HOPES & FEARS

Wairarapa Times-Age, 24 August 1942, Page 3

HOPES & FEARS

THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA HIGH COMMAND UNEASY. PROSPECTS OF RUSSIAN WINTER OFFENSIVE. (By Telegraph—Press Association—Copyright) LONDON, August 22. When questioned with reference to the opening of a second front in Europe, a Wilhelmstrasse military spokesman today admitted that it was possible “provided it is attempted with sufficient men and equipment.” The spokesman, who is quoted by “The Times” correspondent on the German frontier, added that failure to open a second front would substantially improve the Axis’ prospects for next spring if, as was hoped, the Russian campaign was concluded decisively by the end of September at the latest.-' Asked to define what he meant by “decisively,” the spokesman said that the German leaders now realised the impossibility of occupying the whole of Russia, hence the High Command must sooner or later choose a line to mark the extremity of the advance that could easily be held against Russian counter-attacks and behind which the economic exploitation of occupied Russia could proceed undisturbed. Little, however, would be gained if the Russians succeeded in withdrawing with their armies intact behind the Volga, nor would the German purpose be achieved unless the Russian military equipment was destroyed and resuscitation was prevented by the occupation or paralysis of the supply routes through Persia, Murmansk, and Archangel. "> “The Times” correspondent says: “If the Russians are not smashed and isolated they would, as last year, organise a winter offensive, thus keeping in the field several million Germans, whose release during the winter for munitions making would be vital if another offensive were to be undertaken next spring. In view of the approach of winter, Marshal Timoshenko’s continual retreats and delaying actions are causing the German High Command great uneasiness. The German High Command prefers great pitched battles, making possible the destruction of the Russian Army. If the Russians were reduced to impotence before the end of September the winter interval would be employed in preparation for an invasion of England in the spring of 1943. “Wide differences of opinion exist between German military experts about the feasibility of this plan, many being sceptical about its success unless Japan is induced to invade Siberia. Japan thus far has not undertaken to comply with the German wishes and she is less disposed to do so after the attack on the Solomon Islands.”