withering and virtually irresistible assault from the air. While this is obviously an over-sim-plification of the problem, there are persons here who believe that the Pacific has, to a considerable extent, become a war of elimination between United States and Japanese aircraftcarriers and that American constiuction capacity guarantees eventual victory for the United States. TEMPORARY HANDICAP. This does not alter the fact, however, that for the time being the United States Navy is likely to be seriously, although not critically, handicapped by a shortage of carriers. With only three large and possibly one or two small ships of this type left, the Navy will have to be cautious in exposing them to enemy attack. It must be remembered in this connection that carrier-based planes are intended for the protection of the fleet as well as for attack. This United States’ shortage is not destined to last for long. The United States has begun a programme of carrier construction which is destined to give the United States from two to three times as many carriers as all the rest of the world put together, including Great Britain. Four new carriers were recently launched, while the Navy and the Maritime Commission are busy converting a large number of merchant ships into plane-carriers. RANGE OF BOMBERS. One of the most interesting aspects of the American-Japanese carrier race is the fact that whereas United States land-based planes have hit and presumably damaged several enemy ships of this type, so far as is known no Japanese land plane has ever dropped a bomb or torpedo on an American carrier. On several occasions, ViceAdmiral William F. Halsey, commander of the American naval forces in the Solomons, had taken his carriers within easy bombing range of enemy land-based planes but has escaped injury. Fortunately, for this country American land bombers, particularly the four-engine Flying Fortresses and Liberators, are able to fly far enough at sea and to carry heavy enough bomb loads to enable them to supplement the

work of carriers. This, Japanese land bombers, have so far proved unable to do. It would seem to be a reasonable deduction that, while the United States is momentarily greatly in need for sea-borne aircraft, this country can expect a rapid improvement in this condition. The enemy, however, seems unable to anticipate . any comparable additions to its carrier force. Thus, the Japanese may be expected to make as quick and as full use of their existing carrier parity as they can. It is not unreasonable to suppose that such tactics will provide tempting targets for America's heavy bombers.