PACIFIC STRATEGY

Wairarapa Times-Age, 28 January 1943, Page 3

PACIFIC STRATEGY

POSITION OF AUSTRALIA MR CURTIN NOT ASKING FOR FAVOURS. BUT FOR BROADER CONCEPTION OF DANGER. <By Telegraph—Press Association—Copyright) SYDNEY, January 27. “Mr Curtin did not plead for special favours, but for a broader conception of the danger which threatens all the democracies. It was the Prime Minister’s frankest appeal for more American help in the war against the Japanese,” says the Sydney "Daily Telegraph” in editorial comment on Mr Curtin’s world-wide broadcast. The newspaper agrees with the clear strategy of the United Nations that Australia is not the best base for a direct attack against Japan, but says there is no doubt that if Australia goes the whole Pacific would be “wide open” to the Japanese and that America would then have to defend her western shores. | “This is the point which Mr Curtin tried to drive home in the bluntest words with which he has so far talked to our ally,” it adds. “Greater American assistance in ships, men and machines is, therefore, essential not only for Australia’s sake but for the sake of the American people as well.” The views expressed by Mr Curtin on the conduct of the war in the Pacific fairly reflect the opinions of the great bulk of Australians. Their hopes that a greater proportion of the United Nations’ strength may be allocated to this theatre have been raised by persistent Washington reports that important announcements , to be made on the direction of global strategy will mean that more attention will be given to the war in the Pacific.

A great champion of closer American attention to the struggle against Japan and for increased Allied striking power in the South Pacific has been the “Christian Science Monitor’s” military writer, Joseph Harsch, author of “Pattern of Conquest,” who has had wide experience of both the war in Europe and the war in the Pacific. Mr Harsch has recently pointed out to Americans the inadequacies of the Pacific War Council, which he contends was ; “instituted by President Roosevelt as a superficial concession to Australia under extreme pressure.” “It was never regarded as more than a sop in official American eyes, and a grudging sop at that,” adds Mr Harsch, “and it has suffered the inevitable fate of a mechanism formed in such circumstances. Its meetings have become less frequent, and the President informs the members of the broad outlines of decisions reached elsewhere.”

Emphasising the desirability of China and the South Pacific democracies (Australia and New Zealand) having a greater voice in decisions on global strategy, Mi’ Harsch points out for the benefit of his American readers that the Pacific Council is not a deliberative or deciding body, but gathers to learn the decisions reached by the American and British chiefs of staffs.