TRAGIC LOSS

Wairarapa Times-Age, 21 September 1942, Page 4

TRAGIC LOSS

FALL OF SINGAPORE STRIKING ANALYSIS. SHARP LESSONS LEARNED. Seven months have gone since Australia's Bth Division was overwhelmed by the Japanese on Singapore Island, writes Keith Murdoch in the “Melbourne Herald.” Late in the afternoon of February 15, the Japanese having de, manded that the Commandcr-m-Chici in person should appear with the white [lag. General Percival went across .<> the Japanese lines and signed the capitulation. The terms were harsh. All equipment was to be handed over in good order. Requests for alleviation wore roughly refused, but the British were allowed to keep 1000 soldiers aimed to restore order in the broken city. So ended the greatest surrender m British history, and the most _hit.er tragedy that has come into the life ol Australia. Wc must study and constantly remember all that happened first, because of the sharp lessons that must most diligently be applied; and. secondly, because of the 15,000 Australian men now eating out their hearts in Malayan prison camps or slaving in the work gangs of Indo-China.

AIR MACHINES OUTCLASSED.

When the last British troops crossed the solid bluestone Causeway from Johore on the island of Singapore, demolition gangs were blowing up the naval base, the vast oil tanks were burning, and the last aeroplanes were taking off for Sumatran aerodromes. Not that we had ever had much to put against the Japanese in the air. We had done our best, R.A.F. and R.A.A.F., and the Dutch, with Hudsons, Brewster Buffaloes, Wiraways, Wildebeestes and other outclassed machines, and in the last weeks had tried to use 50 Hurricanes that came in crates without pilots, and a few more Hurricanes that arrived late; but the Japanese had more, faster and better machines. From now to the end, our aerodromes were under Japanese shellfire, and were, therefore, useless. Whatever support the troops could get from the air—and it became negligible—came from aerodromes far away in the Dutch possessions.

THE ARMY IN RETREAT.

Nearly all the army had been retreating—two Indian divisions, the 9th and 11th each with about one-fourth white troops, had been on the move for eight weeks, and had covered 6CO miles ol country. The two Australian brigades, the 22nd and 27th, had come from northern Johore. In the fighting on the Muar River they had lost some 300 killed, and the -19th and 29th battalions, fighting desperately* and with high elan, had been badly cut up. Our men were well equipped and m good order, and they were met by strong reinforcements. These had been hastily collected from the A.I.F. camps in Australia. Why the island passed so quickly into Japanese hands is explicable only by researches into the intricate subjects of morale, tactics and leadership.

DISPOSITION OF TROOPS.

There were fully 90,000 British troops to give battle; stores and munitions were ample; yet', from the first, the garrison had few chances and, except for some sections of officers wno maintain to this day that, if tne Australians had held on the north-west-ern beaches, we would still have tne island, the feeling of hopelessness seems to have been general. In a percentage of the troops it was so close to the crust of morale that it soon broke through into demoralisation. General Gordon Bennett was given the western side of the island, the Indians and some British troops were given the eastern side, , and the local regiments, a Gordon Highland battalion and some naval ratings held the southern seafront. Gordon Bennett had his reinforced brigades, the fresh 44th Indian brigade, and some English and Scottish troops.

VERY LITTLE PREPARATION

Very little preparation had been made on this north-western 17-mile front on one seven-mile scetion on which the Japanese finally descended. It was mostly mangrove swamp, fringing the rubber plantations, and the garrison command had believed it to be impassable. Orders were given for booms to be placed across the rivers, mines to be laid, and various demolitions and preparations, but they would have taken four or five weeks to carry out. All that we could do was to run out wire around strong posts dug in the shallow soil, and prepare searchlights and machine-gun positions. We had plenty of artillery, but nowhere did we have a prepared defensive line. On the night of February 5, Australian patrols crossed the Straits and spent 36 hours on the Japanese side. They reported that the Japanese strength appeared to be about two brigades, and that no barges or small ships were observed.

HAMMERED BY SHELL & BOMB. But on Sunday, the 7th, the bombardment of Australian positions became intense; by nightfall, it was like drumfire. How the Japanese could have brought up guns and shells for such an effort must be left unanswered, but General Bennett was convinced that they used the abandoned artillery of our own forces, and they seemed to have many light trench mortars made specially with sufficient range for the crossing of the Straits. By the time the Japanese soldiers set out for the island beaches in the early part of the night of February 78, our men had been hammered by shell and bomb, and the reply from our guns had been feeble. The Japanese with undisturbed aerial reconnaissance had pinpointed our positions —a captured map showed every road and headquarters position exactly marked.

STRAIGHT THROUGH AUSTRALIAN

POSTS.

But we had not had heavy casualties, nor did we have thorn in suosequeiit fighting. I do not believe a thousand of our men were killed througnout the whole of the Malayan fighting —it may not have been more than 600. We were overwhelmed m our forward positions, particularly where the 19th Battalion with its 60 per cent of new reinforcements stood; our reserves failed to make effective counter-at-tacks, or even effective stands; and a good many of our men appeared far behind our lines, unnerved’ and not knowing where to go. The Japanese came straight through the middle of the Australian positions and pursued a direct line for the city of Singapore, 12 miles away. /

RAPID ENEMY PROGRESS.

The mangrove swamps they knew all about—they had tracks through some, they came up the many estuaries of the unblocked rivers, and found their way individually or in threes and tours to meeting places beyond our troops. Although they could not have used three divisions in the whole battle, they were on the edge of the city within five days, and had its watei supply, its food and, indeed, its whole

physical existence in their grasp. Singapore was lost in the first day’s fighting; by the fifth day its agony was intense. On the sixth day the sectional commanders advised that further resistance was useless, and on the eighth day General Percival decided that all must surrender.

LIGHTLY HELD LINES.

It has been often asked how could 90,000 British troops be overcome so quickly, and with such relatively slight loss in casualties. The answer lies in the speed with which the Japanese passed in substantial numbers through lightly held lines, and the ineffectiveness of the use of reserves.

Probably less than one-third of the British forces were, at that stage of the campaign, front-line troops. The hospitals were full—there were more than 2500 Australians in hospital—the crack British rgiments, Argyles, Loyals, Leicesters, and so forth, had been reduced by as much as 80 per cent, and the Indian troops, which had fought fiercely early in the campaign, had not much fight left in them. A final attempt at counter-attack on the night of the 11th ended with the attackers well behind the start line. History will decide whether the island of Singapore could have sustained a siege. Its defences were planned to do so. but they did not take account of the developments in the air, and they had no provision against attack from, the mainland.

Why. during months of waiting, preparations were not made to defend the Straits of Johore remains a mystery. It was in keeping with the strange malady of Malaya that led to so much miscalculation, so much fumbling, so much brave and ineffective spilling ol blood. RETREAT AFTER RETREAT. Our own part was marred by a constant jarring and belittlement of our British and Indian comrades, by inadequate discipline, and. finally, by . the percentage of weak and undisciplined soldiers breaking down under the strain of battle. The conditions of the last battle were indeed dispiriting. There had been retreat after retreat, when retreat had been declared impossible. Vast demolitions, destruction of the sea base, tales of departing officers, all had their effect upon tired and disillusioned men. and the shelling and bombing of their poor positions had increased every hour. J Our men were not veterans, the reinforcements were the hasty combings of the depots, and the training was inadequate.

INDISCIPLINE OF MINORITY, The debilitating effect of the climate, tropical ailments, malaria, the jungle, the Malayan and Chinese people, and even the long and unnecessary delays in letters from home, all added to the. troubles. , n „„ But the worst trouble we weie under was the indiscipline of small elements. Too long has it been a dieted tradition of the last war that indiscipline marked the fi rs L 1b who knew the stern battle discipline of the earlier soldiers know how mis"JnSof the Australian force was magnificent. They had pie pared themselves for their soldier tasks until they were like steel foi such men we can never be too o iaie ful.