TIDE OF CONJECTURE

Wairarapa Times-Age, 28 September 1942, Page 4

TIDE OF CONJECTURE

REGARDING WAR OUTLOOK IN PACIFIC AMERICAN AND AUSTRALIAN COMMENT. IDEAS OF CORRESPONDENTS. (By Telegraph—Press Association—Copyright) (Received This Day, 12.30 p.m.) SYDNEY, This Day.

While many Australian war commentators continue to express the belief that a Japanese occupation of Port Moresby would be the prelude to immediate invasion attempts against the mainland, the same view is not held by most American correspondents in the South Pacific. Mr Martin Agronsky, a New York “Daily Mirror” correspondent, who has just returned to America from Australia, lists Port Moresby, New Caledonia and New Zealand as the order of conquest in Japan’s South Pacific strategy. Although General MacArthur forestalled a Japanese invasion of Australia, says Mr Agronsky, the enemy believes he can accomplish the same pur- 1 pose by sitting astride the United States-Australia supply line. “Japan has not lost the initiative in this theatre,” warns Mr Agronsky. He says fast cargo vessels, capable of speeds up to 25 knots, has been the secret of Japan’s success. These vessels, which had long been prepared to do war transport work, enabled Japan to move large numbers of men to press home quickly the advantages gained by the first invaders.

Discussing recent successes of the Allied air forces in the South Pacific, Mr Agronsky declares them to have been due to the “superior quality of our flyers and tactics, but we cannot match Japan’s Zero fighters. Our flyers are still waiting for high altitude ships to put them on the same level as the Zeros.”

Although the next six months will be crucial ones in this theatre, with Japan endeavouring as a first move to dislodge the American, occupants of the Lower Solomons (protecting the South Pacific supply line and menacing both Japan’s naval system concentrated at Truk, and her hold on other islands), American commentators here feel that the United Nations are now better prepared to withstand and counter the enemy’s aggressive thrusts than at any previous time in the Pacific war. “A thin margin of sea power” in this theatre has been declared by Admiral Nimitz to lie with the United Nations. Before an invasion of New Zealand would be possible, Japan would have to annihilate the American Fleet —which with the passage of time becomes a fear increasingly remote. Even enemy full-scale moves against nearer objectives—Port Moresby or New Caledonia, must involve a major naval clash which the enemy seems anxious to postpone—although such a battle is regarded here as inevitable.

With the improved 'flow of reinforcements, it is now grossly pessimistic to believe that South Pacific air supremacy—won despite admitted superior features of the Japanese Zerocan be wrested from the Allies unless Japan is prepared to throw in aircraft without regard for losses. Renewed Japanese efforts in this theatre —which are admitted by Tokio to be intended to check the increasing aggressiveness of the United Nations —present grave dangers to Australia and New Zealand, but they also present opportunities for coming to grips with the enemy under favourable terms. Moderate Australian opinion is a reflection of this view. It is epitomised by the Sydney “Herald's” correspondent, who writes: “It is too soon to say that the tide has turned, but last week’s developments, both in the Solomons and in New Guinea, have certainly not led to any further deterioration in the Allied position. There can be no wider strategical security until the Japanese movement south is put into reverse, and until the nuclear base of Rabaul is reduced. For the present, each phase in the battle for the islands must be viewed as an element in a much wider struggle, with the most dangerous days still ahead.”