Wairarapa Times-Age WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1943. OBSCURITY IN THE PACIFIC.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 10 February 1943, Page 2

Wairarapa Times-Age WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1943. OBSCURITY IN THE PACIFIC.

and very wisely, the Allied nations are not allowing specific and detailed information to escape as to the extent to which they are giving priority over the Pacific to the African and European war theatres and to the great campaign that is being waged unceasingly, over wide ocean and other areas, against the U-boats. While it is in no way open to criticism, the reticence thus observed by the Allies creates an atmosphere of obscurity and uncertainty in regard to what is being done, might be done, or ought to be done in the Pacific. Assertions as to the extent to which the war in the Pacific allegedly is being neglected and subordinated appear in themselves at times to be recklessly venturesome and out of touch with -established facts. For instance, only a couple of clays ago, an American newspaper columnist of good standing was quoted as declaring that “the United States is outnumbered in warships and planes in the South Pacific” and that “the enemy is fighting from bases that are more favourably located than those of the Allies.”

Almost simultaneously, it was reported that in fierce air battles over Wau, in New Guinea, the Allies, without themselves losing a single plane, had swept attacking Japanese air formations from the sky, the enemy loss’es in lilttie more than two hours being 26 aircraft destroyed for certain, with 15 others so damaged that they were unlikely to have been able to return to their base at Lae—a base -which has since been heavily pounded.

Now, on top of their heavy defeats in Papua, the Japanese have been cleared out of Guadalcanal. This has to be considered with the fact in mind that Guadalcanal, in American hands, is a wedge driven deep into the arc of defence, or of invasion, which the Japanese have established, and are doing their best to strengthen, from the East Indies across the South Pacific.

While there are expectations of a considerable intensification, at any time, of air and naval fighting in the Solomons, possibly on a major scale, the position to date in the Pacific war as a whole is declared to be that Japan has suffered far heavier losses of both ships and aircraft than her adversaries and that her ability to effect replacements is far inferior to that of the Allied nations.

Grounds thus appear for believing that a good deal of what is being said, particularly in Australia and the United States, about the neglect of the Pacific war by the Allies is exaggerated and unduly pessimistic. It is not for a moment in doubt, of course, that much stronger naval, air and other forces than are meantime, so far as it known, deployed against Japan could be used most advantageously against her if they were available. On the other hand there are some grounds on which'the Allies are bound, from the broadest standpoint, to give at least a very considerable measure of priority to other war theatres than the Pacific.

For example, the prosecution of the North African campaign with the greatest vigour that is practicable is! necessary, not only in order that the Allies may extend their land offensive action as speedily as possible to the European continent, thus seconding the magnificent effort now being made by Russia, but in a definite sense as an important contribution to the defeat of Japan. The opening of the Mediterranean, with all that it would imply in the shortening and improved protection of shipping routes, will greatly assist and facilitate effective Allied action in all theatres of war, not least in the Pacific. There is apparent force in the statement made not long ago by' an American commentator that “the reopening of the Mediterranean is probably a prerequisite to any serious British attempt to reopen the Burma Road.” Allied interests in all theatres' obviously demand that nothing should be allowed to stand in the way of a fully effective prosecution of the campaign against the U-boats or of powerful offensive action in Europe. It has been suggested that a stage may be reached when, with Hie whole of Africa in Allied hands, lhe'Mediterranean open and Allied bombers pounding Germany from all sides, it might be safer to “let Hitler stew in his shortages” than to let Japan go on consolidating her conquests and building up her military power. This is a question of vital, moment, but it could only be answered in 'light of very much fuller and more explicit/ information than, is available save,, perhaps, to those who are responsible for the direction of Allied strategy.