Wairarapa Times-Age WEDNESDAY, JULY 29, 1942. RUSSIA IN DANGER.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 29 July 1942, Page 2

Wairarapa Times-Age WEDNESDAY, JULY 29, 1942. RUSSIA IN DANGER.

——.<>_ — TN their visible effect, the fall of Rostov and ol' Novo Clierkassk, together with the progress the Germans have made in establishing bridgeheads at several vital points on the lower course of the River Don, suggest plainly that- the armies of the Soviet Union, are threatened with great and damaging defeat a defeat which obviously would prejudice heavily the total cause of the United Nations. At a moderate estimate, Russia is at present engaging some two-thirds of Germany’s military strength, as well as armies placed at the disposal of the leading Axis Power by her satellites and partners. The release from Russia of any large part of the Axis land and air forces now employed there obviously might be expected to alter greatly and gravely the position and outlook in other theatres of war. In the extent to which the campaign in South Russia has visibly taken shape, this release manifestly is threatened. If, that is to say, the Germans are able to build progressively on the measure of success they have meantime gained—-though they have not gained it without paying a terrible price in lives and material—-a great weakening and at least temporary disablement of Russia must be expected. The Russian, armies are no longer in a position, as they were last year, to continue fighting battles of retreat while maintaining intact their essential organisation and lines of communication. Last year the* Germans reached Rostov and held it for a brief period before being driven back by a Russian counteroffensive, but their advance on that occasion was much less formidable than the one in which they are now engaged. The enemy last year reached Rostov and the Don on a narrow front and they were stopped and held well to the westward of the great elbow of the Don, to the north and east of Rostov, which they have now largely occupied, and in some parts ot which they have crossed the river. The line of the Don is the last effective barrier covering vital, road, rail, river and oil pipeline communications linking the Caucasus with the rest of Russia. Unless the present course of the war in South Russia can be reversed, the enemy is in a fair way to drive from the Don to the Volga and the Caspian Sea, separating the Russian southern armies from those in the centre and north and cutting all their main lines of communication. The bearing of this deevlopment, should it take shape, on prospects in the Middle East and over a wider field evidently would be very serious from the standpoint of the United Nations. Some reasons appear for doubting, however, whether the Germans are making as assured headway in their Eastern campaign as the present course of events on the Lower Don in itself would suggest. Within the last month or two, Stalin and other Soviet leaders have declared with every appearance of confidence that the German armies are now weaker and the Russian armies stronger than they were last year. Yet it has been stated over and over again that in the Don basin the Russians have been and are withstanding enemy forces very much superior numerically. Unless Stalin and his colleagues were indulging in empty boasts—a practice to which they are not prone—in the declarations referred to, it would therefore appear that Russia must be holding considerable forces in reserve. Events in the near future may be expected to show whether these reserves do or do not exist. Apparently, however, the Germans are counting upon a safe stalemate along by far the greater part of the front of 2,000 miles in Russia, or upon their ability to repel any attack the Russians may launch. Should these assumptions prove to be unfounded, the German eastern armies, including those now thrusting so dangerously into Southern Russia, might find that their own position had become precarious.' % Grave and critical as the immediate outlook in Russia, plainly is, wide possibilities remain open. These do not all point one way. It may suit Japap’s own purposes, for example, to attack Russia when the German onslaught is developing its maximum intensity. On the other hand, if Russia is holding forces in reserve for a counter-offensive, she may be expected to co-ordinate her action with any taken by her Allies, in Western Europe or elsewhere, against the common enemy.